MAP
of the
BRITISH COLONIES
and the
UNITED STATES &c.
of
NORTH AMERICA
Engraved for Andersons British America
J. Lodge sculp
HUDSONS BAY
JAMES'S BAY
GULF OF MEXICO
BAY OF CAMPECHE
NEW MEXICO
KENTUCKY
VIRGINIA
N. CAROLINA
S. CAROLINA
GEORGIA
WEST FLORIDA
EAST FLORIDA
Illinois
Bermuda
Halifax
BOSTON
PHILADELPHIA
Charles Town
Havana
Jamaica
Porto Rico
Leeward I.

Sir Jaqu Royal 1827

CANADA:

OR,

A VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE

OF THE

BRITISH AMERICAN COLONIES;

SHEWING

Their Extensive and Improveable Resources

AND POINTING OUT

THE GREAT AND UNPRECEDENTED ADVANTAGES

WHICH HAVE BEEN ALLOWED

To the Americans over our own Colonists;

TOGETHER WITH

THE GREAT SACRIFICES WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE

BY OUR

LATE COMMERCIAL REGULATIONS

OF THE

COMMERCE AND CARRYING-TRADE

OF

GREAT BRITAIN

506

TO THE

United States:

ALSO EXHIBITING

THE POINTS NECESSARY TO BE KEPT IN VIEW

FOR THE

FUTURE ENCOURAGEMENT OF BRITISH SHIPPING

AND FOR

THE PROTECTION AND SUPPORT

OF THE

COMMERCIAL INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN

AND HER

NORTH-AMERICAN COLONIES:

ADDRESSED TO

THE RIGHT HON. GEORGE ROSE,

&c. &c. &c.

BY DAVID ANDERSON.

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PREFACE.

THE author's principal motives for laying the following pages before the public is, to shew the importance of the Canadas, in order to draw attention to their present perilous situation, with a view to adequate measures being taken for their defence; and to point out the errors by which the interests both of the British ship-owners and North-American colonists have been sacrificed to the Americans, that the like mistakes may be guarded against, in any negotiations with the American government.

From several years residence in these colonies, and his experience in their commercial

concerns, and from the information he has collected from various channels, but particularly the materials he had collected for a Statistical Account of Canada, which he has nearly ready for publication, he flatters himself he has been enabled to communicate some very useful information respecting their improveable resources.

For much information which the author has received, he has particularly to acknowledge his obligations to Nathaniel Atcheson, Esq. Secretary to the Committee of Ship-owners for the Port of London, by whom he has been favoured with some very important documents respecting the trade of our North-American possessions.

However sensible he is that what he now submits to the public falls short of what the subjects treated of are deserving, the author flatters himself that the facts he has stated, from a variety of authentic documents, together with his own observations, will shew the importance of those colonies beyond any thing that has hitherto appeared before the public.

TO THE

INHABITANTS

OF

BRITISH NORTH AMERICA,

AND THE

BRITISH SHIP-OWNERS.

ALTHOUGH the author has drawn up the following facts and observations with a view, at this critical moment, to advocate the cause of British North America and British ship-owners, whose interests and prosperity are inseparable, he is nevertheless sensible of his inadequacy to perform the undertaking in a manner suitable either to the importance of the subject or the deserving of his transatlantic fellow subjects.

From several years residence in the Canadas he had an opportunity of duly appreciating the vast and improveable resources of those colonies; impressed with which, and a warm regard and

attachment to the interests of their loyal inhabitants, he has been induced, however insufficient his abilities, to endeavour to draw attention to these important provinces; and, in the course of this work, the capabilities and interests of all the British North-American colonies, as connected with the interests of the British ship-owners, are particularly brought into view. The sacrifices heretofore made to the Americans, and the prospect of immediate negotiation between the British and American governments, appear to him to render the present a period peculiarly fitted for discussing the interests of both; and, he flatters himself that this statement may not be altogether unproductive of advantage to their cause. To further this object, he ventures to suggest, that the British ship-owners and North-American colonists should come forward and lay before the British parliament a full developement of the resources of those settlements, that their important interests may be duly appreciated and protected in any future negotiations or commercial arrangements with the United States.

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

GEORGE ROSE,

Treasurer of the Navy,

&c. &c. &c.

SIR,

PARTICIPATING in the general esteem in which your unremitting attention to the interests of the commerce of this country, particularly of the British shipping, is held by all commercial men, I have presumed to offer the following pages to your notice, trusting that the importance of the topics, which constitute the subjects of inquiry, and the observations they contain, will be accepted as a satisfactory apology. It is almost superfluous to add, that the value, the danger, and the neglected state of our North-American colonies, at the present juncture, are matters of the deepest interest

to the British nation, and call most urgently for the protection which your estimation and ability enable you to afford.

From the facts stated, it is obvious, that, of all our colonies, those in North America are by far the most valuable to this country; and, it is equally notorious, that, in the most imminent danger, they have been left comparatively unprotected. Neither the matchless value of their territorial properties, — the unparalleled loyalty and patriotism of their inhabitants, — nor the vast and unexampled improvement they have lately made in British commerce, has been adequately appreciated; but, on the contrary, and whilst the inhabitants of Europe, almost with one voice, extol our liberality, applaud our courage and magnanimity, and hail us as their protectors and delivers, these, the most valuable, the most improveable of all our colonies have been left, in a considerable degree, to their own efforts, against a most inveterate enemy.

That our North-American possessions are, in point of true national advantage, in the

most eminent degree entitled to our consideration, will, I trust, be shewn, by the following pages, in the most striking view. For, as to all the properties which render colonies valuable to a mother-country, they, of all our colonial establishments, rank the highest: in point of present value they are of the first magnitude; and, as to growing importance, both as respects our commercial prosperity and maritime power, they stand unparalleled.

The two grand motives for the acquisition and protection of colonies are; first, the increase of our merchant-shipping, for the supply of our navy with men; and, secondly, the vending of our manufactures.

With respect to the support of our shipping, the amount of the tonnage of British ships annually cleared out to foreign parts, the whale-fisheries excepted, upon an average of the last ten years, was 801,408 tons, upwards of one-third of which was in the trade with our American colonies,* whilst the shipping em-

* See No. 17, in the Appendix.

ployed in the trade with China and the whole of our East-Indian possessions form only about a twentieth part.

The amount of the earnings of British ships in the whole of our imports from foreign ports, upon an average, for the same period, was only about £7,212,672;* yet, such has been the late rapid increase of the trade of our American provinces, that, previous to the commencement of actual hostilities with the United States, two millions and a half arose from our intercourse with these valuable settlements.†

As a market for British and colonial produce and manufactures they have lately afforded a demand for upwards of two millions and an half for their own consumption, besides about £3,000,000 for the supply of the United States, in defiance of her prohibitory laws. Thus, at a period when our merchants and manufacturers were suffering the greatest distress, these colonies furnished a demand for upwards of five millions sterling of British

* See No. 12, in the Appendix. † See No. 8, ibid.

manufactures and colonial produce. From the improvement of their own trade, and, by the access they opened for our commerce through the strongest bulwark of American prohibition, they have, in the short space of four years, (1806 to 1810,) added upwards of four millions to the annual demand for our manufactures, &c. whereas, the whole demand for China and our East-Indian possessions, through the East-India Company has not amounted to more than about £1,200,000, without any probability of increase.

Indeed, the late increase of the commercial importance of these colonies has been without parallel. At the conclusion of the American war, their demand for British manufactures and colonial produce was only £379,411, and 10,317 tons of British shipping were all that annually cleared out from their ports with exported produce; but, in 1806, notwithstanding their rights and privileges as British colonies were almost completely sacrificed to America, this demand was increased from £379,411 to £1,381,718, and the shipping from 10,317

to 124,247 tons. Further, when Buonaparte and Mr. Jefferson destroyed the operation of our own impolitic and destructive laws and regulations, by which we had, in relation to these colonies, sacrificed our commercial and shipping interest, they, in four years, increased their imports of British manufactures and colonial produce from £1,381,718 to upwards of £2,500,000, and advanced the employment afforded British ships from 124,247 to 309,394 tons.

In this short period of four years interval in the operation of the commercial regulations, which had so cramped the natural growth of the prosperity of these provinces, the exports of timber increased from 95,975 to 311,114 loads, being an increase of 215,135, evincing, in fact, a capability of increase to almost any extent. This increase is nearly double the amount of the demand of our West-Indian settlements for lumber; and, considering the many parliamentary inquiries which have taken place upon the capabilities of our North-American colonies in this re-

spect, it is a subject of regret that the legislature should have been so far misled or mistaken upon a subject of such great national importance. For, notwithstanding all the inquiries which took place, the Americans were still allowed to supply almost the entire demand of our West-Indian settlements for this article.

As to the consideration of the supplies our American colonies are capable of affording, the facts I have stated make it evident, that they have proved their adequacy to supply both the mother-country and her other colonies. This is a fact of the greatest national importance, in as much as shipping is indispensable to our safety and independence as a nation. To secure the carriage of the timber we import, from the immense tonnage employed therein, is unquestionably an object of the first importance to the shipping interest.

The magnitude of the augmentation, which might be made to the employment of British ships, may be estimated by comparing the amount of foreign tonnage annually employed

MAHARAJA SERFOGI'S SARA

in importing lumber into the mother-country and her colonies, with the amount of the tonnage of British shipping employed, in what is called the carrying-trade, which I designate the importing of goods for re-exportation, and carrying goods from one foreign port to another. Upon making this comparison, it will be found that the tonnage employed in the carrying-trade consists of comparatively the smallest amount; and, if we except that part derived from our own colonies, the tonnage employed in the carrying-trade would be found to be hardly deserving consideration.

But, however desirable an object it may be to secure the carriage of this important article, it is what we cannot effectually accomplish, except the timber is furnished by our own colonies. For that which we import from foreign countries must, inevitably, be carried almost entirely by the ships of the countries exporting it, because of the enormous advantage that foreigners have over us in the cost of their ships and in the expense of navigating them, which may be very correctly estimated, by the

rule laid down for that purpose in No. 5, in the Appendix, and, in general, will be found to amount to from 30*s.* to 50*s.* per ton upon a six months' voyage. This disadvantage could only be obviated by an adequate countervailing duty. But, to raise our countervailing duty at once, from *seven-pence half-penny per ton* to 30*s.* or 50*s.* *per ton*, might be attended with some difficulty. For, although no delicacy might be necessary with regard to America, upon this score, she having, instead of 50*s.* charged at the rate of at least £3 against us, yet, with respect to those governments that have not hitherto charged high countervailing duties against us, it might be attended with some inconvenience.

This important purpose is, therefore, only to be effected by obtaining the timber from our own colonies: and the resources of our American colonies being commensurate to this demand, we have it in our power, in one single department of the direct trade with our colonies, to add to the employment of British shipping an amount of tonnage exceed-

ing that of the greatest extent of our present carrying-trade, notwithstanding its vast variety and extended scale.

In respect to foreign timber, therefore, under existing circumstances, the interests of this country,—the custom of other nations,—and the example of our ancestors, require that it should either be prohibited or charged with adequate protecting duties in favour of our own colonies. In urging this measure, it may be observed, that foreign governments, although they might have a right to remonstrate concerning the partial operation of such laws as we might enact for prohibiting or rendering foreign produce liable to high protecting duties in favour of our own colonies, yet, in point of principle, they have no right to bring them at all into discussion. To be "put upon a footing with the most favoured nations" is all they can reasonably insist upon.

The *criterion* for estimating this protecting duty is, the difference between the freight and other expenses incurred in importing timber from our own colonies and the freight

and expense incurred in importing it from foreign countries, to which an addition should be made to secure a preponderance in favour of our own colonies. As we cannot, consistently with equity and justice, charge the timber of different countries at different rates of duties, but must charge the same amount upon all foreign timber indiscriminately, it is, therefore, necessary to compare the amount of expense on all the foreign timber imported into this country, and take the expense upon that imported at the cheapest rate, as a maximum for ascertaining the amount of the protecting duty.

Suppose, for instance, that the freight and other expense upon timber imported from the following countries, to be—from the British colonies in North America, £6; from the United States, £6; from Russia, £2 : 15; and from Prussia, £2 : 10; the difference between the expense of importing timber from Prussia and from our colonies in America, the one being £2 : 10 and the other £6, is £3 : 10; and, suppose 5*s.* per load added, to give a preponderance in fa-

vour of our own colonies, £3 : 15 per load is therefore the protecting duty which ought to be charged upon all foreign timber indiscriminately.

These remarks concerning timber may, perhaps, be considered rather prolix. Upon considering, however, that, with respect to the expense of importation, the gross amount of the present duty charged upon foreign timber is not even sufficient to put our own American colonies upon an equality with the countries upon the Baltic, &c.;—that part of this duty is only a war-tax, to cease in six months after a peace;—and, that it is even probable that foreign courts may be at this very moment using their influence to have this duty reduced, whilst our colonists and ship-owners may remain in ignorance of what is going on, till they hear their fate in these interests for years to come officially announced;—upon considering and reflecting upon these circumstances, it is conceived not irrelevant, but, on the contrary, requisite that we should enter more minutely into detail upon a subject, which, of all others,

it must be admitted, is of the very first magnitude to the British shipping-interest.

The annual demand of our West-Indian settlements for lumber is about - 147,275 tons

For agricultural produce about	72,499
For fish about - - - - - - - - - -	32,603
This	252,377 tons*

is sufficient to have loaded about 210,315 register tons.† Upon an average of three years, previous to the interruption of our commercial intercourse with the United States, the Americans furnished of this demand the enormous proportion of 211,043 tons, with which they must have cleared out at least 175,870 register tons of shipping. By attending to the facts which I shall state, it will be found that our own colonies were capable of furnishing these articles, in sufficient abundance, for the supply of our

* See No. 6, in the Appendix.

† Many of the vessels used in supplying the West Indies with American produce are small sharp fast-sailing vessels, which will scarcely carry tons measurement equal to their register tons.

West-Indian settlements; and, consequently, this privilege granted to the Americans was altogether unnecessary. The adequacy of our American provinces to furnish agricultural produce in sufficient abundance for the supply of our West-Indian settlements, may, compared with their resources in other produce, perhaps, be considered the most questionable. The causes, however, which I have assigned, for hitherto preventing the improvement of their resources in this respect, and the means which would prove effectual in improving these capabilities, so as to produce supplies adequate to all our demands, will, I trust, be found quite satisfactory upon these important points. Indeed, the interests of the nation renders it the imperious duty of his Majesty's ministers, on entering into any negotiations or commercial arrangements with the American government, adequately to inform themselves respecting the great and improvable resources of our North-American provinces, and detect the mistaken policy of our late commercial regulations, by which they were sacrificed to

the United States, so as to avoid similar errors.

Amongst the sacrifices made to the Americans, the principal are to be found *in the opening of the ports of our colonies to their ships,—in the advantages allowed them in the countervailing duties charged by them and us respectively,*—and *in the admission of their produce into this country, at lower duties than those charged upon the produce of other foreign nations.* In these, the sacrifice of British shipping, and the injury done to British merchants and British manufacturers, and our North-American colonists, are immense.

Nothing, surely, could have been more impolitic than to have allowed them to have supplied our colonies with masts, spars, square timber, deals, or staves, or any other description of lumber, considering our own American colonies are evidently capable of supplying even double the demand, both of the mother-country and her colonies; yet they were allowed and even encouraged to supply our colonies in every part of the world with these bulky articles.

Could the amount of the American tonnage employed in their trade to our colonies in Europe, in Africa, and in the East Indies, be correctly ascertained, and adding the amount of the tonnage of the lumber they imported into this country to the 175,870 tons cleared out annually in their trade with our West-Indian colonies, the amount would be found to be enormous. There is no doubt but that the amount of tonnage, which they employed in these direct spoliations upon British commerce, bore a very large proportion to the whole amount of tonnage we employed in foreign trade.

The injuries we sustained, by the trade which the Americans were allowed to carry on with our colonies, was, however, not merely confined to our shipping interest. Their intercourse with our West-Indian possessions has always been attended with smuggling: they imported East-Indian and Chinese produce and manufactures largely into these settlements; and smuggled out sugars in return.

In their trade with our East-Indian possessions, too, they could import East-Indian and

Chinese produce and manufactures in such quantities, and at, comparatively, such low prices as to enable them almost entirely to supply our West-Indian and North-American colonies. It follows, from their direct trade with the East Indies, that they can import India goods into the United States at a much lower rate than that at which the like articles could be imported from London through our East-India Company; consequently, vast importations were made for their own consumption, which superseded a proportionate consumption of British manufactures.

The duty charged, by the East-India Company, upon the American trade with our East-Indian possessions has been, by some, held forth as an equivalent for this privilege. This is an argument too absurd to merit notice. But, as it has been advanced in support of the measure, even by some of our legislators, it may, therefore, be observed, concerning its absurdity, that it is no more reasonable than it would be to exclude British ships from the port of London and

endeavour to render the measure palatable by urging the imposition of a duty. The trade must pay the duty, and whenever it or any other trade ceases to afford a profit, after paying duties and other expenses to which it is liable, it will, indeed it must, be discontinued. The British government, therefore, instead of having opened the ports of our Asiatic settlements to the Americans, ought rather to have opened them to a general trade with the British islands and strictly to have observed the law which prohibited foreigners from any participation in the trade of our colonies. For it is to these wise laws, which were held sacred by our ancestors, that we are indebted for ships, colonies, and commerce.

The advantages allowed the Americans in the countervailing duties charged by them and us, respectively, will be found to have been enormous. These respective duties were, no doubt, about equal in point of per centage upon the other duties charged: the Americans and us charged 10 per cent. respectively; but they

differed widely, however, with respect to real amount,—no less indeed than *three thousand three hundred per cent.* against the British ship-owners,—our countervailing duty being about 22*d.* per ton, and that of the Americans £3 per ton.

The admission of United-States produce at a lower rate of duties than was charged upon the produce of other foreign nations was equally unjust towards other foreign nations and our own colonists, as it was injurious to our shipping interest. The United States gave us no advantage over other foreigners; but, on the contrary, singled us out for many insults and disadvantages. Then, surely it was ungracious to other foreign nations to grant her this peculiar privilege. Our North-American colonists, being excluded any participation in almost any other trade than that of the mother-country, have an undoubted right to look for a reciprocal advantage in the exclusive privilege of supplying her with all articles, of which they could furnish her with sufficient supplies, (such as lumber, fish, &c.) and for adequate encouragement in protecting duties upon those articles

of foreign produce, of which she could only furnish partial supplies.

Now is the time to remedy all those evils which existed in our commercial regulations with America. And, indeed, it is to be hoped, that his Majesty's ministers will not put the United States only "upon a footing with the most favoured nations;" but that, in their commercial arrangements with all foreign nations, they will duly appreciate and protect the vast resources of these colonies.

No news ever reached Canada, that gave more sincere joy, than the remark, which you made in the House of Commons, that the Americans should be "put upon a footing with the most favoured nations." They understood your meaning to be, that the United-States produce was to be rendered liable to the same rate of duties as that of other foreign nations; and I sincerely hope, for the sake of British commerce, the protection of the British shipping-interest, and the prosperity of our colonies, that their hopes will not be disappointed.

The public are already under many obligations to you, for your zealous and vigilant attentions to the general concerns of the commercial world, by which the ship-owners have particularly benefitted: and I hope the following pages will prove, that in no department of British commerce could you more essentially serve the commercial and shipping interests of the country than by your consideration of those affairs which relate to or affect the interests of our North-American colonies.

I have the honour to be,

with sentiments of the

greatest respect and esteem,

SIR,

Your most obedient and

very humble servant,

DAVID ANDERSON.

London,

March 10, 1814.

VALUE AND IMPORTANCE

OF THE

BRITISH COLONIES

IN

NORTH AMERICA.

CHAP. I.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE BRITISH NORTH-AMERICAN PROVINCES, SHIPPING AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, ETC.

THE critical situation in which our colonies in North America have been placed by the present war with the United States; the neglected state of our shipping interest; the precarious dependence, to which our West-Indian colonists have, for several years past, been often reduced, for articles indispensably necessary to their very existence; are subjects,

which the circumstances that mark the present period render peculiarly interesting.

Relating to these important points, the commercial connection which existed, and the intercourse which has been maintained, between the United States and our American continental colonies, our West-Indian colonies, and this country, previous to the late hostile steps resorted to by the Americans, are topics, the investigation and discussion of which are not only of the greatest importance to the British nation collectively, but to our ship-owners in particular, and therefore constitute matter of the most serious consideration for the legislator.

The marking features which constitute the essential character of our North-American colonies necessarily claim, in the outset, our most particular attention. Their vast extent of coast; their fisheries; their forests; their relative situation with respect to the United States; their population; the state of agriculture and quality of the soil; their exports and imports; all these constitute collectively and individually, subjects of most interesting consequence, as well during the continuance of a war with America, as with reference to any

treaty which might be in contemplation for the termination of the present hostilities: more especially, as a well-directed line of policy towards these valuable possessions would undoubtedly call into action their numerous and hitherto much-neglected capabilities, and thereby promote the various interests involved in the important subjects above mentioned.

Perhaps to the statesman, who has an eye to our domestic policy, most of the general and some of the particular points of local information respecting these provinces may be familiar; but, as far as relates to the shipping-interest, and the various commercial connections which these general points of policy involve, there are so many minute details regarding both the geographical and statistical character of these provinces,—so many local peculiarities familiar to those only who have experienced the practical result of the former, and had an opportunity of examining the properties of the latter, that communications upon such topics, from persons adequately informed, may not only be found useful to the merchant and ship-owner, but to the statesman, either in vigorously prosecuting the war, or in negociating or ar-

ranging a pacific or commercial treaty, the most accurate information upon such points is absolutely indispensable.

With regard to our shipping interest, for example, the statesman may be aware of the established custom and sound policy of imposing a countervailing duty in favour of our own ships, in order, as far as possible, to secure the carriage of the raw material which we import; but, without correct information, and a strict attention to many minute circumstances, which can only be thoroughly known to and correctly communicated by ship-owners, or others intimately acquainted with the shipping-interest, he may commit the most egregious mistakes. For, in the absence of such minute information, or from not properly discriminating between interested communications and the fair statements of those who are unbiased by any secondary considerations, instead of securing (as he may have imagined) our ship-owners interest in the carriage of such commodities, he may have actually agreed to a preference given to the ships of foreign nations.—He may, in the arrangement of commercial treaties with other powers, have sacri-

ficed the interest of our ship-owners, as heretofore, by contenting himself, upon the one hand, with a countervailing duty of *thirteen pence* per ton, or the *hundredth part of the freight*, in favour of our own ships, (See No. 3, in the Appendix); and, upon the other hand, by agreeing to a countervailing duty of £3 per ton, in favour of the ships of foreign nations, (See No. 4.)—He may be possessed of a large share of general information regarding our American provinces; but, in order that he may be enabled duly to appreciate, protect, and encourage, the improvement of the valuable properties of these colonies in any negotiations concerning them, it is absolutely necessary that he should know the existence of many minute and important circumstances, of which it is evident our legislators have been hitherto ignorant. For instance, he may view the supplying of our West-Indian islands with American produce from our own colonies, as a very desirable object; and may, therefore, feel inclined to encourage it; but he should also know, that even after the question, *whether or not our American provinces could supply our West-Indian islands*

with flour, lumber, &c. had been frequently discussed in the British parliament, that flour still continued to be carried from the *banks of the St. Laurence* to the ports of the United States, to be there shipped in American vessels for *these very islands*; and that lumber still continued to lie rotting in the ports of our provinces, for want of a market, whilst these islands continued to be supplied with the above articles from the United States; otherwise, how could he guard and secure our shipping and commercial interests in legislating or negotiating concerning them?—He must know, as a maxim of general policy, that it is expedient we should protect and encourage our own fisheries; but it is highly important that he should also know, that, whilst the Americans were encouraged in supplying our West-Indian islands with fish actually caught and cured upon our own coast, by authority of the British government, our own fisheries laboured under the greatest difficulties in finding a market.

I certainly do not pretend to give all the necessary information upon these subjects, but shall endeavour to point out and make a few remarks upon some of those of the most mate-

rial importance, in order, if possible, to lead to their complete elucidation by others more competent. Indeed our ship-owners and merchants at large are called upon at this critical period, to communicate the fullest information to Government concerning our shipping, — our American provinces, — and our West-Indian colonies,—in order to put them sufficiently upon their guard against these important interests being again sacrificed, as they have been by former commercial treaties.

Hitherto, from some strange misconception of the reciprocal interests of the mother-country and her transatlantic possessions, the British government has been in many respects, actually legislating for the advantage of America, both before and after the disgraceful commercial treaty, which the Americans threatened and frightened us into, in the year 1794, which operated in their favour until lately, when, fortunately, a period was put to it by their insufferable encroachments and unbounded ambition ;—actually legislating in favour of those very people, who, as soon as they had, by her fostering care and protection, acquired sufficient strength, rebelled against

her, and succeeding in asserting their independence, became, and have been hitherto, her bitterest enemies ;—in favour of America, with whom we are now at war, and who looks at our extensive and improving colonies along her frontiers with a jealous eye, straining every nerve to wrest from us these most important possessions, the tenure of which, we in a great measure owe to the loyalty and patriotism of their inhabitants.

America is thoroughly aware of the value and growing importance of these colonies, and shapes her course accordingly ; she knows that when the mother-country is under a state of seclusion from the continent, these colonies are capable of supplying her with various articles of the most material importance,—with articles for which, although essential to her political existence, Great Britain has nevertheless been dependent upon the precarious supplies of her very enemies.

But exclusive of these advantages which the mother-country derives from the natural produce of these possessions, we must look to their growing importance to her as a market for her manufactures, which, for want of demand,

have of late years been at times rotting in our warehouses, and consequently many of our valuable and industrious mechanics were rendered destitute of their usual means of support, and thereby exposed to that spirit of riot and discontent, which has so lately convulsed the northern counties, and spread confusion over districts which, previously to these disastrous occurrences, had been the scene of commercial industry and domestic comfort.

I have already observed, that one of the main objects, which I have in view, is to draw attention to the critical situation of the British provinces, particularly the Canadas, in consequence of the present war. I shall, therefore, by way of shewing their importance to Great Britain, in order to stimulate her to adequate measures for their defence, take notice of the topographical characteristics of these colonies and several features of domestic policy, with respect to their relations with the mother-country, with the British settlements in the West-Indies, and with the United States, which appear of most essential consequence, to be minutely investigated and

maturely considered, with reference to any negotiations, for the termination of hostilities.

These observations, however, will be carried little further than merely to impress distinctly and emphatically the importance of the subject.

Information of this kind will, no doubt, have some weight in the estimation of our legislators, whenever negotiations for peace with America shall be in progress: such information is, indeed, absolutely necessary, in order to ascertain the genuine interests, both of the mother-country and of her colonies; as, without a correct knowledge of such particulars, it would be impossible to form any adequate idea of the extent to which they might be rendered available to Great Britain, nor what political regulations would be best calculated to rouse into action and give full play to these most important advantages, which these colonies possess.

That the operation of political regulations or legislative enactments have hitherto been so much misconceived and misdirected, as to impair many of those valuable capabilities inherent in these provinces, and the principle

by which these most impolitic measures have been directed has been much better calculated to promote the interests of the Americans, who have, ever since their independence, been our secret enemy, and are now in open hostility with us, than of these colonies, or Great Britain, is a position, which it is my present object to substantiate.

In illustrating these intended observations, although I shall indeed generally take notice of all the four British provinces, yet, as the Canadas form at present the principal object of attack by the Americans, and constitute, in many respects, the most important of our American possessions, I shall be more particular with respect to these provinces.

The most important advantages which distinguish the British colonies in America are the vast and inexhaustible forests of valuable timber which abound throughout the whole; the excellent quality of the land which predominates, particularly in the Canadas; and the

extentive variety of productive fisheries which surround their coasts.

Upon reaching Quebec, in ascending the St. Laurence, the country begins to improve in point of fertility, and upon reaching St. Anns, which is sixty miles above Quebec, a tract of the finest and most fertile land in America, commences upon both sides of that river, and continues upwards to the extremity of Lake Superior, being a length, from St. Anns, of about *fifteen hundred miles.*

Unquestionably this vast extent of country, advancing in such rapid progress of improvement,—the superior quality of the soil, and its other important advantages, have excited the envy and jealousy of the government of the United States, and had the most powerful influence for commencing the present war. My own opinion is, that their cupidity for these colonies has been a much stronger stimulus, than the ostensible pretext, relative to the impressment of their seamen. The American government is fully aware that the produce of all that part of their territory which lies upon the St. Laurence and the

Lakes, from Lake Champlain upwards, must be exported through the river St. Laurence; and that, by the same channel, the inhabitants of that extensive territory must consequently be supplied with foreign produce and manufactures.

The Americans, no doubt, conceived this the most favourable opportunity, which would ever occur, for wresting the Canadas from Great Britain: for, hitherto, the people who inhabit the northern parts of the United States, are, as will be made appear hereafter, still in complete ignorance of the extent to which they can be benefited by having the English along their frontiers; and from hence, they more easily become dupes of their own government, respecting misrepresentations of their interest in this respect.

When the Americans see an extent of upwards of 1200 miles of their frontier-settlements, now closing in union with those of the English colonies, and are thoroughly apprised that this is a door opening to British commerce, which will not only prove profitable both to the English and their colonists; but also know, that it will prove advantageous to

all such of their own citizens as inhabit that extensive country along the Canadian frontiers, and therefore know that at any after period it might be very difficult, if not impossible, to induce that portion of their population to take a part in a war so contrary to their interest; they have for these reasons, therefore, eagerly embraced the first opportunity that offered for commencing hostilities.

ALTHOUGH the geographical position of our American provinces is sufficiently pointed out in the maps, yet, as some important inferences are intended to be drawn from their boundaries, and also from their extent of coast, compared with that of the United States, I have thought it expedient to enter into the following statement: —

The extreme length of Nova Scotia, which extends from the gut of Canso to Cape Sable, is about two hundred miles, and its breadth about ninety.

The province of New Brunswick extends from the bay of Fundy to Chelleaure Bay,

being its extreme length, which is also about two hunded miles; and its extreme breadth, from the gulph of St. Laurence to the line which divides the province from the state of Main, is about one hundred and twenty miles.

Of these two provinces New Brunswick only borders upon the United States; the length of this communication is about two hundred and twenty miles.

The province of Lower Canada extends from the mouth of the St. Laurence, upwards to St. Regis, about sixty miles above Montreal; being a length of about six hundred miles, upon that noble river, from whence it derives many of the important local advantages which it so eminently enjoys.

On the south it is bounded by the British province of New Brunswick, and the states of Vermont, and New York. From Cape Roziers upwards, for more than one hundred miles, the country consists of barren rocky mountains, and is therefore unsettled; but beyond that distance it is settled to the upper extremity. The breadth of this part of the province lying upon the south side of the St.

Laurence is very irregular; its greatest breadth may be about one hundred miles, and the average perhaps about sixty.

That part of the province which lies upon the north side of the St. Laurence has Upper Canada for its upper boundary; the division line between the two provinces commencing from the St. Laurence at a point about twenty miles above the mouth of the river Ottawa.

Its eastern boundary is the Labradore coast; and its northern boundary-line Hudson's Bay. The extent of this part of the province, upon the north of the banks of the St. Laurence, (being, from the border of Upper Canada downwards to the islands of Mingan, in the mouth of that river,) is about seven hundred miles. Of this extent, however, there are not more than three hundred and fifty miles settled; the settlements only extending downwards to Rock Bay, which is one hundred miles below Quebec.

The province of Upper Canada is situated upon the north side of the river St. Laurence, Lake Ontario, Lake Errie, Lake Huron, Lake Superior, Lake of the Woods, &c. and from thence upon a line undefined to the Pacific Ocean.

From Lower Canada, along this inland navigation, which is so singularly convenient, beautiful, and extensive, to the extremity of Lake Superior, is a length of about *thirteen hundred and fifty* miles of an almost uninterrupted continuation of a fine fertile soil, and in every respect a most delightful country: a very considerable proportion of this extent, however, is still unsettled. The settlements, at present, only extend to Detroit, which is situate between Lake Errie and Lake Huron, being a distance of about five hundred and fifty miles from the border of Lower Canada; but the fine climate, the superiority of the soil, and the conveniences and advantages of local situation, are such that the settlements are extending upwards very rapidly.

It appears, therefore, that from Detroit, which is the uppermost of the settlements, downwards to their lowest extremity, at Rock Bay, which is one hundred miles below Quebec, is an extent of about nine hundred miles settled upon the north banks of the St. Laurence and its lakes: this, with the above four hundred and fifty miles of the lower province, inhabited upon the south side, makes the whole extent

of the settlements of the two Canadas, lying upon the banks of the St. Laurence and the Lakes, about *thirteen hundred and fifty miles*.

The possession of such an immense extent of country, upon this inland navigation, so advantageously situate for commercial purposes, is necessarily of the first importance to Great Britain

It is important to take notice of the great length of frontier by which these provinces and the United States communicate with each other, in order to shew the commercial facilities and those most important and permanent advantages, which this extended communication is calculated to afford to British commerce; which will more adequately enable us to judge how far these circumstances, and the rapid improvement of this part of the American frontier, have roused the jealousy of the United States and prompted them to the commencement of hostilities.

Considering the great length of the line of frontier, by which the British provinces com-

municate with the United States, no human power can prevent a commerce, highly advantageous to the British, being carried on between the two countries:—a commerce, which to us, considering the great extent and growing prosperity of the country constituting these frontiers, must be a permanent source of wealth; but particularly during times and circumstances such as we have lately experienced, during the period our most inveterate enemy has succeeded in shutting us out from the continent of Europe.

This intercourse has been hitherto limited, from the immense tract of unsettled land which divides the two countries, having been confined to a few roads of communication, and these few even very inconvenient: the quantity of British manufactures hitherto introduced into the United States has, therefore, notwithstanding this extended line of frontier, been comparatively small; the same circumstances have also had the same effect on the transportation of produce by the Americans to the St. Laurence.

The demand for British manufactures in these colonies has been hitherto indeed little

more than for the supply of the inhabitants; but, as the settlements of the British colonies and the United States have now begun to meet throughout an extent of upwards of 1,200 miles of their frontier — a length greater than the whole extent of the coast of the United States, from New Brunswick to Florida, a door is thereby now opening for the introduction of British manufactures, to the United States—a door which, whilst the British keep it open, by encouraging the commerce which it gives access to, America can neither, by prohibitory laws, prevent the introduction of British goods, nor, by embargo, hinder the produce of that vast extent of country from being transported to the shipping-ports of the St. Laurence,—two objects of the first importance to the mother country.

Such parts of the frontiers of the two countries as are settled are rapidly encreasing in population, which is also daily acquiring an accelerated accumulation by continual emigrations from the eastern states, not merely to that part of the United States, bordering upon Canada, but also into these provinces.

The immense extent of American territory,

just emerging from a dreary wilderness into a fine fertile country, upon the very frontier of the British colonies,—upon the navigable waters of the St. Laurence, which must inevitably carry its produce to where it can only be shipped by British merchants; and, from whence it can only be carried by British ships, has, as I have before hinted, excited in the American government a degree of jealousy of which few people are aware. For that government, as well as the governments of the continent of Europe are not ignorant of the profit and sound policy of securing, as far as possible, the carriage of all their own produce, and also of grasping all within their reach of the carriage of the goods of other nations.

They know that as the overflowing of a fountain, after answering the specific purpose for which it was opened, finds out the channel most congenial to its current, so the surplus produce of this new and fertile country, although hitherto almost absorbed by the great demand, arising from the vast influx of settlers, must likewise, in large quantities, push its way through the most convenient channel to another market: they also know that this chan-

nel must be the St. Laurence; and, consequently, that the markets must necessarily be those, in which neither their merchants, nor their ships can be employed in the exportation of produce; and are, therefore, sufficiently apprised that the British must exclusively enjoy all the advantages resulting from this fine country, hitherto unknown, but now rising into importance.

Thoroughly impressed with these advantages, and the increasing importance of these colonies, to Great Britain, the United States will, during the present war, make proportionate exertions to obtain possession of them; or, at the period of hostilities, endeavour, by some commercial treaty, to get them again sacrificed to their interest: but the mother-country, from motives of the soundest policy and regard to self-interest, is bound to make commensurate exertions to defend these valuable colonies in time of war, and protect them in their legitimate privileges in time of peace.

The following may be considered a few of the advantages which Great Britain derives from this great length of inland navigation and extended communication between the

United States and the British provinces, viz:—The river St. Laurence and the Lakes must be the principal channel for the commerce of the countries upon both sides, as well the American side as the Canadian, both in the export and import trade: as long, therefore, as the British hold their present possessions they must exclusively enjoy that trade.—The inhabitants of the British colonies pay almost no taxes, whilst their neighbours, the Americans, upon the opposite banks of the river, are liable to heavy taxes and other public burthens: our colonists will, therefore, undoubtedly continue firmly attached to the government from which they enjoy this advantage. British manufactures, &c. being admitted into Canada, duty free, whereas they are liable to heavy duties in the United States; and the St. Laurence being the shortest and cheapest channel by which these countries can be supplied with foreign commodities, the Canadians will thereby have the supplying of the Americans who inhabit the country upon their frontiers, with British and other foreign manufactures secured to them. This extensive frontier will prove a door always open

to the introduction of British manufactures, in spite of the most rigid enactments of the American government to the contrary; and, moreover, the higher the duties charged by the American government are, either to answer pecuniary purposes, or, to encourage domestic manufactures, the greater will be the encouragement held out to their citizens to evade them by smuggling: the higher the duties, therefore, the greater will be the advantages enjoyed by the British over other foreigners by this exclusive door of access. And should America at any future time, as they have at some former periods, charge a higher duty upon British than upon other foreign merchandise, the difference, instead of excluding our manufactures, will only operate as a countervaluing duty in favour of the Canadian importers and the British ships, as well as prove an additional inducement held out to their own citizens to evade the duty. For, certain it is, that all the revenue of the United States is not sufficient to keep up a custom-house establishment, sufficient to prevent smuggling by means of this immense door of access, provided the American duties, as I have observed, constitute a sufficient inducement.

The benefits which will result to the Canadians, as well as the other colonists, however, from the enjoyment of their rightful privileges in respect to the exportation of their produce, will give them by far the most important advantages over the Americans; namely, in securing to them the supplying of our West-Indian colonies with American produce,—and, in charging the same duties upon American lumber and other produce imported into the mother country as upon that of other foreign nations;—these fair, just, and legitimate, privileges secured to our American colonists,—privileges which too vitally concern our shipping interest,—will do more towards securing the attachment of our American colonists than all other advantages united;—nay, more than all other favours which the mother country has it in her power to bestow upon them.

In modern times, when navigation is found to be the principal source from whence flows the riches and independence of nations, or at least the channel through which these valuable

blessings are, in the most eminent degree, derived, of all the properties which characterise any country, the extent of coast and the navigable facilities which it affords are the first in importance.

Concerning our American provinces, therefore, it may be remarked as a most important fact, that the extent of navigable shores of inhabited and fertile country, accessible to ships from sea, is greater than that similarly navigable in the possession of the United States, from New Brunswick to Florida.

In explanation of what is meant by the term shore, or coast, (so far as regards this comparison,) such only is intended, as will admit of ships of three hundred tons register measurement; a burthen sufficiently large to carry produce to foreign markets at the lowest rate of freights.

The extent of shores of the settled and fertile territory of the continent of North America, belonging to Great Britain, amounts in the aggregate, to 1310 miles.*

* In estimating the extent of the navigable shore of the British colonies, I have reckoned from the River St. Croix,

This is a greater length of navigable coast than that which was lost by the last American

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which divides the province of New Brunswick from the State of Main, round the coast of Nova Scotia, through the gut of Canso and along that part of the coast of New Brunswick and Lower Canada which fronts the gulph of St. Laurence to Cape Roziers, making a length of 600 miles.

From Cape Roziers, upwards, to Montreal, upon the south side of the St. Laurence,	530
From Montreal, downwards, upon the north side of the St. Laurence, to Rock-Bay, which is one hundred miles below Quebec	280
Altogether amounting to	1410 miles;

being two hundred and ten miles more than the whole extent of that part of the coast of America, lying between the River St. Croix and the River St. Mary, which was the whole extent of sea-coast possessed by the United States, previous to their purchase of Louisiana from the Spaniards.

It will be observed, that this statement comprehends only the shores of the continent, and (except the space which lies between Cape Roziers and Cape Chat, being about one hundred miles of rocky mountains,) such parts only of the country as are settled and fit for agricultural purposes.

It appears, therefore, that, after deducting the one hundred miles of barren mountains above Cape Chat, the extent of shores of the settled fertile country, which their colonies comprehend, is 1310 miles.

war; and, estimating its value by the commercial facilities which it affords, is comparatively much more valuable than an equal extent of the United-States coast, fronting the Atlantic Ocean.

This comparison of the navigable coast of the United States, with that of the British possessions, in front of such parts of the country as are capable of agricultural improvements, may be objected to on account of part of the one being the shores of the River St. Laurence, and the other open to the Atlantic Ocean. Such objections, however, will be removed, by inspecting the map of the country and chart of the coast; for, by drawing a line upon the former, at some given distance, (suppose one hundred miles,) and in such a direction, that it shall not exceed the proposed distance from such parts, (whether upon the coast of the Atlantic, or up bays and rivers,) as ships of the proposed dimensions of three hundred tons can find safe harbours, it will then be found, that the difference is greatly in favour of the British possessions in point of territorial extent, bene-

fited by such navigation; and still more in favour of the British possessions in point of the quantity of superior soil so benefited. Such parts of the coast of the United States, (or indeed of any other coast,) as are completely open to the ocean, afford no harbours to any description of ships. It is in bays, creeks, mouths of rivers, or under shelter of islands, therefore, that harbours are exclusively to be found. And when we notice, that we are considering these with reference to ships of 300 tons register measurement, it will be found, that neither this, nor any other coast open to the sea, will afford harbours for shipping of such dimensions but at very considerable intervals,—in many parts, intervals of several hundred miles. It is the commercial facilities which the harbours afford, that constitute the value of the sea coast; without these conveniences mere extent is of little importance.

Estimating by this criterion, it follows, as a necessary deduction, (which, as already observed, may be demonstrated by mere inspection of the map,) that as far as relates to the shores of the St. Laurence throughout the

whole extent of that part of it, which has been included in this estimate of 1310 miles of navigable coast, fronting agricultural territory, scarcely a mile can be found, (with the exception, perhaps, of about fifty or sixty miles situated immediately above Cape Chat,) in which there are not road-steads to be found where ships may ride with safety.

With regard to the comparative advantages to be derived from foreign shipping, a far greater extent of surface of country upon the banks of this river is therefore benefited in this respect, than upon a like extent of the coast on the main ocean.

The possession of this improveable country and its navigable shores, guarantees the peaceable possession and uninterrupted occupation of the whole coast of Labradore, of Newfoundland, and of the numerous islands in the gulph of St. Laurence. These important and improveable coasts altogether amount to several thousand miles of the most productive and valuable fisheries;—fisheries, which, to any country, would be of immense importance, as well on account of the maritime facilities which they afford, by

being a nursery for sailors, &c. as on account of the pecuniary purposes and conveniencies to which they are adapted; and, therefore, the possession of them to Great Britain, by so far securing her own maritime resources, and preventing the aggrandisement of that of other nations, are invaluable.

The countries which form these extensive fishing-coasts, consist generally of barren rocky mountains, the barren and inaccessible nature of which, protects and encourages the prosperity, and actually secures the value of the fisheries. Such fisheries, situated in front of fertile soil, would be comparatively of small importance; the cultivation of the land would, no doubt, divide the attention of those employed in the fisheries; a variety of pursuits would inevitably create an irregular demand for labour, so as to completely disorganize the necessary machinery of an extensive fishery; under existing circumstances, however, no such inconveniences need be apprehended.

Notwithstanding the general inaccessible nature of this fishing-coast, there are, however, to be found in the mouths of rivers, &c. places of sufficient extent to admit of such

towns and villages as might be necessary for the convenience of the fisheries.

If Great Britain keep the entire possession of these fisheries,—guarded upon the one hand by her terra-firma possessions in that quarter, and upon the other by her powerful fleets; and do not again cede a share of them either to the French, Americans, or any other power: —if she, also, hold the fine level country which she now possesses upon the banks of the St. Laurence and the Lakes above Quebec, without again shackling the industry either of the woodman who clears its forests; of the cultivator of its fertile plains; or, of the fisherman who bestows his attention upon these productive fisheries:—if, moreover, she prohibits all intercourse between our West-Indian islands and the United States; and enforces a regulation of the duties upon the timber she imports from countries other than from her own colonies, calculated to promote her own shipping-interest, the growing prosperity of these colonies would not only greatly augment her resources, and prove a safe guarantee of her maritime power and independence, but the mutual benefits, which the one colony would derive from the

other, would also tend greatly to secure to her a permanency of all these important advantages. The reciprocity of interest that will in consequence circulate among all the numerous classes, which a variety of pursuits distinguish throughout her colonies, must necessarily promote in them such a firm attachment as will prove the greatest possible security of these possessions. The markets, which would thereby be opened and secured to these provinces, would inspire every class of society with such a spirit of enterprise and energy as would set every branch of industry in motion, encouraging and supporting each other, like the constituent parts of a well constructed piece of machinery: the timber-trade, giving employment to the woodman and the raftsman; the exportation of grain, flour, &c. and provisions, encouraging the agriculturist; the exportation of fish and oil, communicating fresh energy to the industry of the fisherman; and the grand result of the whole, yielding abundance of profits and emoluments to our merchants, and affording employment to our shipping, would thereby contribute to the advantage of all classes in these provinces, as

well as to the encouragement of the commercial concerns of the mother-country. The West-Indian colonists likewise, instead of experiencing the uncertainty and inconveniences which they have hitherto done in obtaining supplies of American produce, would receive a regular and abundant supply. For, under such a line of policy, many of the very articles, particularly flour, instead of being shipped from the ports of the United States, under the system of management which prevailed previous to the American embargoes, &c. would be shipped from the ports of the St. Laurence, and thereby provide the British provinces with the most ample resources for the supply of their sister colonies in the West-Indies. Not only the inhabitants of the continental provinces therefore, but also our West-Indian colonists, grateful for the benefits afforded by this variety of pursuits and diversity of interests, so essential to their general convenience and prosperity, and for which, being thus combined, organized, and protected, they must feel indebted to the mother-country, would, from the most powerful impulse, self-interest, cherish the most genuine loyalty and affection towards her.

Thus far with respect to the advantages possessed by the British colonies, as far as relates to their geographical position and commercial facilities: the next object, and the first in importance, is their produce and manufactures.

CHAP. II.

OF THE PRESENT STATE OF OUR AMERICAN PROVINCES, PARTICULARLY THE CANADAS, — THEIR SOIL, CLIMATE, INHABITANTS, STATE OF AGRICULTURE AND EXPORTS, ETC.

In order that a more adequate idea may be formed of those great advantages, which the mother-country may derive from the vast resources inherent in these provinces, particularly the Canadas, through the medium of her shipping and manufacturing interests, I shall here take a cursory view of *the quality of their soil;* of *their climate;* of *their inhabitants;* and of *the state of agriculture.* My observations upon these, however, shall be carried no further than is necessary to assist in forming opinions, concerning the discouragements which these

provinces have laboured under, and the improveable capabilities which they possess, in respect to the above important sources of national wealth.

QUALITY OF THE SOIL OF UPPER AND LOWER CANADA.

From the river Little Metis, which is about two hundred miles below, upwards to St. Ann's, which is about sixty-five miles above Quebec, the country, although not mountainous, (except upon the north side of the St. Laurence below Quebec,) nevertheless forms a very uneven and irregular surface.

The kinds, of which the soil consists, are of great variety; being in some parts a very light sandy soil upon a sandy or gravelly bottom; and in other parts a strong clay, with almost all the variety of gradations which are to be found between these two extremes. There is, how ever, a much larger proportion of the very heavy sort than of the very light: indeed, throughout this tract of country, which is an extent of about *two hundred ond sixty-five*

miles upon the banks of the St. Laurence, the soil, with respect to kind, consists generally of a strong loam upon a sub-soil of red clay or till.

With regard to quality; supposing the soil arranged into four distinct rates, there is not much of the best or first rate; neither is there much of the worst or fourth rate; the average may be considered to be about *a medium between the second and third rate qualities.**

* In regard to the short description, which I have given of the soil, in order that a true and correct idea may be formed of its quality, it is necessary to state, that the scale by which I have formed my estimate in this respect, is the quality of the land in Great Britain, divided into four distinct rates. And further, to avoid the ambiguity and obscurity so general in descriptions of the qualities of land, I think it necessary also to state, that, in judging of the quality, the intrinsic or natural fertilizing capabilities are alone kept in view. For, if the vicinity of large cities, navigable rivers, or any external improvements were to be taken into consideration, and the soil rated according to its value, there would, under such circumstances, be no certainty of ascertaining the precise description of the soil, although the rate were stated. As for example, a third rate in the vicinity of a large city might be let at as high a rent as a first rate quality at a considerable distance: or one farmer by proper management might

From St. Ann's, upwards, to the border of Upper Canada, which is about sixty miles above Montreal, being a length of about one hundred and seventy-five miles upon both sides of the St. Laurence; and from the border of Lower Canada, upwards, to the extremity of the settlements of the upper province at Detroit, being an extent of about five hundred and fifty miles upon the north banks of the St. Laurence and the lakes, makes, from St. Ann's upwards, a length of about *seven hundred and twenty-five miles* of a beautiful and level country. The general characteristics of the face of the country, throughout this vast extent, afford but little diversity in point of appearance. The kinds of soil, however, consist of considerable variety: but that which mostly prevails is a strong deep loam, which in many parts con-

raise, upon a third rate, a crop doubly fertile compared, with that which might be raised upon a first-rate soil, by another inferior in skill and industry. But as neither of these circumstances could essentially alter or bring about any permanent change in the fertilizing capabilities, which these soils naturally and intrinsically possess, it would consequently be absurd to rate them, in point of quality, according to their respective values, or present state of fertility.

sists of a mixture of rich blue clay and friable earth: this is a kind of soil, which, in whatever country it is found, generally constitutes that of the best quality.

A large proportion of this vast extent of country is of the *first rate quality*, and the average of the whole may be said to be *excellent*.

Reckoning to the depth of about fifty miles from the St. Laurence and the Lakes, (which depth would include all the land yet granted by the British government,) perhaps there is scarcely to be found, either in Europe or America, a tract of country, equal to this in extent, which comparatively contains so large a proportion of a first rate quality of land; and certainly there is not, in any other part of the United States, excepting Louisiana and other parts upon the west side of the Alegany mountains, and upon the banks of the St. Laurence and its lakes, an equal extent of territory, wherein even one-third of the quantity of first rate soil would be found. Indeed, in many parts of this vast country, there are occasionally to be found uninterrupted tracts of land of a first rate quality, even to the extent of a hundred miles in

length; whereas, in most countries, one-third of that extent of an uninterrupted range of such quality is rarely to be met with.

CLIMATE.

THE climate of any particular country ought to be estimated in proportion to the healthy, agreeable, and fertilizing properties, which it possesses: the climate of Upper and Lower Canada enjoys these advantages in an eminent degree.

The summer, indeed, is extremely hot; but, as the atmosphere is remarkably clear and pure, the heat is therefore not so oppressive as in climates where the air is more close and sultry.

The winter is intensely cold: but, as the frost continues without intermission during winter, and generally with a clear sky and a fine dry air, it is thereby rendered both healthy and pleasant; the cold being infinitely less penetrating than in moist climates.

Foggy weather is very little experienced so far up the country as Montreal; or, indeed,

much farther up than Quebec, and there only, occasionally in spring. But, down the river, particularly towards its mouth, easterly winds are invariably attended with thick fogs.

The spring sets in with a clear sky, and the air generally continues frosty until the snow is quite gone. The snow is, therefore, principally carried off by the rays of the sun; for it is but seldom that natural thaws are much experienced, until the snow is completely carried off. Rain seldom continues long at a time, in the spring; except in the mountainous districts. The spring in Lower Canada sets in earlier or later, in any particular place, as it is higher or lower upon the River St. Laurence; and this, even in the same parallel of latitude, being earlier as the country extends to the westward.

As the country at the mouth of the St. Laurence is very mountainous, and less so towards the westward, so in proportion there is less rain and foggy weather, as the country extends in that direction; the spring, indeed, sets in earlier, and the climate is in every respect more agreeable and favourable to agriculture, in any particular place upon the St. Laurence, in proportion as it is distant from the sea.

In spring, the land is generally fit for ploughing as soon as it is clear from snow. For, notwithstanding the severity of the frost, it does not penetrate deep into the ground, which is protected from its severity, by the snow falling in considerable quantities in the earlier part of the winter. By the time, therefore, that the snow disappears, the frost is also generally quite gone. The snow continuing upon the land during winter is a circumstance remarkably in favour of fall-wheat, fall-tares, or clover, which may have been sown with the preceding crop: for, continuing until a late period of the spring, it thereby prevents these crops from being exposed to a scorching sun through the day, and frost during the night; alternations of weather which occasionally occur early in the spring, in all latitudes liable to frost, sometimes pulling up such of these crops as may be so exposed, by the very roots; a circumstance not unfrequent in Great Britain. As has been already observed, rainy weather in the spring seldom continues long at a time; the farmers are therefore seldom under the necessity of harrowing in any of their seeds

whilst the ground is wet, which is a circumstance of material consequence in agriculture. Indeed, the seed of all kinds of crops being harrowed *in* dry, is an advantage of the first importance, but more particularly in the culture of hemp and flax.

Hoar frost but seldom occurs in spring, which is a circumstance very favourable to every species of the earlier green crops, such as hemp, flax, pease, early potatoes, and a variety of others.

During the summer season, and also the fall, rain or thick weather seldom continues more than two or three days together ; not often, indeed, more than one day at a time : a most material circumstance in favour of making clean summer-fallow ; raising fallow-crops ; making hay ; and performing the necessary operations in the management of hemp ; as well as other agricultural avocations.

During winter, the thermometer fluctuates from 25° above zero, down to 28°, and sometimes even as low as 30° below that point. But, when such an intense degree of cold occurs, it seldom continues longer than two, or at most

three days at a time; and such severities seldom occur more than once in a season; and, perhaps, in only one season out of two or three: the greatest degree of cold is generally felt in February.

There are not, perhaps, above two or three days in the course of the winter so intensely cold as to prevent ship-carpenters, and other workmen employed out of doors, from following their occupations: this circumstance affords one of the most convincing and decisive proofs, that the cold in Canada, compared with the cold in Great Britain, is not by any means experienced in a degree of severity proportionate to the degree of cold shewn by the thermometer

Throughout the season, there is a much greater proportion of clear weather in the Canadas than in Great Britain; even in the neighbourhood of Quebec, and about Montreal and in Upper Canada, where the country is less mountainous and more remote from the sea, the proportion of clear weather, compared with that experienced with a clouded atmosphere, is still greater. Upon the whole, the climate of the Canadas, compared with the

climate of Great Britain, is equally agreeable; equally favourable to agriculture; and actually more healthy.

INHABITANTS.

THE population of the Canadas is composed of the descendants of the French colonists, who inhabited Canada at the conquest, and emigrants from the mother-country and the United States; perhaps the descendants of the French colonists constitute three-fourths or four-fifths of the whole population.

As no census has been taken since the year 1783, it becomes impossible to state accurately what the population at present is.

Mr. Harriot, in his History of Canada, computes the population of the lower province at 250,000, and that of the upper province at 80,000, in 1808; this computation I am inclined to think, from the opinions which I have heard upon the subject, is rather under than over-rated.

However, taking this statement of Mr. Harriot's as a true estimate of the population

in 1808, and with the ordinary increase amongst the inhabitants, and also taking into account the extraordinary influx of settlers from the United States, occasioned by Mr. Jefferson's embargo and other measures of the American government, between the year 1808 and the breaking out of hostilities between the two countries, I think we may now reasonably compute the population of Upper and Lower Canada at 375,000, of which the lower province may contain about 275,000.

With regard to the respective characters of each of the three divisions or classes of people, composing the population of these provinces, and in the first place respecting the descendants of the French colonists, it may be observed, that they are honest and upright in their reciprocal dealings to a degree scarcely any where to be met with where so much ignorance prevails, or indeed perhaps any where;—sociable and polite in their manners; and, as far as regards economy, they are sensible, ingenious, and industrious

It is very uncommon and extraordinary that these characteristics, and an almost total want of education, should exist together; and this

circumstance shews what the people might be, if they enjoyed the benefit of education.

The British and Americans may rank together in point of industry and economy; and, from the advantages which they enjoy from education, are superior to the descendants of the French colonists in point of enterprise.

Concerning the attachment of the inhabitants of the Canadas to the mother-country; and, in the first place, regarding those who may be distinguished as the English part of the Canadian population, who are composed of emigrants from the mother-country and of the descendants of English emigrants, we may make the following remarks, viz. respecting those who emigrate from the mother-country it may be observed, that such emigrations are sometimes occasioned by a predilection for republican principles. But it may be easily perceived, that, when this is the case, a British province, in the vicinity of a republican country, would not be the choice of such people. Indeed, such persons invariably land in the United States, from whence, however, many of them from disappointment ultimately find their way into Canada.

For, finding that this republic has also laws, which must be obeyed, as well as taxes which must be discharged; finding that prodigality and idleness in this country, as well as in that which they left, is also accompanied with poverty and distress; finding that the poor miserable soil so generally prevalent throughout the United States not only yields the cultivator but a scanty subsistence, but, is only to be obtained at a high price; and, finding, too, that a reciprocity of the grosest rudeness and ill-manners,—insult and indignity to the rulers who must be obeyed, and contempt of the laws and authorities which must be submitted to, are a few of the characteristic of this country and its republican government:—this paradise, therefore, about which they had been so long dreaming, at last thus disappearing, they find themselves in reality transported,—transported from the solid comforts their native country afforded into the midst of difficulty and distress. Thus cured of their political madness, and ashamed to return to their native land, the fertile plains upon the banks of the St. Laurence and the blessings of the British constitution, therefore, attract many of these,

as well as others, from the barren wastes of New England to the British provinces.

After these people have not only learned, by such experience, that if American liberty exceed that of British, it is only in immorality and licentiousness, but that the liberty and protection, speciously indicated by this republican constitution, is precarious and uncertain, and in many respects only to be enjoyed in idea; whereas, the blessings of the British constitution, being equally extensive, are enjoyed in reality; such of these people, therefore, as find their way into the British provinces, need not be doubted as to their attachment to the British government.

Considering these circumstances, and that the other part of those who are denominated the British part of the population is composed of emigrants, who have, in the first instance, made choice of the British provinces, and of the descendants of these and such as have been described, it is natural to conclude, that the whole of those who are commonly denominated the English part of the Canadians, must remain firmly attached to the British government.

The American part of the Canadian colonists consists of two descriptions of people, viz. loyalists who left the United States during the late American war and emigrants. The former, considering the losses and sacrifices they experienced from adhering to the British interest, cannot certainly be doubted in point of loyalty: and, the greater part of the latter having left the United States, from discontent at the political measures pursued by their own government, and finding the privileges and advantages which they enjoy under the British government superior to those they enjoyed under the government of the United States, there can be no doubt entertained but that these also are firmly attached to the British interest.

The descendants of the French colonists, who inhabited the colony at the conquest, have uniformly given proofs of their firm attachment to the British government and its interests; particularly in the part they acted during the late American war. They certainly at that time manifested their loyalty and attachment in a manner highly honourable.—Loyally attached to the mother-country, these colonists

manfully stood forward in defence of her interests; in many instances they were mustered, led forth, and encouraged to fight, and bleed in support of the parent country, by their Roman Catholic priests; some of whom actually fell in such patriotic and praise-worthy examples. These and many other instances of loyalty might be circumstantially adduced: but, should any one doubt, the events passing at the present time afford the most incontestable proof of the loyalty of the whole inhabitants of these provinces

STATE OF AGRICULTURE.

Such is the present state of agriculture in Canada, that almost any change would be for the better. If it can be said that any thing approximating to system in cropping is observed, it is in that of wheat and grass alternately: or, it may be more properly said, that the land is cropped with wheat the one year and lies waste the next, and in many instances this mode

is pursued, even for generations, without manure being applied. The wheat is invariably sown in spring, and the land receives only one ploughing.

Clean summer-fallow is unknown in the country, and, except in the neighbourhood of Quebec and Montreal, the farmers are equally ignorant of drill-crop, or indeed of fallow-crops of any description. After stating these facts it is almost unnecessary to add that artificial grasses are also unknown.

The above mode of cropping prevails generally over the Canadas, but more particularly throughout the lower province. Any deviation from it is occasionally by the intervention of a trifling quantity of pease, flax, oats, or barley. Near the farmer's houses there are also generally to be found some small patches of Indian-corn and tobacco, which, together, perhaps, receive the greater part of the manure which is applied: these crops, notwithstanding, are seldom or never introduced into a rotation of cropping over any farm generally.

The land, however, is so very excellent, in general, that crops of forty bushels, per

French acre, (equal to fifty-four per English or sixty-six per Scotch acre,) are frequently to be met with; either where the land is first cleared, or where it may have received any improvement; such as lying several years in grass instead of one; manured and cropped with pease, &c.; for, besides these superficial improvements, there are scarcely any other known in the country. But the wretched system of cropping which is practised, soon reduces such spots of land, as may be found either from their pristine qualities, or from recent improvements, in this high state of fertility, to such a degree of poverty that they do not, perhaps, yield more than ten or twelve, or even, in some instances, more than eight or nine bushels, per acre.

Indeed, so much does the pristine state of fertility of the soil and its ultimate reduction, answer the above description, that the price of land is estimated by the same rule by which a horse is valued, namely, by age,—the older the worse But, in Great Britain, land is valued upon a principle the very opposite to this; there it is known to have improved, rather than fallen back, by cultivation, even under the very

worst system of management; I mean so far as relates to the native quality of the earth, and not as to its immediate state of fertility.

Such, indeed, is the natural superiority and fertility of the land of these provinces, generally, that when it is either purposely laid down to remain in meadow, or otherwise escapes the plough for a few years, that it generally produces the most luxuriant growth of natural clover. This circumstance, not only proves the natural good quality of the soil, but also indicates the expediency of adopting some system of cropping which would embrace that valuable grass.

Respecting the quantity of land under cultivation, the only means of ascertaining its amount, is by forming a computation from the statement of the quantity which was ascertained to have been under cultivation in 1783; and in forming this estimate we may also form a tolerably correct idea of the quantity of grain annually produced in these provinces.

In 1783, according to the census then taken, by order of government, the population

was stated to have been 113,012; the quantity of land under cultivation 1,569,818 acres, and the quantity of seed sown 383,349 bushels. Allowing two bushels and a half of seed, per acre,* there must have, therefore, been at that time 153,339 acres under grain.

Notwithstanding that the amount of the population is computed at 375,000, in estimating the quantity of land under cultivation I shall take it at only 360,000. According to the above statement, the relative proportions of cleared land, of seed sown, and of acres under grain, to 360,000 inhabitants, is 5,002,428 acres of cleared land, 1,221,159 bushels of seed sown, and 488,463 acres under grain.

It may be observed, that there appears a great disproportion between the number of acres under grain and the gross quantity of cleared land. But it may also be remarked, that, in estimating the cultivated land, it is

* The French acre, or arpent, is to the English acre as three is to four: the French measure is the standard in Lower Canada, and the English measure in the upper province: two bushels and an half may be considered the average quantity of seed.

probable that the site of the houses, and gardens, and space of ground about them, roads, banks of rivers, and rivulets, &c. patches of wood land reserved amongst the cleared land, for supplying fuel, &c. may have been included; and these spaces, with the quantity of land under flax, &c. and meadow land, the quantity of which is very considerable, must altogether render the quantity of cleared land, not u ed for the production of grain, very considerable.

An estimate of the amount of the grain, which is produced, may be made by computing the quantity consumed for the people's food; and adding to it the amount of exports; the grain used in the keeping of horses; feeding of stock; and the seed which is sown; which altogether will constitute the gross amount. From a computation of all these, as under,* it

* In estimating the quantity of grain used for the food of the inhabitants, I shall suppose the quantity requisite to each family of six persons, men, women, and children, to be equal to that which would be sufficient for four full-grown men, and that each man would require $2\frac{1}{2}$lb. of bread, meal, Indian corn, and pease, per day.

appears, that about 13 or 14 bushels per acre is only produced. Considering, therefore, what poor crops these are,—the excellent quality of the land,—and the favourable climate, it is sufficiently evident that an improvement in agriculture might be easily effected.

The wheat which, as has already been ob-

Now, supposing each bushel to yield 48lbs. of bread, meal, &c. each family would in that case require about 75 bushels of grain annually. The 360,000 inhabitants, consisting of 60,000 families, would, therefore,

require	4,500,000 bushels.
To which add the quantity exported .	330,483
And the amount of the seed . . .	1,221,159
Making altogether	6,051,642 bushels;

being equal to about $12\frac{1}{4}$ bushels per acre; besides that used in the keeping of horses and feeding of stock, &c. the quantity of which cannot be correctly estimated by any rule that could be depended upon; but, at the very highest, their amount cannot be supposed to be such as would make any very considerable addition to the produce per acre. To suppose the average to be about 13 or 14 bushels per acre may, perhaps, be pretty near the mark; and, indeed, from the best information which I have been able to collect from the inhabitants of the country, as well as from my own observations made upon the spot, I am inclined to conclude that this is about the average produce per acre.

served, is invariably sown in the spring, is seldom more than three or four months in the ground, and, notwithstanding that circumstance, a very good quality is generally produced; this is a proof that a very superior quality indeed, might be produced if it were sown in the fall of the year.

The climate is remarkably in favour of fall-wheat; for the snow, which continues to a late period of the season, shelters it in the early part of the spring, from the scorching rays of the sun through the day, and the nipping frosts in the night, as well as from the dry, cold, and bleak, easterly winds in March, which so often injure the wheat in Great Britain.

The introduction of barley into the list of crops raised in Canada is only very recent; and the adoption of the culture of it is a proof that the Canadian farmers are not so wedded to *old customs* as either to refuse the introduction of new crops, or, the adoption of new schemes of improvement; but, on the contrary, it proves that they will try experiments and persevere in such discoveries as are thereby found profitable.

Barley is not yet generally grown in Canada;

that which is raised is cultivated principally below Quebec.

The growth of pease for exportation, as may be observed by No. 1, in the Appendix, has been but recently attended to; and, it may be observed, that as the prices advanced the quantity produced has increased: this circumstance also affords another proof that the Canadian farmers are not backward in cultivating whatever crops they find profitable.

FLAX is generally raised throughout the country. The crops are generally good; and, indeed, in some instance, excellent: this, however, appears to be a secret which the people do not know. For, so little is the management of this article understood, that, notwithstanding the good crops which are produced, it seldom turns out to be worth the trouble and expense incurred in working it; and, perhaps, there is hardly any instance of its being found profitable merely from the circumstance of its being improperly managed after it is pulled. For both flax and seed are completely spoiled

in the process of management which succeeds the operation of pulling.

The Canadian farmers appear not to know, that after flax is pulled, the seed should be separated from it as soon as possible; and that the flax and the seed then require treatment so very different from each other, that what is necessary to the one is destruction to the other; both in point of quantity and quality.

As soon as the flax is pulled it is generally suffered to lie in handfuls or so, upon the ground which produced it, for the purpose of being watered; and in this state it remains until this purpose is understood to be accomplished.

The loss occasioned by entirely watering flax upon the grass, is immense; the injury it thereby receives, both in quantity and quality, is very great; and, in many instances, such as completely to ruin the crops. For, even supposing it possible, that the under part of that which lies thick upon the ground would water regularly, that which was uppermost being exposed to the dews of night and the sun in the day, would become watered in less than half the time requisite for that which lies

nearest the ground; consequently, by the time that the undermost were watered the uppermost would be rotten. This loss and inconvenience would, in a certain degree, happen under the best and most careful management, according to this process of watering altogether upon the grass; and, therefore, as this method is even but imperfectly understood in Canada, the loss is, consequently, proportionably increased. For, as it is laid down very thick and with great irregularity, when spread out to water, a considerable part of it either soon adheres to the ground, or, sinks down amongst the roots of grass, or weeds, and is thereby mill-dewed or rotten.

Until the flax is watered, the Canadian farmer never thinks of separating the seed from it; the seed is, consequently, not only liable to much injury, but the greater proportion lost.

The flax, whilst under this process of watering, being alternately wet with dew or rain, and scorched with the rays of the sun, the pods soon open, and that which is ripest falls out; indeed, of any sort of crop, the best of the seed is the most liable to be shaken out.

Besides, the actual loss of the best quality of the seed, that which remains is in general materially injured; a few rainy days succeeding each other will sprout every grain of it: and although such a continuance of rainy weather seldom happens during the harvest in Canada, yet certainly such occurrences sometimes take place; consequently, the flax-seed then exposed will be inevitably ruined for the purpose of sowing.

The flax, upon being considered watered, is taken up, bound in sheaves, and the seed then threshed out: and such is the favourable state of the climate and superior quality of the seed, that notwithstanding all the bad treatment which it receives, that which remains is generally found to be of a good quality: indeed, if properly managed, it is in point of quality equal to Dutch seed; and would answer the soil and climate of Great Britain equally as well as that from Holland

HEMP.—For some years past a considerable quantity of hemp has been produced in Upper

Canada; nearly in a sufficient quantity for the supply of that province with cordage. The proper and profitable method of cultivating and managing it, however, in all the stages of the necessary process through which it goes, from the time of its being sown, to the period of its being cleaned, is far from being well understood in that province; and, in the lower province the culture of it may be said to be hitherto unknown.

The experiments hitherto made in the cultivation of this article in Lower Canada have chiefly failed; not in the smallest degree, however, from any unfavourableness either in the soil or climate; but merely from the ignorance of those who have hitherto made the experiments.

The Canadian farmers failed from their ignorance of its general management; particularly of the process which it undergoes after being pulled, as may be naturally conjectured from what I have observed concerning flax: and those who have tried the cultivation of it by way of example to the Canadian farmers, have generally failed of success on account of their ignorance of agriculture in general.

One, in particular, of these sage experimentalists recommended to the Canadian farmers to sow hemp instead of wheat, because their land was exhausted with the growth of that crop; and did actually himself, upon a farm of about one hundred acres, which he had procured for the purpose, notwithstanding this farm was in a very reduced and exhausted state, sow about twenty-five or thirty acres of hemp, as a commencement. This was a quantity sufficiently large for a farm in a high state of cultivation, and of three or four times the extent of the one he occupied: of course this experimental crop was not worth the pulling; and I believe never was wholly pulled.

When we consider, therefore, that this ingenious speculator recommended hemp as a crop suitable to land that would not produce wheat, —that he had actually sown it upon such land, which of course failed of producing a crop worth the reaping, it is evident, that if this curious specimen of husbandry had any effect at all, it must have been to convince the Canadian farmers that hemp was not a crop suitable to the country.

Instead of recommending hemp as a substitute for wheat, it would have been more compatible with common sense, and the rules of good husbandry, to have recommended the growth of hemp to the Canadian farmers, that they might have had the more abundant crops of wheat. He might have done this with great propriety. For, if land be rendered capable of, and has actually yielded a good crop of wheat, it would then produce an abundant crop of hemp, besides being again in a proper condition to yield another fertile return of wheat, or any other sort of grain.

It is well known that the length of this crop is one of its most essential qualities; and, consequently, if land be exhausted with wheat, it is in a miserable condition indeed to produce hemp. If hemp be short, it is almost good for nothing, being incapable of being wrought. Besides, it is peculiar to this, and almost all other green crops, that if they are luxuriant they actually improve the land: but if poor and stunted, they ruin it; whereas, the flour produced from a bad crop of wheat will be about as good, in point of quality, as that which is

produced from the grain of the most luxuriant crop.

From the bad system of cropping, which is practised, the land, in point of fertility, is rather in a reduced state. This circumstance, therefore, certainly in some degree generally operates against the cultivation of both hemp and flax. There are nevertheless to be found, throughout the Canadas generally, upon every farm, even where the land is most reduced, certain pieces of land fit for producing very fertile crops of either hemp or flax: for instance, land newly taken in; small pieces under pease, meadow, or what may have otherwise been several years under grass; or spots that may, from one or other of a variety of causes, be more than ordinarily fertile: amongst these such a choice might be made, by any one who possessed any tolerably accurate idea of agriculture, and the cultivation and management of hemp and flax, as would ensure the profitable cultivation of these crops.

Considering that the land is in general well adapted to the cultivation of hemp and flax;

that our government are disposed to give encouragement to the growth of hemp; and that good crops of flax, although spoiled in the watering, are raised throughout the country in general; it is therefore evident, to any one at all acquainted with agriculture, and the means which have generally proved successful, in the introduction of improvements in other countries, particularly the rapid success which attended the means used for improving the cultivation of flax in Scotland, that the result of a little well-directed attention to the cultivation of hemp in these provinces would, undoubtedly, be the abundant supply of the British market with that important article.

WITH respect to the state of agriculture in general, in British America, it may be observed, that very little alteration has yet taken place in the wretched system of management which prevailed when we first took possession of these colonies: the increase in the exports of agricultural produce has been chiefly owing to the extension of—and not to the improvement of agriculture. If proper measures were adopted,

however, to bring about an improvement of agriculture, in general, in these provinces, the present unimproved state of agriculture; the superior quality of the soil; the favourable climate; and the ingenuity and industry of the people, are circumstances which would undoubtedly ensure the most certain success: and the vast benefit and advantages which would result to the mother country, as well as to her colonists, from such an improvement, ought to stimulate her to undertake its introduction.*

ARTICLES OF EXPORT FROM THE BRITISH NORTH-AMERICAN PROVINCES.

THE articles exported from Upper and Lower Canada are, the produce of the forest,

* The attention of the board of agriculture might be most profitably directed towards the improvement of the system of agriculture pursued in these colonies.

viz. furs, square oak and pine timber, masts, spars, staves, deals, &c. and pot and pearl ashes; the produce of agriculture, such as wheat, flour, bread, provisions, &c. Besides these, the Canadian exports consist of a numerous list of other articles, as enumerated in No. 1, in the Appendix; a list which not only shows the variety of which these exports consist, but also exhibits an interesting view of the abundant resources of these provinces.

The principal articles exported from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia are, lumber, pot and pearl ashes, provisions, live stock, fish, coal, gypsom or plaster of Paris, &c.

These provinces are very advantageously situated for the fisheries, particularly Nova Scotia. They have, however, both paid great attention to this branch of industry, by which means these fisheries are now brought to such a degree of perfection, as to render supplies of fish of any description from the United States to our West-Indian colonies altogether unnecessary. For, with the supplies of cod-fish which may be obtained from Newfoundland, and of salmon and

shad from Canada, these colonies are not only sufficient to supply our West-Indian possessions with fish, but also the most extensive demand which we can secure from other markets. The lumber furnished by these two provinces is mostly from New Brunswick: and consists principally of masts, spars, square pine, deals, boards, scantling, black birch, &c.

These colonies are sufficiently capable of supplying the demand both of the mother-country and her West-Indian colonies, with every kind of lumber, (i. e. timber or wood,) except those kinds which are only produced in tropical climates, such as mahogany, lignum vitæ, &c.: and, (with Newfoundland in respect to fish,) of supplying our West-Indian islands with grain, flour, meal, bread, fish, provisions, live stock, &c. And also upon a proper disposition of our commercial concerns in regard to drawing the produce of that part of the United States bordering upon the waters which have their out-let to the sea by the St. Laurence, and the necessary attention being paid to the encouragement of improvements in agriculture, these colonies would, in a very few

years, yield the mother-country all the wheat, hemp, and flax, which she requires from foreign parts.

With respect to their adequacy to furnish such supplies, some may, perhaps, urge the smallness of the proportion of these articles which have hitherto been supplied, and may press it as a presumptive proof of their inadequacy to furnish them.

To this objection it may be answered, in the first place, that the British colonies have long been crippled by so many shackles, as shall be made plainly appear, that they have never yet had a fair opportunity of ascertaining how far they could have furnished these supplies; and, in the next place, whenever any opportunities have been allowed, for their resources to flow in their proper channel, they have given the most ample proof of their being adequate to supply the most extensive demand.* To argue, therefore, that the British American provinces are inadequate to furnish these supplies, upon the ground of what they have hitherto done, would be as preposterous, as to assert that the British West-Indian colonies cannot supply the mother-country with coffee, because that article

is permitted to be introduced from *Turkey* and *Bourbon* for *domestic use*, or that the British manufacturers are inadequate to supply our domestic wants, because, *French*, *German*, *Russian*, *East-Indian*, and other foreign manufactures are allowed to be imported for *home consumption*.

After having made these observations concerning the nature of the properties and qualities which these provinces possess; considering that the commercial interests of Great Britain is the main object which I have in view, particularly her shipping interest,—that these provinces, notwithstanding the many discouragements they have laboured under, have lately, (when a little relieved by our ruinous *suspending-laws*, and *licensing-system*, accidentally ceasing to operate with their usual vigour and effect in favour of our enemies,) afforded a very large proportion of the employment of our shipping, even equal to upwards of one-third part of all the tonnage which we employ in foreign trade,—and that these colonies from their

resources and capabilities having been hitherto neglected, and their interests sacrificed to the United States and other foreigners, are therefore evidently capable of contributing to the support of our commercial and shipping interests, infinitely beyond what they have hitherto done. I shall, therefore, in the first place, take notice of, *the enormous sacrifice of our shipping and commerce to the United States occasioned by the great and unjust advantages allowed them over our own American colonists; with some other causes of discouragement which these important interests have experienced:* and, in the second place, of *the extensive, valuable, and improveable resources and capabilities, possessed by our American provinces, as respects our shipping and commercial interests.*

CHAP. III.

OF THE ENORMOUS SACRIFICE OF OUR SHIPPING AND COMMERCE TO THE UNITED STATES, OCCASIONED BY THE GREAT AND UNJUST ADVANTAGES ALLOWED THEM OVER OUR OWN AMERICAN COLONISTS; WITH SOME OTHER CAUSES OF DISCOURAGEMENT WHICH THESE IMPORTANT INTERESTS HAVE EXPERIENCED.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

WITH respect to these three important interests, viz. of our ship-owners, our merchants, and our colonists, they, it may be observed, are so intimately connected, that, in most instances, whatever injures the one proportionably injures the other, and *vice versa.*—For instance, by increasing the trade of our colonies, we thereby so far secure additional employment to our ships,—business to our merchants, and a market for our manufactures;—

thereby securing these important interests in a channel wherein no rival has a right to come in competition with us in time of peace, and wherein no enemy has it in his power to interrupt the connection in time of war. By securing a numerous and extensive merchant-shipping also, we not only thereby provide ourselves with the only means by which we can defend it,—by which we can protect our trade with foreign parts, and secure our safety and independence at home, but we also thereby greatly encourage the exportation of our manufactures and the extension of our commerce in general, by an extensive foreign connection, necessarily formed and secured by our maritime industry. With respect to our commerce, we may, no doubt for a time, so far secure it, by employing foreign ships, where our own are either directly or indirectly excluded: yet, by following such a system we are not only foregoing the most valuable part of the profits arising from such transactions, but in reality meanly submitting to our enemies, and voluntarily surrendering to them the means by which alone we acquired our commerce, and by which alone we can retain it. In fact, to pur-

sue measures adopted either to retain or extend our commerce at the expense of our shipping-interests, will prove but mean and miserable subterfuges, and, if persisted in, will ultimately lead to the ruin of our commerce as well as our shipping.

The losses which our shipping and commercial interests have sustained, from the advantages allowed the Americans, may be stated to have originated and existed principally,—

In the relaxation of our navigation-laws in favour of the United States, by opening the ports of our colonies to their ships;—

In the admission of the produce of the United States into the United Kingdom, at the same rate of duties as that of our own colonies;—

In the advantages allowed American ships in the countervailing duties charged by the British and United States governments respectively;—

In the inequality of the amount of the duties charged upon the lumber we import in general;—

In the importation of enemies produce by license, &c.;—and,

In the high price of our ships, and the great expense at which they are navigated, compared with those foreign ships with which they have

to come in competition. Each of these points, consequently, deserve a few observations.

OF THE RELAXATION OF OUR NAVIGATION-LAWS IN FAVOUR OF THE UNITED STATES, BY OPENING THE PORTS OF OUR COLONIES TO THEIR SHIPS.

For the encouragement of our shipping, the safety of our colonies, and the protection of our commerce, our forefathers, at an early period of our maritime consequence, enacted,* that no foreign ship should enter the ports of our colonies. This law our ancestors, even up to the present generation, respected and held sacred over every difficulty and distress:—viewing this, and other laws, enacted for the same important purpose, as essential to the support and protection of our merchant-shipping and commerce in general; and also, viewing our merchant-shipping and commerce as essential to our maritime power and independence, they considered peace itself as no sacri-

* See 12 Car. II. c. 18.

fice to the most scrupulous observation of our navigation-laws in general.

This wise law, so admirably calculated to protect and promote the interests of our commerce and our colonies, as well as of our shipping, has been of late years, however, greatly abused, and indeed almost totally disregarded: the greatest abuse which it has experienced has been in its relaxation in favour of the United States of America.

The act of the 23d Geo. III. c. 39; empowering his Majesty in Council to suspend our navigation-laws in favour of the United States, led the way to a shameful system of concession to America, which we have acted upon towards that government ever since.

The first operation upon this act was to admit, by proclamation, the produce of the United States into this country, at the same rate of duties as was charged upon the produce of our own colonies;* the first of these proclamations

* Your Majesty, by the said orders in council, did think fit to permit to be imported into the colonies or islands belonging to your Majesty in America or the West.Indies, in *British ships only*, navigated according to law, all such arti-

was issued the 14th of May, and the next on the 6th of June, 1783.

This privilege was granted to conciliate and satisfy the clamorous disposition of the Americans, when roused by a sense of the privileges they had lost by their independence, from finding themselves placed in the list of *other foreign nations*, and their produce imported into Great Britain, was consequently rendered liable to the same duties as the produce of other foreign countries,—effects which our navigation-laws,

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cles the growth, production, or manufacture, of any of the territories of the said United States, (except salted provisions, and the produce of their fisheries,) as might by law, before the declaration of independence, have been imported from the countries belonging to the said States into any of the said colonies or islands; but your Majesty, at the same time, thought fit to prohibit any commercial intercourse between the countries belonging to the United States of America, and the colonies or islands belonging to your Majesty in America or the West-Indies, in ships belonging to the subjects of the said States.

OBSERVATION.

This last regulation, first established by order in council, has since been adopted and confirmed by act of parliament; and, though the people of the United States complain of

existing at that time, wisely brought about, without even the interference of the legislature.

Had there ever been an instance wherein concession and submission had satisfied avarice and arrested ambition, we might have naturally expected that the Americans would have been content to have been placed, in other respects, simply upon a footing with other nations. But we have found, to our experience, that one concession to imposition only makes way for another,—that the first compliance with an unreasonable demand, however small, is actually inviting fresh aggression,—that nations

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this regulation more than any other, it *is not new,* but is founded on the antient law of this country, " which forbids " any goods to be imported into, or exported from, any of " the colonies belonging to your Majesty in Asia, Africa, or " America, except in ships belonging to your Majesty's sub- " jects, and navigated according to law."—It is founded also upon a public law, approved and adopted by all European nations, who have ever claimed a right of restraining the trade and navigation of their colonies, in such a manner as, in their judgement, will be most conducive to their respective interests. It might be proved, if it were necessary, that the policy of Great Britain, in this respect, is much more liberal than that of France or Spain.—*Reports of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council, from Mr. Atcheson's Collection of Reports, &c.*—Edition 1807.

as well as individuals, who endeavour to secure friendship by concession, frequently subject themselves only to meanness and contempt.

In fact, the Americans so easily obtained this great advantage to which they owe so large* a proportion of their shipping, and we consequently a proportionable loss of ours, that they even considered it as no favour. For, observing, by his Majesty's proclamation of the 2d of July, 1783, that their produce was to be admitted into our West-Indian settlements, but that this privilege did not extend to their ships, they, in order to extort from us this further concession, imposed, upon importations made in British ships, countervailing duties, amounting to an absolute prohibition.†

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* See an account of this enormous increase in page CVII. of Mr. Atcheson's book, entitled "American Encroachments on British Rights."

† With respect to the measures which the United States, and the provinces of which they are composed, have taken, in consequence of his Majesty's order in council, of 2d July, the committee find that the state of Maryland has, on this account, imposed a duty of five shillings per ton on British shipping, at their entrance or clearance in the ports of that state, (which is said to be two shillings more than they have laid on all *other* shipping,) and two per cent. *ad valorem*,

Instead of meeting this act of hostility with corresponding retaliatory measures, the British

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over and above what is now paid, or may hereafter be paid, by the citizens of the said state, upon all merchandize and manufactures the growth and produce of Great Britain, imported in any *British ship* or vessel owned or belonging, in part or wholly, to any British subject or subjects.

And the assembly of Georgia, now sitting, has prohibited all intercourse with the British West-India islands, until the orders of his Majesty in council be revoked.

It does not appear that any of the other states have passed any legislative act to the like purpose; but, in the assembly of Pensylvania, which was sitting when the last accounts came away, an act had been read a second time, for imposing duties on every ton of British shipping, and on British manufactures and commodities, in like manner as those imposed by the state of Maryland, with the addition, that the assembly of Pensylvania proposed to augment the duty on British manufactures and commodities, imported in British shipping, to 2½ per cent. *ad valorem;* and there is intelligence received of a general ferment in all the southern and middle states, on account of the restrictions laid by his Majesty's order in council.

The assembly of New York had addressed the Governor on the subject, in terms of resentment to Great Britain; and the assembly of Virginia have unanimously resolved, " That the United States, in congress assembled, ought to be empowered to prohibit British vessels from being the carriers of the growth or produce of the West-India islands to the said States, so long as the order in council shall be continu-

government acted with the most humble submission; and, for "these *courtesies*," actually granted the valuable bonus, in the commercial treaty of 1794, of trading to our East-Indian possessions;—a privilege which was then, in vain sought for, by British merchants. Besides this concession, extorted from us by the insolence, which our pusilanimity had encouraged in this upstart republic, the ports of our West-Indian islands were uniformly opened to their ships, upon principles that, to their interest, were the most favourable which ingenuity could have devised,—principles, which shall be proved to have secured the carriage of almost the whole imports made into these islands to American ships. For, although their ships were by law excluded the ports of

ed; or to concert such other measures as shall be thought effectual to counteract the designs of Great Britain, with respect to the American commerce."

The province of South Carolina has laid duties on West-Indian produce, from £50 to £100 per cent. higher than on that of foreign islands: but it appears, that this duty was imposed before they had any knowledge of his Majesty's order in council, of 2d July.—*Reports of the Committee of Council, from Mr. Atcheson's Collection of Reports, &c.*

our West-Indian colonies, yet they were, from the commencement of the late French war up to 1807, admitted without the authority of any law; and, after that period, they were admitted, by orders in council, according to the American-intercourse-bill enacted for that purpose.

From the commencement of American independence, up to the date of the commercial treaty, in 1794, and even up to the present hour, we appeared and are still apparently at a loss how to rank the Americans,—what privileges they were entitled to, or what prohibitions they ought to be liable to in respect to their being placed amongst other foreign nations. How unfortunate! that we did not, at their very birth as a nation, find out, that they put every other foreign nation, with which they had dealings, upon a more favourable footing than us,—that we did not, instead of meanly purchasing an equally favourable footing with other nations, in respect to vending our manufactures to that country, by the most enormous and unprecedented sacrifices, verily and indeed, put them upon a footing with "the most favoured nations," by excluding them as well as other foreigners from the ports of our colo-

nies,—by charging the same duties upon their produce as upon that of other nations,—and by imposing a countervailing duty in favour of our own ships equal to what they charged in favour of theirs, instead of the pitiful sum of 22*d*. balanced against £3 : 10 : per ton.*

However, in this unfortunate dilemma, with respect to what relation the United States should stand towards us, we not only gave the Americans the most unbounded advantages over other foreign nations and over our own colonists, but also even over British ship-owners and British merchants. For the ports of our East-Indian colonies were not only opened to her ships and to her commerce, whilst the British ship-owners and British merchants (except the East-India Company) were not only excluded, but insulted, by being told that, their being admitted to trade to these colonies would endanger the safety of the whole of our Indian establishments. But no such calamity, it would appear, was apprehended, by our government, from this American intercourse in that quarter.

* *See Nos. 3 and 4 in the Appendix.*

This channel of commerce being open to these foreigners, and shut against our own merchants, some of our countrymen were induced, from eagerness of gain, to abandon their country, and become Americans; or, so to compromise their characters as to create doubts of their retaining any attachment to it.

The British, although undegraded by such a comparison, in any other country in the civilized world, were nevertheless, in order to gain the confidence of their own government, in respect to their being allowed to trade to these colonies of their own country, obliged to personate a people, who would not, in any country, *besides England*, have been preferred, upon the score of peaceable behaviour and honourable dealing.

Nothing surely could be more humiliating to an Englishman than to see his countrymen metamorphosed into *Yankies*, merely to gain the confidence of the *British government*, in order to obtain a share of that trade from which, by the old established laws of the land, foreigners were totally excluded.

I am neither arguing nor inquiring whether this trade should or should not have been

thrown open, as it has been lately, to the British merchants in general. But surely, British merchants had infinitely a better right to it than foreigners, who were allowed, in the most unreasonable manner, to come into competition with our East-India Company in this trade, which either ought to have been sacred to that company, or thrown open to their country at large.

This branch of commerce, which was opened to the Americans in British India, afforded an opportunity, which they embraced to the fullest extent, of filling the British American and West-Indian colonies with East-Indian manufactures of every description, not only to the injury of the East-India Company, but also to the injury of British manufacturers.

This trade being now opened to the country in general, however, will form no apology whatever FOR AGAIN opening it to the Americans. The former privileges they enjoyed in this respect, being improvidently granted, can give them no claim; it is, therefore, to be hoped, that their flag, excepting ships which might put in in distress, shall never again wave in the ports of these or any other British colonies.

Although the Americans were, as already observed, and are still, by the strict letter of our navigation-laws, excluded from the ports of our West-Indian islands, yet this trade was opened to them after their independence; and opened, too, upon such principles, as not only secured to them the opportunity of furnishing produce for the supply of these islands, but, also, ultimately secured to them its carriage.

From the period of American independence to the commencement of the late French war, the principal articles of American produce were still allowed to be imported into our West-Indian settlements in British ships. Considering, therefore, that, before the American war, these settlements were almost entirely supplied from the country which now forms the United States,—that the produce of these states was afterwards admitted upon the same terms as that of our own colonies, — that the ports of the United States were considerably nearer to these islands than the ports of our own provinces, — and that the supplying of our West-Indian settlements with American produce, from the United States, must have, therefore, been a trade well organized and un-

derstood: whereas, upon the other hand, our remaining provinces being at a comparatively greater distance, and their produce consequently liable to a proportionably higher freight, their trade with the West Indies, previous to the late American war, was therefore limited, and, of course, less understood, either as to the preparation of lumber, or the proper assortment of cargoes in general, than in the United States; and, having also been before that period in the habit of shipping their wheat to Great Britain, they even were not sufficiently provided with mills to manufacture that article into flour for the West-Indian market. *This difference of freight* in favour of the Americans tended considerably *to discourage the trade from our own provinces*, and operated greatly in encouraging the transportation of their produce to the ports of the United States, instead of taking it direct, in British bottoms, to the king's sugar-colonies, or to any intermediate port in British America.

Had a duty, equal to have balanced this difference in favour of America, and something over and above, to have constituted a premium or protecting duty in favour of the British colo-

nists, it would have encouraged and increased the exportation of produce from our own colonies, and discouraged and diminished the exports from the United States, and at last enabled our own provinces to have completely supplied all the demands of our West-Indian settlements, for American produce. This duty, although it would have been but a mere trifle as to the price paid in the West Indies, yet it would have been of great importance compared with the freights from the British provinces, and its operation would have, no doubt, ultimately rendered us independent of the United States, in a very important respect. Had the above circumstances been attended to, and adequate measures been adopted and persevered in, our own provinces would, by the commencement of the late French war, have been capable of affording our West-Indian settlements all their supplies. From the interests of these provinces, however, being neglected and misunderstood, their whole exports, at the commencement of that war, did not altogether amount to a quantity sufficient to answer the demand of these islands; and, moreover, from various impolitic measures operating against

them, there was then even but a small proportion of what they did export sent thither; and, consequently, a large share of the supplies of these settlements continued still to be furnished from the United States. The inconveniencies, to which we were rendered liable by this dependence upon America, were also greatly increased by the want of proper convoys to protect our ships employed in this intercourse with the United States.

This danger to which our ships were exposed was afterwards pleaded as an excuse for a further suspension of our navigation-laws, in opening the ports of our West-Indian colonies to American ships, as well as to their produce: and this suspension was managed in such a manner, as answered the purpose of the United States *infinitely better than even its total repeal.*

From the inconveniencies suffered, by a want of adequate protection to our ships employed between the United States and our West-Indian islands, at the commencement of the late French war, serious inconveniencies were felt in the West Indies for want of lumber, and the greatest distress for want of food; — every article selling at the most enor-

mous prices, and the inhabitants threatened with actual famine, the governors of the respective islands, were under such distressing circumstances, compelled, as a dernier resort, to open the ports to the Americans, both to their produce and to their ships.

Then glutted markets and a depression of prices ensued, and the ports again closed to the Americans; and, then, of course, as the stock on hand became exhausted, prices again advanced, until at last it again became necessary to open the ports to the Americans, for a fresh supply; thus producing a continued and rapid succession of extremes, which occasioned the most serious inconveniencies;—inconveniencies which often reduced our West-Indian colonists to the necessity of eating sour flour and half rotten provisions at the most exorbitant prices; and at the same time almost excluded the produce of the British provinces from the West-Indian market.

The comparatively greater distance at which the ports of the British provinces, than those of the United States, were from the West Indies; and the ports of the British provinces being principally shut up by the frost, during

the winter season, are circumstances, which, although, in themselves, they would have had scarcely any perceptible effect in excluding the produce of the British provinces from the West-Indian market, yet, coupled with the rapid changes which that market was rendered liable to, it may be easily perceived, that they were calculated to produce that effect, and to continue to operate in this respect as long as the singular scramble, which the supplying of our West-Indian possessions exhibited, whilst the farce produced by this law and its suspension was kept in play.

Whilst large stocks remained on hand, prices were moderate; but, as the super-abundant quantity became exhausted, the farther supplies being still dependent upon the same precarious means, the remainder became an object of speculation, thereby causing an immediate rise of prices.

But if the Canadians heard of such scarcity and high prices as were thus produced, and accordingly despatched cargoes to meet them, their shipments were sure to meet the market in the very reverse state of what they had been informed; such adventurers were sure to find

every British island in the West Indies glutted, and produce selling perhaps at prices lower than those current at the ports where their shipments were made. They ultimately found that what might be termed a brisk demand and encouraging prices soon increased to that dearth and almost actual famine, which produced the necessity for opening the ports to the Americans, who, from their contiguity with the West Indies, had an opportunity of glutting these ports with produce, considerably before supplies could reach them from the British provinces; and, therefore, learned, by experience, that as long as the intercourse between our West-Indian colonies and the United States was permitted and continued upon the same footing as has been before described, it was impossible for them to derive any advantage from their sister colonies in the West-Indies, as a market for their produce.

I have mentioned the rapid changes which the West-Indian market was rendered liable to, and the distance and liability of some of the ports of our provinces to be blocked up by the frost in winter, as two causes which contributed to the exclusion of the produce of

these provinces from the West Indies. Had only one of these two causes existed, our continental colonists would have certainly come in for a share in furnishing the West-Indian market with American produce.

It may be argued, that our American provinces, on account of their distance, and of some of their ports being liable to be shut up at certain seasons of the year by the frost, are incapable of furnishing our West-Indian colonists with regular supplies. With regard to the distance, an addition of eight or ten days to the length of the passage is equal to the difference, and therefore, excepting under the circumstances produced by the alternate opening and shutting the market to the Americans, scarcely deserves to be called a disadvantage.

As to the disadvantages which might arise from the circumstance of the ports being shut up by the frost, it may be observed, that some of them are no doubt shut up from two to five months: but, an additional stock laid in in the fall of the year would prevent every possible inconvenience, which could arise from this interruption, except in regard to a few articles of minor consideration.

With regard to flour; as the supplies would principally depend upon Canada, so far the inhabitants of the West-Indies would require to lay in a small additional stock in the fall of the year, as the navigation of the St. Laurence is shut up between four and five months. This could be done without further inconvenience than the out-lay of money, and about half a dollar per barrel, for which it may be warranted to keep twelve months, instead of four or five.

As part, however, might be obtained from the lower provinces, where the ports *are not so long blockaded* by the frost, three or four months stock on hand would be the largest quantity which would be requisite to provide against this inconvenience.

Concerning lumber, no possible plea can be urged against its keeping; and, therefore, all the disadvantages which could arise to our West-Indian colonists, from their being confined to these provinces, for their supplies of that article, would be also the laying in three or four months stock in the fall of the year.

Fish and provisions would keep with the greatest safety; at least, if they were cured and packed in a manner suitable to the climate,

they could receive but little, if any, injury, from being kept for this length of time.

Thus, it appears, that so far as the British provinces are capable of supplying our West-Indian settlements with flour, meal, bread, grain, &c. lumber, fish, and provisions, and the furnishing of such supplies confined to the resources of these provinces, no difficulties need be apprehended either from the distance or from the occasional suspension of the navigation during winter: and, indeed, upon that trade being encouraged to flow in this channel, no inconvenience could possibly be experienced.

The quantity of wheat and flour, &c. hitherto annually exported from the British provinces, has been certainly short of what was sufficient for the supply of our settlements in the West Indies. This circumstance, although, for obvious reasons, no proof of their inadequacy, yet formed an additional excuse for the admission of United States produce into these settlements.

The hostile spirit of the American government, with some other circumstances, have at length convinced us of the capability of our American provinces, of supplying not only our

West-Indian colonies with lumber, but, also, the mother country. And, although nothing has yet taken place, at all calculated to increase the exportation of flour, (at least, however far any circumstances may have occurred favourable to that end, others have operated proportionably against it,) yet, it is no less clear, that in time of peace with the United States of America, flour may be obtained from our possessions upon the St. Laurence, in sufficient abundance for the supply of our West-Indian islands.

The American embargo and the continental system have, ever since 1807, produced an extraordinary demand, in Canada, both for lumber and flour.

This great demand for fish and lumber, of every description, has been *completely answered.* For the British American forests producing timber in abundance, and the population of these provinces being sufficiently numerous to bring it to market, (at least, with the assistance they had from the Americans,) the greatest demand for that article, therefore, which has ever occurred, in the British colonies, has been abundantly answered. The proportionate

demand for flour, however, has certainly not been supplied. For the circumstances upon which the increase of the exportation of that article, and of lumber, from Canada, depend, differ materially, both in their nature and facility of operation.

The American embargo and non-intercourse measures, it may be easily perceived, were much more calculated to prevent supplies of flour than of lumber being brought to the Canadian ports. For, although the supplies of lumber, from the American side of the St. Laurence, were almost entirely cut off, yet there being an abundant quantity of that article upon the Canadian territory, it had only to be cut down and floated to market; whereas, it plainly appears, that, on account of the American prohibitory laws, the increase of the quantity of flour for exportation was dependent upon the extension and improvement of agriculture: means of slow operation when compared with the felling of timber. For, ever since Mr. Jefferson's embargo, in 1807, the supplies from the Americans being almost entirely withheld, very little increase in the exportation of flour was to be expected; whereas, for the

reasons adduced, there was nothing to prevent an increase in the exports of lumber; at least, not until the commencement of actual hostilities.

Although these prohibitory measures of the American government had the effect of increasing the demand for flour, in the ports of the St. Laurence, and producing higher prices than those paid in the ports of the United States; yet, for the reasons already mentioned, they had also the effect of greatly preventing the Canadian exports of that article; and, therefore, although they created in the Americans, situated upon the Canadian frontiers, an inclination to prefer the ports of the St. Laurence, in the disposal of their property, yet these people could not benefit by the circumstance, not having the power of a choice.

Had not open hostilities actually commenced, however, and, at the same time, America had continued, by her prohibitory laws, to withhold supplies from our West-Indian islands, a considerable supply of flour would have found its way to the Canadian ports, however vigilant the Americans might have been to prevent it, by enforcing the laws established for that purpose. The late prohibitory

laws of the United States have done a very essential service to the British American provinces, in putting an end to the absurd practice of alternately shutting and opening the ports of our West-Indian islands to the Americans, a practice which it is obvious was unnecessary and highly impolitic; and, indeed, has proved extremely injurious to our shipping-interest, discouraging to our continental provinces, and hurtful to our West-Indian colonists: it is, therefore, to be hoped, that that pernicious and ruinous licensing-system will not be adopted, to supply the place of the other absurdity. Agreeably to what I have already observed, the English government had it certainly in their power to have framed and enforced an act, which would have proved effectual in the encouragement of the exportation of produce from the British American provinces into our West-Indian islands, and, at the same time, secured to the inhabitants of these islands regular and abundant supplies, without opening the ports of these settlements, either to the produce or the ships of America.

This purpose might have been accomplished, by permitting, upon certain conditions, the

importation of such articles of American produce into our West-Indian settlements, as the British provinces were then unable to furnish in sufficient quantities.

For instance, had the British provinces not been all at once adequate to supply our West-Indian possessions with flour and lumber, then let these articles have been admitted into these settlements, liable to such a duty as would have encouraged the transportation of the flour, manufactured upon the United States side of the St. Laurence to the Canadian market, instead of the ports of the United States. And, as it cannot surely be urged, that we could not furnish ships to transport such temporary supplies as might have been thus wanted from the United States, let them have been importable only in British ships.

Had such a measure been adopted, it would have immediately secured the carriage of the whole to our own ships, and in a few years would have encouraged such an influx of American produce to the ports of the St. Laurence, as would have enabled the British provinces to supply our West-Indian possessions with every article of American produce of

which they stood in need, (some trifling articles excepted, which are not produced in these latitudes, such as rice, &c.)

Such a measure, according to No. 6, in the Appendix, would have added 211,043 tons to the annual employment of our ships, being an amount of tonnage, upwards of *one-fifth of the whole which we employ in foreign trade* ; and would have added no less than £1,477,301 to the annual earnings of our merchant-shipping.

Indeed, such a system of policy would have brought the whole produce of that part of the United States, which lies along the Canadian frontiers, to the ports of the St. Laurence, and thereby enabled the Canadas to have furnished the mother-country, also, with large supplies of wheat and flour: but, as these affairs have hitherto been regulated, the very produce of the Canadas has, in several instances, been carried to the ports of the United States; a melancholy proof of want of attention to our commercial and maritime affairs, and of the assiduity and attention of the American government to that important interest. The adequacy of our American provinces to the supply of our West-Indian settlements, with flour and lumber,

as well as American produce in general, however, being discussed more at large in another part of this work; and being a subject which it is unnecessary to pursue further, as relating to that now under consideration, namely, the opening of the ports of our colonies to the United States, it may be dismissed for the present.

It may be observed, from what has been advanced upon this subject, that this relaxation of our navigation-laws, in respect to our West-Indian colonies, has been a downright sacrifice; because, upon the one hand, we had no equivalent for the concession, and, upon the other, there was no circumstance in existence which rendered such a measure necessary.

This extraordinary and unprecedented privilege, which has been so unjustly granted to the American—at the expense of our own—shipping-interest, in respect to the West Indies alone, amounts to no less than about 211,043 tons of 40 cubic feet, as stated in No. 6, in the Appendix.

To ascertain the amount of tonnage which this trade has added to the American shipping, it may be observed, that ships generally carry

about a ton and an half measurement-goods per ton register: but, it must be observed, that as the greater part of the ships employed in this trade are small sharp vessels, being generally fast sailers, they cannot be consequently computed to carry more than about a ton measurement to the ton register: the register tonnage, annually cleared out of the American ports in this trade, therefore, cannot have been less than 211,043.

The amount of the tonnage which the Americans have employed in their trade with our East-Indian colonies, could not be correctly ascertained.

At a moderate calculation, however, we may conclude that this most gratuitous sacrifice of our shipping, by relaxing our navigation-laws, in respect to opening the ports of our colonies to the United States, has at least added 300,000 tons to the employment of American shipping: computing the employment which they had in their intercourse with our our colonies in the East-Indies, in America, in the Mediterranean, in Africa, &c. altogether, at only 88,957 tons.

Our legislative proceedings, both in respect to the trade and intercourse between our West-

Indian islands and the United States, and the opening of the ports of our East-Indian possessions to American ships, are evidently so glaringly stamped with injustice and impolicy, both towards our American colonists and our ship-owners, as, it is to be hoped, will deter the legislature from again relaxing in favour of America, or any other nation, our navigation-laws, which ought to be held sacred under every difficulty.

Indeed, the minister, who would *again countenance any treaty*, which would permit the American or any other foreign flag, either to enter the ports of our East or West Indian, or any other of our colonies; or, admit the Americans to participate in the king's fisheries on the shores of British America or Newfoundland; or would, from any pretended accidental necessity, (such as has been speciously held out in respect to the West Indies,) advise his Majesty to grant, by license, or otherwise, such a privilege, ought to be considered, not only as totally regardless of the interests of his country, but as actually concerting and encouraging measures for its ruin.

MAHARAJA SERFOJI'S

OF THE ADMISSION OF THE PRODUCE OF THE UNITED STATES INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM, AT THE SAME RATE OF DUTIES AS THAT OF OUR OWN COLONIES.

By virtue of the power vested in the privy council by the 23d Geo. III. cap. 39, the produce and manufactures of the United States were, by his Majesty's proclamation, admitted into this country at the same rate of duties as was charged upon the produce of our own colonies, and continued to be admitted upon the same advantageous terms, until the expiration of the late commercial treaty with America.* Neither was the alien-duty charged in favour of our own ships, nor any certificate re-

* Your Majesty, by the said order in council, has been pleased to permit, that (except fish-oil, blubber, whale-fins, and spermaceti) any goods, being unmanufactured, as well as pig-iron, bar-iron, pitch, tar, turpentine, resin, pot-ash, pearl-ash, indigo, masts, yards, and bowsprits, being the growth or production of any of the territories of the United

quired, as usual, that the importations made in American ships were the produce and manufacture of the United States; these orders in council thereby admitting, that the ships naturalised the property; and, consequently allowing this new republican flag to cover property from every sort of scrutiny as to its origin.

States of America, may be imported directly from thence into any of the ports of this kingdom, upon payment of the same duties, as the like sorts of goods are or may be subject to, if imported from any British island or plantation in America.

OBSERVATION.

Your Majesty has thought fit to grant to the commerce of the United States, with respect to certain articles above enumerated and described, (being those in which the commerce of the United States is principally carried on,) the same preference as is granted to the commerce of the islands and plantations in America, remaining under your Majesty's dominion: and, in many of these articles, the commerce of the said States derives great benefit from *the preference* thus given, to the detriment of the commerce of other foreign nations, as will be seen by the following table.*—*Report of the Lords of the Committee of Council, from Mr. Atcheson's Collection of Reports.*

* The Table here alluded to is omitted, being rendered unnecessary by No. 3, in the Appendix.

These advantages, the Americans, by their threatenings and compulsory measures, obtained with so little difficulty, that, instead of being grateful for these unparalleled privileges, they were only stimulated to make further demands, equally unreasonable and unprecedented; such as a free trade to our colonies, &c. enforcing these demands by the imposition of exorbitant duties against our commerce, non-importation-acts, and other hostile measures.

This gross abuse, however, of our profuse liberality and unbounded concessions to them, had not the effect which they might have naturally been expected to produce, namely, a retraction of every former concession that had in the least exceeded the limits, which our maritime laws and transactions with other nations had set to our stipulations in all commercial arrangements with that country.

Had this been the case, one of the most important of these retractions would have been a charge of an equal amount of duties upon American produce, as was charged upon the produce of other foreign nations. But, no such effects were produced. Our government still continued their conceding system, endeavour-

ing to purchase friendship by meanly submitting to the grossest insult and imposition.

Fish-oil, blubber, whale-fins, and spermaceti, were afterwards only made exceptions to this general exemption of duties upon the produce of the United States: and, after having for several years exempted America from the alien-duty, when we did at last put her so far upon a footing with other foreign nations, as to subject her to an alien-duty, still it was only to the trifling amount of about one *fiftieth* or *sixtieth* part of her excessive charge of this description against us.

It appears, that the duties charged upon American and other foreign produce, previous to the expiration of our late commercial treaty with the United States, were no less in favour of America, even after she was subjected to the alien-duty, than 18*s*. 6*d*. per load upon pine or fir timber, 14*s*. 8*d*. upon oak, 43*s*. 4*d*. per ton upon ashes, and proportionably favourable to her upon all other articles, as appears by No. 3, in the Appendix.

This difference in favour of American produce, on the duties levied upon our importations, was evidently a sacrifice both of our

revenue and of our American provinces, and an unjustifiable partiality shewn to the United States in respect to other foreign countries. America gave us no advantage over other foreigners!* What claim then had she to any preference from us in this respect?

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* *Tonnage-duties, giving a preference to the ships of the United States and of other nations over those of Great Britain.*

By a law made in Pensylvania, a duty of 4*s*. 6*d*. per ton, for every voyage, was imposed upon the vessels of every nation with which congress had not made treaties of commerce. By a law made in Maryland, a duty of 1*s*. per ton was imposed on all foreign shipping, except British; and a duty of 5*s*. per ton upon British shipping. By a law passed in Virginia, in 1788, a duty of 6*s*. per ton was imposed on British vessels, and 3*s*. per ton on all other foreign vessels. By a law made in North Carolina, a duty of 5*s*. per ton was imposed on British vessels; and a duty of 1*s*. per ton on all other vessels.

Duties on imports, giving a preference to those of the United States and of other nations over those of Great Britain.

By laws passed in the provinces of New Hampshire, Massachusetts-Bay, and Rhode-Island, in 1785, a duty of 6*d*. currency, being equal to 4½*d*. sterling, was imposed on every bushel of salt imported in ships owned, in whole or in part, by British subjects; and, by laws passed in the states of

The injury of such partiality, both to our colonies in America and our shipping, is immense. The low duty charged upon American timber in particular has undoubtedly added an enormous proportion to the amount of the shipping of that country, and evidently prevented a proportionable increase in the amount of ours. Had the same duties been charged upon her timber, as were charged upon that from other foreign countries, the quantity which she could have imported would have been very small indeed; and, considering the state of affairs upon the continent of Europe, such a measure must have proportionably encreased our importations of timber from our own provinces; and, consequently, secured the carriage of it to our own ships. For the 18*s.* 6*d.* per load upon fir timber, and other duties so

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New York and Maryland, the cargoes of British ships are, in every case, to pay double the duties imposed on those of other nations. In Virginia, a law was established, to commence in March, 1788, by which an additional duty was imposed on all merchandize imported in British ships.—*Report of the Lords of the Committee of Council, from Mr. Atcheson's Collection of Reports.*

generously sacrificed to the Americans, would of course have been so much in diminution of that proportion of the price left to pay freight, &c.; and, consequently, given our ships, employed in the carriage of timber from our own colonies, a proportionate advantage over American ships similarly employed from the United States; and thereby, at last, enabled us to have entirely shut up this source, whence America derived so large a proportion of the encrease and support of her shipping.

British ships, from the immense expense at which they were navigated,—from their being by the American countervailing duties prohibited the privilege of carrying even almost any share of our exportations to that country, and having the benefit of only a mock countervailing duty in our importations,—were, therefore, virtually excluded from the carriage of American produce imported into this country in general; and our own provinces being capable of supplying us with some of the most bulky articles of which these importations consist, particularly timber, rendered the imposition of these duties still the more necessary.

America may allege that the same duties

being charged upon her timber, as upon that from the Baltic, would altogether prohibit its importation into this country. Be this as it may,—this is a point with which we have no concern. Were we to take such a circumstance into consideration, and to make allowance for it in regulating the amount of our duties, how far would such a rule lead us? To admit this principle would be to admit a precedent of the greatest impolicy, and indeed of the most extravagant folly.

Upon such a principle, the Emperor of China, had he timber for exportation, might shew us that it was only the high freight that prevented his timber from being exported to this country, and with propriety urge the principle we had admitted and adopted, as a plea for such a regulation in his favour, as would ensure the exportation of his timber to this country, as well as his teas. It would be but a silly argument, in opposition to such a plea, to plead that a sacrifice of 20*s*. per ton answered the Americans purpose, whereas, he would require £20 per ton: the loss to us, indeed, might differ materially, but the principle is exactly the same.

All that America can, in reason and justice, require of us, upon this score, is, to be put upon *a footing with other nations*,—a privilege which she has in very few instances extended to us, but upon many occasions singled us out, by the most marked insults and disadvantages.*

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* *Duties on imports, giving a preference to those of other nations over those of Great Britain.*

By laws made in the provinces of New Hampshire, Massechusetts-Bay, and Rhode-Island, a duty of 6*s.* sterling, per hundred weight, is laid on cordage of British manufacture, and only half that duty if it be of the manufacture of any other foreign nation.—By a law passed in the province of Maryland, a duty of 2*s.* per cwt. was imposed on brown and clayed sugars imported from the British West-India islands; and a duty of 1*s.* 6*d.* per cwt. on the like articles imported from the plantations of France, Spain, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden; and a duty of 1*d.* per pound on refined sugar imported from Great Britain; and a duty of ½*d.* per pound on the like article imported from the dominions of France, Spain, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden.—By a law passed in South Carolina, in 1784, higher duties were imposed on the produce of the British West-India islands than were payable on the like produce of the West-India islands of other foreign nations; and, in Georgia, similar acts were passed, for the same purposes. The committee believe, that the laws before mentioned are by no means all that have been passed for the purposes before stated. The regulations made in

It is notorious, that, at this very moment, staves imported into this country from the United States are only liable to *one-third* the amount of duty charged upon staves from other foreign countries,—even upon those imported from countries with which we are in the strictest amity.*

By charging the same rate of duties upon the timber of all foreign countries, and regulating the amount of the duties as circumstances and our own interest point out, we

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these respects, by the several legislatures, are so various, that it is hardly possible to obtain a complete account of them. The merchants of Glasgow estimate the tonnage-duty, imposed in the period above mentioned, on British shipping throughout all the United States, to have been, on an average, 2*s.* 3*d.* more per ton than on American ships, and that this charge on a ship of 200 tons, amounts to £22 : 10 for each voyage; and they estimate the duty, imposed during the said period, on goods imported in British ships through all the United States, to be, upon an average, 2 per cent. more than on the like goods imported in American ships, and that this charge on a cargo of the value of £2,000 amounts to £40.—*Report of the Lords of the Committee of Council, from Mr. Atcheson's Collection of Reports.*

* Fish, foreign staves, and lumber, are now excluded, by order of council, from the British West Indies.

might, in a very few years, secure the carriage of that article entirely to our own ships; and also, the supplying of it to our own colonies.

The advantages to be derived from the acquisition of this employment to our own ships would be immense. And it is our own fault if we do not secure the carriage of every load of timber which we import.

For no foreign nation would ever think of complaining of the duties which might be imposed for this purpose, provided they were equal in amount:—being a matter of mere domestic policy, and imposed agreeably to an inherent right, which we enjoy in common with other nations, of imposing what duties we choose upon foreign produce, no nation could or would ever complain of their amount.

Neither the American, Russian, Prussian, Danish, Swedish, nor any other foreign governments, consult our interest or inclinations in respect to the duties they impose upon such produce and manufactures as they import from this country; then, certainly, neither are we, therefore, under any obligation to consult any of their interests or conveniencies in this respect: far less to adopt or continue measures

which sacrifice our most important commercial interests to their advantage.

It is no doubt to this sacrifice of our duties upon American produce, that America owes a very large portion of her shipping. The tonnage which she annually cleared out for this country with timber alone, before the hostile measures she adopted towards us, was not less than 120,000 tons: being a downright sacrifice of a proportionate amount of our own shipping,—of our American provinces,—and, indeed, of our whole mercantile interest.

OF THE UNREASONABLE ADVANTAGES ALLOWED TO AMERICAN SHIPS, IN THE COUNTERVAILING DUTIES CHARGED BY THE BRITISH AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS RESPECTIVELY.

The difference, or extra duties, charged by the government of any particular country, upon the goods imported in foreign ships, compared

with that imported in their own vessels, is an alien, or, countervailing, duty, intended only to affect the ships; its object is neither the general policy of the importation of the goods which constitute its subject, nor the funds which it is to furnish; but, for the express purpose of encouraging and securing the freight to its own shipping.

A relative equality of this duty, therefore, as respects the relation in which nations stand to each other, is but just and reasonable. Indeed, no government, which attends to its own interests, will ever suffer an inequality in this respect to operate against them: but will charge, in favour of their own ships, equal to what is charged against them in every foreign country respectively; otherwise they are evidently guilty of conniving at the destruction of their own shipping-interest.*

* Your Majesty by the said orders in council, has allowed the goods and merchandize, being the growth, production, or manufacture, of the territories of the United States, though imported in ships belonging to the subjects of the United States, to be exempted from the alien-duty.

OBSERVATION.

The goods imported in ships belonging to all other foreign

The method, or data, by which the British and American governments have levied their

nations, are subject to the alien's duty; and the government of this country has received frequent complaints from other foreign nations of the distinction thus made, to their prejudice, in favour of the United States. (page 54.)

As the security of the British dominions principally depends upon the greatness of your Majesty's naval power, it has ever been the policy of the British government to watch, with a jealous eye, every attempt which has been made by foreign nations to the detriment of its navigation: and, even in cases where the interests of commerce, and those of navigation, could not be wholly reconciled, the government of Great Britain *has always given the preference to the interests of navigation:* and it has never yet submitted to the imposition of any tonnage-duties, by foreign nations, on British ships trading to their ports, without proceeding immediately to retaliation.

In the year 1593, during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the State of Venice, (which was then one of the first maritime powers of Europe,) made a distinction to the disadvantage of English ships in the duties on merchandize imported into, or exported from, the Venetian territories: Queen Elizabeth, in a charter she at that time gave to the Turkey Company, forbade, during the twelve years which the said charter was to continue, the importation, into England, of currants, or the wine of Candia, in Venetian ships, upon forfeiture of the said ships and their cargoes, unless the state of Venice should think fit to abolish the distinction before mentioned, to the disadvantage of the ships of England:—

countervailing duties, for the protection of their shipping, has been a per centage upon the

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and, in the year 1660, when the government of France imposed a duty of 50 sols per ton, payable in the ports of that kingdom, upon the shipping of all foreign nations, including therein the shipping of Great Britain, the legislature of this country, by the 12 Charles II. 2 chap. 18, immediately imposed, by way of retaliation, a duty of 5*s*. per ton, on all vessels belonging to the subjects of France, which should trade to the ports of this kingdom, and enacted, that this duty should continue to be collected as long as the duty of 50 sols per ton, or any part thereof, should be charged upon British ships trading to the ports of France, and three months longer.

As a further inducement to the government of Great Britain to pay due attention to the system of policy, which the congress of the United States appear now to have in view, the committee think it right to suggest, that, if the British legislature acquiesce in the distinctions already made by the present congress without remonstrance, the congress of the United States may, in a future session, be encouraged to increase these distinctions, so as to make them, in the end, effectual to the purpose for which they were intended. The house of representatives, in the two last sessions of congress, have certainly had such a measure in contemplation: in the last session they proceeded so far in it, that a resolution was passed, and a bill was twice read for that purpose; the members returned from the northern states strongly supported this measure; those of the southern states resisted it, as being contrary to their interests; the more moderate members, both of the senate and house of representatives, thought the

other duties. For instance, we have been in the habit of making an extra charge, upon importations made in American ships, of *ten per cent.* upon our duties; America also charged extra, upon importations made in British ships, about ten per cent. upon her duties. These data answered her purpose extremely well: for our importations are principally articles of great bulk, small value, and liable to low duties: whilst her importations are of great value in proportion to their bulk, and, being manufactured goods for the general consumption of the country, are a proper object of taxation, and are indeed liable to very heavy duties.

Although her countervailing duties and ours, therefore, might be nearly equal as to per centage upon the other duties, yet in amount they differed widely in her favour; and, consequently, answered the purposes for which they were intended.

That a clear and accurate view of this im-

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time was not yet arrived when they might venture with safety to take a step of this importance. (page 125.)—*Report of the Lords of the Committee of Council, from Mr. Atcheson's Collection of Reports.*

portant subject may be had, I have, in No. 3, in the Appendix, given a statement of the bulkiest articles of which our importations both from Europe and America consist; exhibiting the amount of the duties with which these articles are chargeable; and also shewing, what the countervailing duty in favour of our own shipping amounts to per ton of 40 cubic feet, or, per ton weight, of such goods as 20 cwt. of which would not amount to a ton measurement; and have also, in No. 4, given a list of the principal articles of the manufactures, &c. which we have been in the habit of exporting to the United States; shewing the amount of American duties with which they are chargeable; and the amount of the countervailing duty per ton, charged by the government of the United States for the protection and encouragement of their shipping.

The ton of 40 cubic feet is the most common standard by which cargoes are computed, or freights reckoned; and, indeed, the freight of all such goods, as, that the ton of 20 cwt. of which exceeds 40 cubic feet, is paid by this measurement, or, at least, (if paid by weight or any other rule,) the amount or rate is proportioned

to the measure, or bulk, of the goods; such as cotton, sugar, wine and other liquids, &c. I have, therefore, adopted this as the most proper measure, or standard, by which to estimate the tonnage, in any discussions concerning freight.

By the statement No. 3, it will be found, that the countervailing duty per ton, which we charged in favour of our own ships, was 6*s*. 8*d*. upon cotton, and 15*s*. upon tobacco: but, upon lumber, which of all others, is the article of the most material consequence, being the most bulky, there is only 6½*d*. to 1*s*. 7½*d*. per ton charged, to secure the carriage of this important commodity to our own ships. By this statement, it appears that the average amount of the countervailing duty which we have been in the habit of charging, upon our importations of lumber from America, was about 18*d*. a ton; and, that the average of what we charged upon the principal articles of American produce which we import, was only about 22*d*. per ton.

From the statement No. 4, it appears that, for the encouragement and protection of the American shipping, a countervailing duty upon the articles enumerated, from 4*s*. to £30 per

ton, averaging about £3, was charged upon the goods imported in British ships.

This document shews us, that the American government, instead of protecting and encouraging their shipping-interest, by a countervailing duty, of only about the *sixtieth part* of the freight, secured that important interest more effectually, namely, by a countervailing duty of nearly the *whole amount* of the freight.

It is also important to observe, that, in 1804, the American government raised the whole duties charged upon their imports from this country, and at the same time added something more than $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. *ad valorem*, to their old countervailing duty; being an addition of about 10*s*. per ton, averaging the value as in No. 4.

It is likewise remarkable, that our government did not raise the duties charged upon American produce imported into this country until the year 1808; and it is moreover notorious, that, instead of the countervailing duty being then also raised, it was actually reduced; —reduced from an insignificant trifle to a mere shadow,—from about 18*d*. per ton upon lumber to 7$\frac{1}{2}$*d*.

Thus we see that, after having for several years submitted to the most exorbitant additional duties, charged by the United States in favour of her own ships, without having recourse to retaliation in any shape, we at last, for the protection of our shipping-interest, adopted measures which were but calculated to mock our injured ship-owners; for, what could be more insulting than to talk of protecting their interests by allowing them *eighteen pence* to balance an imposition of £3!!

When we did at last charge the alien-duty upon our importations from the United States, we were not bound to lay it on according to any certain rule,—neither by a per centage upon the duties, nor by any other particular mode; but, whatever the mode adopted might have been, the amount charged ought, as to the proportion which it bore to the freight, to have exactly corresponded with that charged by America:—in fact, it ought to have been £3 per ton instead of 18*d*.

As this duty is specially laid on to the disadvantage of foreign ships, for the interest and encouragement of the ships of the country into which the importations are made; and, as

such distinctions have been acceded to both by us and the Americans, undoubtedly neither nation could object to the other's making a charge in favour of their own ships, equal to what the other charged in favour of theirs: the interest of the ships being the direct object of the tax.

It is, therefore, unreasonable to suppose, that any certain per centage upon the duties could be considered an equitable mode of levying this duty; and equally absurd to suppose, that either nation, whilst they had the least claim to common sense in support of their arguments, would object to the other's charging this countervailing duty, even at the rate of 3,300 per cent. upon their other duties, provided such a proportion were requisite to render the countervailing duties equally advantageous to their ships, as that charged by the other nation; about 3,300 per cent. appears to have been the rate at which *the British government*, for the *encouragement of American shipping*, allowed her countervailing duty to exceed ours!!*

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* If it should be thought proper to subject the goods brought in American ships to the duties payable generally on goods brought in foreign ships, and also to equalize the

For various reasons the amount of duties, charged by the two countries upon their importations respectively, must vary most materially, as to the proportion they bear to the tonnage of the goods upon which they are levied; and, therefore, an equal per centage upon these duties must produce, upon their respective shipping-interests, effects extremely different;—effects, only calculated to *encou-*

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tonnage-duties, it will be a discouragement to American shipping, and an encouragement to British shipping, to the extent of the present difference of the duty; and such measures will not prevent the same quantity of American produce being brought into this country,—more will be brought in British ships,—less in American ships.

There is no security, that congress will not be induced to increase the duties on British and other foreign ships. It is probable that they will increase these duties as their shipping increase, and British capitals can be easily transported to America for that purpose. Foreigners have no title to complain of what congress have done or may do in this respect;—theymay equalize if they think proper. *Congress have, in this instance, acted with true political wisdom, and on sound principles of navigation-laws,* and they will not be disposed to alter so wise a system.—*Opinion of a Committee of the Merchants of Glasgow, submitted to the Committee of the Lords of Council, from Mr. Atchison's Collection of Reports.*

rage and increase the American shipping, and in an equal ratio discourage and sacrifice ours :— The Americans will, therefore, no doubt, eagerly embrace a principle so much calculated to promote their interests.

To regulate this important duty, according to the strictest principles of equitable reciprocity, and agreeably to our own interest, we ought to ascertain, (according to the rule laid down in No. 4, in the Appendix,) the precise amount, per ton, of the duty charged by America, and then charge what would amount to an equal proportion of the freight.

It is, therefore, of the first importance, to ascertain the exact amount, per ton, imposed by the government of the United States.

To acquire the necessary information upon this point, let the tonnage of the goods exported thither be ascertained, which might be done, either from the information of the exporters, as to the relative proportions which the value and tonnage of each article or species of goods, of which our exports consist, bear to each other, or, which would be a surer and a much less objectionable method,—by having

the tonnage, by which freights are paid, of all goods exported, entered at the custom-house.

The amount of the American countervailing duty, per ton, being thus ascertained, we ought then to charge ours, either by the ton, or, as heretofore, by a per centage upon the duties, (but, with this great, important, and equitable, difference,) regulating that per centage so as to produce a proportion to the freight exactly corresponding with that charged by America, —no matter whether such per centage were ten or whether it were several thousand per cent. upon the other duties.

It is to be hoped, that the various circumstances concerning this important subject will be minutely investigated and carefully attended to in future. For, it is evident, that although we have hitherto, in our commercial treaties and other regulations, respecting our trade with America, stipulated and provided concerning countervailing duties, and have talked of laying this, that, and the other, per centage upon some other per centage, in addition to these countervailing duties, — all speciously pretended for the encouragement of our shipping — yet, nevertheless, we have, in the blind-

est and most ignorant manner, been, in reality, bartering our ship-owners interests and legitimate privileges for a mere shadow;—been actually, by our legislative knowledge, experience, and consummate skill, in financial and commercial affairs, securing our shipping-interest, by a countervailing duty of 18*d.* per ton upon timber, which is one of the bulkiest articles which we import, (being no less than about the sixtieth part of the freight,) and submitting to the American government's imposition of a countervailing duty of nearly the whole amount of the freight in favour of their shipping;—thus, catching at the shadow whilst they enjoy the substance.

Our countervailing duty was known to exist, or appeared only as an embellishment to an act of parliament,—by the prominent feature it forms in a compilation of our custom-house-duties,—or, by the arithmetical exercise it gives our custom-house-clerks; but, the American alien-duties were most feelingly proved to exist by their operation; and, indeed, so effectually did they operate, that not a package of goods was ever shipped from this country in a British ship, whilst an American vessel was to be found to receive it.

It is impossible, with any degree of accuracy, to compute the amount of British shipping which our government have sacrificed by the enormous and incredible advantages allowed to America, over British ships, in respect to these countervailing duties, — £3 to 22*d.*— a preference of 3,300 per cent.; and yet an equality of these charges is what the Americans, unreasonable as they were, would have never objected to: or, as a committee of the merchants of Glasgow observed upon the subject, in a communication to a committee of the privy council, that "Foreigners," and of course we amongst others, "had no right to complain of what congress have charged, or may charge, in this respect,—they may equalize if they think proper. "*Congress have, in this instance, acted with true political wisdom, and on sound principles of navigation laws.*"*

Considering the attention which America has shewn to her shipping-interest, and how much she has scrutinized every part of our conduct, in all our commercial concerns, which in any way directly or indirectly affected

* See Note to page 129.

her interests,—would she have allowed such a difference to have existed against her ships? Undoubtedly she would not! Her conduct, hitherto, is sufficient to convince us that she would have immediately met any extra charge of ours, in this respect, with a corresponding amount of duties.

No government, perhaps our own excepted, would have so long submitted, under similar circumstances, to such depredations upon the most valuable branch of our commercial establishment.

The amount of our shipping thus sacrificed must be very considerable. For the American ships having, by the wisdom of their government, all the shipments from this country secured to them, were thereby enabled to carry their own produce to Great Britain at proportionably a cheaper rate.

Considering this advantage enjoyed by American ships,—that our shipping laboured under the disadvantage of the high price which they cost,—the heavy expense at which they were navigated,—and unaided by an adequate alien-duty, it was no wonder that ours were almost entirely excluded from any participation, in

either the export or import trade with America.

From the view taken of this important subject it is obvious, that, as an inherent right of regulating the commercial intercourse between its own subjects and foreigners, every nation has also the right, upon the immutable principle of equity and justice and the laws and customs of nations, as universally acknowledged, to impose such countervailing duties as it may deem expedient.

Consequently, no nation, which may be the object of such duties, *has cause to complain*, having it also in her power to counteract the duties imposed by any particular state by *counterpoising them with others equally beneficial* to its own shipping.

The right, therefore, remains undisputed; and, with respect to the expediency of exercising it, it is obvious, that, to this country, whose *imports* exceeds its *exports*, the *higher the countervailing* duties imposed by foreigners in favour of their own ships are, the *more advantageous, therefore, to British ships*, considering that an *equal charge in favour of ours* would operate effectually in securing the carriage of our

imports, as theirs would in the carriage of our exports,—we should, therefore, be the gainers, in proportion as our imports exceeded our exports.—If such foreigners charged these duties so high as to secure the carriage of all their imports from us—so much the more in our favour! as, an equal amount of duty, which we should, as a matter of course, charge (were we not obstinately blind to our own interest as heretofore) would as certainly secure to us the carriage of the whole of our imports from them.

This favourable opportunity has been afforded us by America — she charged a countervailing duty of such an amount, that, had we raised ours to an equal proportion of the freight, it would have secured to us the carriage of every ton of goods which we imported from that country; — she actually, thereby, offered us the carriage of her exports to this country, being about 150,000 tons per annum, in exchange for the carriage of our exports to her ports, being only, perhaps, about 30,000 tons, Unfortunately, however, for British merchants and British ship-owners, our legislators, from some unaccountable motives, *disregarded*

our shipping-interest, and, with their *usual condescension and generosity towards America*, let her enjoy the carriage of both!

OF THE INEQUALITY OF THE AMOUNT OF THE DUTIES CHARGED UPON THE LUMBER WHICH WE IMPORT IN GENERAL.

The object of the custom-house-duties charged upon the foreign produce which we import, is, in general, the funds which they furnish; with a few exceptions, at least, such as exorbitant duties intended as prohibitions; and countervailing duties, either for the protection and encouragement of our shipping, or for the encouragement of our own colonies.

An equality of the duties upon our imports from foreign countries (that is to say, from countries other than our own colonies) is, therefore, both as far as relates to impartiality to the foreign nations furnishing the articles*

* See Note to page 128.

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and our own interest in the revenue, indispensably necessary.—The only difference, which ought to be allowed to exist in these duties, should be only an additional charge upon the produce of countries not in amity with us, and in some trifling instances in respect to articles of which a variety of qualities are indispensably necessary.

No variety in the quality of any species of timber, however, is necessary; the best quality of every particular kind being fit for every purpose to which an inferior sort could be applied. As the cost of all foreign timber consists almost wholly in freight and other charges in transportation, and duties, a reduction of duty on account of quality must, therefore, be the most impolitic sacrifice of our revenue, and cannot be viewed in any other light than a premium paid to enable the people who are unfortunate enough to be the proprietors of a bad quality to vend their inferior stuff in this country, and also to keep up a successful competition with those who import the most superior timber.

We have, however, for some time past, been in the habit of charging different rates of duties

upon the timber which we import from foreign countries. The distinctions have been principally in favour of America and Denmark; the very two nations, which, of all others, have practised the greatest deceit towards us, — two nations, who stand unparalleled in respect to the lengths they have lately gone to vilify and defame, in the most wicked and groundless manner, our character as a nation.

The grounds upon which our American advocates have founded their claims for this privilege to the United States are, the inferiority of the timber* and its distance from our market, and consequent liability to high freight; and the reason for charging a reduced rate of duties upon Norway timber was also its inferior quality,—reasons the most absurd, in favour of whatever nation they may have been urged; but, with respect to America and Den-

* By taking notice of the prices current at Liverpool, and other ports where American timber was regularly imported, it will be found that American timber, both oak and pine, (except pitch pine,) sold at considerably lower prices than either European or Quebec timber.

mark in particular, they are altogether unaccountable.

These governments may urge, as a plea to secure this privilege, that the same rate of duty being charged upon their timber, as upon Russian, Prussian, and other European timber, would not leave a sufficient amount to pay freight, and would, therefore, amount to a prohibition,—so it may, and so is many an honest, worthy Englishman absolutely prohibited from riding upon the king's high-way, from the expense of a horse being beyond his reach.—It is not our business to take notice of the distance at which the foreign timber, which we import, is from our market, nor of what quality it is, with respect to the equality of the duties to which it is liable; considering that we can have an abundant supply, without making any abatement of duty upon the timber of any particular foreign country.

Had a scarcity of supplies been either experienced or reasonably apprehended, the duties in general might have been lowered; but, as there has never been any want or even scarcity, except in some trifling instances, arising principally out of our destructive licensing system,

there was no occasion for this expedient. Indeed it is clearly shewn, in the 3d chapter, that our American colonies are more than sufficient to supply all our demands for timber of every description. This abatement of duties, therefore, in *favour* of *Denmark* and *America*, being, to the former, 10*s*. per load, upon pine or fir, and, to the latter, 18*s*. 6*d*. upon fir, 15*s*. 6*d*. upon oak, and in the like proportion upon all other items of our timber-importations from the United States were mere sacrifices.

With respect to the motive which induced this sacrifice, considering that our colonies have always proved themselves capable of furnishing supplies infinitely beyond the greatest demand; and, that our ship-owners were suffering the greatest distress for want of employment to their ships, it is obvious, that, as there was neither a scarcity of timber nor of shipping to carry it, this sacrifice must have proceeded from mere generosity,—and as a *bounty* granted the *Danes* and *Americans* in support of their shipping, to enable them, with an inferior article, to maintain a *successful competion* with *our own colonists*, in the supply of

the British market with timber of the most superior quality.

OF THE ADMISSION OF ENEMIES PROPERTY BY LICENCE, AND THE 43d GEO. III.

Respecting our trade by licence, or, *Privy-Council-system of commerce!* it may be observed, that the British nation owes its commercial greatness and superiority over all other nations in this respect, to the peculiar properties of the British constitution, which, by the safety it provides for private property, and by the protection and encouragement it holds out to industry, thereby affords commercial facilities and advantages not to be equalled in any other nation.

The laws which respect commerce (not orders in council, or laws made for the convenience of retailing commercial licenses, but the laws of the land, calculated to give permanency and security to every species of mercantile industry) have been proved, by expe-

rience, and treasured up in the constitution for the protection and encouragement of trade. These laws (the most important of which are those that respect our shipping) so amply provide for the safety and security of commercial enterprise, as to give the fullest scope to the plans and schemes which the enterprising and ingenious may introduce into our mercantile system of economy and industry, notwithstanding that many years, in which peace and war may alternately prevail, may be necessary to bring such undertakings to maturity: whereas, the arbitrary and uncertain measures of the governments of other countries, with few exceptions at least, are such as render private property insecure, all mercantile pursuits uncertain, and the best-contrived commercial schemes generally unsuccessful. But the British constitution scrupulously respecting and protecting private property from every imposition, and so amply providing for the protection and encouragement of every branch of business, as to set all our manufacturing and commercial concerns in motion, supporting each other like the constituent parts of a well-constructed piece of machinery, thereby enables

us, notwithstanding the prices of labour, and the raw material, may be much higher than in most other foreign countries, successfully to come in competition, both with the foreign manufactures and ship-owners.

It is neither from a carelessness of the sovereigns of the continent of Europe and their ministers concerning the thriving of their commerce and manufactures,—nor because our government is more assiduous in their attention to these affairs,—neither from any natural disposition to indolence or want of enterprise in the people upon the continent,—nor because we individually excel in industry and ingenuity, that we exceed every other nation in commerce,—but, as I have already observed, because our laws, which respect our mercantile pursuits, excel those of all other countries, being (at least until lately) laws of the land, enacted from the wise deliberation of a parliament representing all classes and interests of the community, and rendered secure, by the peculiar properties of our constitution.

Notwithstanding the advantages, however, which we have derived from adhering to a permanent system of commercial laws, we have

lately shewn a most unaccountable disposition to strike out of the good old path, chalked out by the wisdom of our ancestors, which has conducted us to a degree of national consequence and commercial prosperity, hitherto unparalleled, into the crooked bye-ways of the European governments, whose arbitrary interference with a subject upon which they have had no comparative experience, have long shackled and discouraged, and, in many instances, ruined their commerce. Yet it is to speculations such as these, conceived in ignorance and hatched in power, that our Privy Council has thought proper to sacrifice the navigation-laws of our ancestors, which may be justly termed the pillars which support our national renown, and the sheet-anchor of our commercial prosperity.

The act of the 23d Geo. III. cap. 39, dated the 12th of May, 1783, authorised his Majesty in council to suspend, as regarded America, every law existing for the regulation of our commercial concerns with foreign nations, and to adopt, in their stead, whatever measures, rules, or regulations, they might choose to adopt. This was, indeed, understood to have been but

a temporary measure; but it set an example, which has unfortunately been too much copied from ever since that period.

Amongst the first proceedings of our Privy Council, in the regulation of our commerce with the United States of America under this act, were his Majesty's orders in council, of the 14th of May and 6th of June, 1783, admitting American produce and manufactures into this country, at the same rate of duties as was charged upon the produce and manufactures of our colonies. According to these proclamations, no countervailing duty was charged in favour of our own ships, nor was any certificate required, as usual, that the goods were the produce and manufactures of the United States.

Thus did our legislature, by this act of the 12th of May, 1783, at once set aside and render nugatory (as far as regarded the United States) those very laws which had not only reared, but were so essential to the protection of our shipping and commerce,—putting the regulation of all our commercial concerns with that country into the power of the Privy Council, who, it will be observed, lost no time in exercising

these powers; for, only two days after they were vested with this dangerous authority, they actually sacrificed the great bulwark of our shipping, colonial, and commercial, interest to the United States. To satisfy this new government, our ministers readily trampled under foot those laws, of which the most powerful nations upon the continent of Europe never could extort from their predecessors the smallest relaxation.*—They without hesitation franked the Americans the duties charged upon other foreign produce,—exempted their ships from countervailing duty, and dispensed with a certificate of the origin of the goods imported in their ships:—thus, is our Privy Council to be found, at once robbing our revenue, discouraging and disregarding our colonies, by shutting up the valuable sources of wealth which they held out,—injuring our commerce, and ruining our shipping,—and, moreover, admitting that very principle which Buonaparte's insisting upon, has been the principal cause of the most expensive war in which we have ever been engaged, and the most destructive

* See note, p. 115.

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which has ever raged upon the continent of Europe;—namely, that free ships make free goods, that the ships naturalize the property;—a principle equally repugnant to common sense and sound reason, as it is hostile to the interests and safety of this country.

In the year 1807, there was also another impolitic and unnecessary surrender of our maritime laws into the hands of our Privy Council, in respect to the opening of the ports of our West Indian colonies to foreigners, called the *American Intercourse Bill.*

This bill authorised the King and his successors, with the advice of the Privy Council, to suspend, during the *present* or *any future* war, all the provisions of the *Act of Navigation* in the British settlements in the West Indies and South America, both as to exports and imports.

This measure was forced upon the shipping and commercial interests of this country in the most arbitrary manner. Instead of evidence being examined, in order to have obtained all necessary information upon a subject of such immense importance, the great body of ship-owners were even, upon solicitation, refused an opportunity of defending themselves against this most capricious and violent

inroad made upon interests, which constitute the main-spring of our commerce.* An act which was to give permanency and security to an absurd practice which had already sacrificed upwards of 120,000 tons of our shipping,—equal to three times the amount of all the tonnage which we annually clear out for the whole ports of our East Indian possessions,—was passed with much less hesitation, less caution or consideration, than would have probably been bestowed upon an act for the regulation of the concerns of a turnpike or theatre.

It has been clearly shewn, in the beginning of this chapter, that the relaxation of our navigation-laws, in opening the ports of our West-India settlements to American ships has

* The various classes of petitioners against the bill, with a degree of moderation highly commendable at all times, but especially under the present critical and alarming situation of the navigation and trade of the empire, urged the necessity of an inquiry on the subject before a committee; but all these entreaties in that respect were unavailing, and the promoters of that ruinous measure *denied to them* that, which had hitherto, in all other branches of trade, been considered a matter of course, if not of right,—namely, the appointment of a committee to inquire into the nature and true merits of these respective cases.—*Mr. Acheson's Introduction to his Collection of Reports.*

been evidently a most unnecessary sacrifice of our own shipping-interest. For, it is obvious, that had the necessary information been obtained, it would have been found, that if the produce of the United States could not have been dispensed with, in the supplying of our West-Indian colonies, the admission of the produce would have, at any rate, been the full extent to which any relaxation of our navigation-laws would have been necessary in this respect; for, most assuredly, their ships might have been spared without the most distant risk of inconvenience.

Another, and upon general principles, the greatest source of mischief opened to us by the admission of enemies property, arises from the unlimited amount and incalculable irregularities as to the quantity of enemies produce imported by virtue of the act of the 43d Geo. III. cap. 153, which is a canker-worm lodged by our legislature in the great body of our commercial, shipping, and colonial interests, wasting its very vitals, and, if not removed, will, in the end, if war continue, ultimately ruin it.*

* That in the confident and general expectation that the North Americans would not be permitted to carry on their

By this act the produce and manufactures of the countries with whom we may be at war

export-trade during their war against this country, considerable shipments of manufactured goods have already taken place; and others to a much greater extent are now preparing for Brazil and other places, for the sole purpose of having cotton-wool in return, which intended export of manufactured goods will, however, now receive a severe check, by the knowledge of the afore-mentioned act of parliament, permitting the import of cotton-wool from the United States, by neutral vessels.

That many of our manufacturing people will consequently be thrown out of employ, and many of our commercial men meet with severe losses.

That much of our shipping, which would otherwise be beneficially employed in the export of our manufactures and the bringing home of considerable quantities of cotton-wool from the Brazils, and from the East and West Indies, will now remain unemployed; the effects of which are already felt to a very considerable extent, by the fall in price of freight for British shipping to and from the Brazils.

That it is humbly submitted to be sound policy and consequently to be highly expedient, that the natives and residents of our own colonies, together with those of our allies, who *constantly* take from us our manufactured goods in payment of their produce, should have the exclusive privilege of supplying us with the raw material, in preference to those who prohibit and interdict our commerce and manufactures.

That if North America be permitted to carry on her export-trade during the war, by neutrals, she will. by such

are admitted into Great Britain, direct from enemies ports, in neutral ships, and liable only to the same rate of duties as they were chargeable with in time of peace.

For some few articles of indispensable necessity, we may be rendered dependent upon our enemies for supplies. In such cases, however, care ought to be taken to ascertain whether or not we could obtain a sufficient supply, by confining the importation to our own ships, and measures adopted accordingly.

Every species of enemies produce, of which we could obtain sufficient quantities from our own colonies and friendly nations, ought certainly to be prohibited, as it was by the laws which existed previous to the passing of this act. But, as to such articles as could not altogether be dispensed with, whilst, at the same time, an adequate supply could be ob-

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means, have the exclusive advantage of supplying, with her cotton-wool and other articles, all the European markets, where the ports are not blockaded; to the obvious disadvantage of our manufactures, merchants, and ship-owners, who would otherwise have the supplying of those markets from hence with our manufactured goods.—*Mr. Lyne's Letter to Lord Castlereagh.*

tained from neutral ports, then let us limit the importation of these to our own ships; and of such goods as we could not dispense with, nor obtain the necessary quantity from neutral ports; in such cases only this act could be judiciously had recourse to.

Timber, for example, is an article of such indispensable necessity, that, were we reduced to a dependence upon our enemies for our supplies of it, considering its great bulk and comparatively small value, we should certainly find ourselves under the necessity of admitting it direct from the ports of our enemies, in neutral ships, and, failing them, even in those of our enemies.

Instead, however, of being under or even liable to this necessity, of late years, our own colonies, even without the least aid from any foreign country whatever, are capable of furnishing us with the most abundant supplies.

Cotton, as a raw material of the very first importance to our manufactures, is also an article of indispensable necessity. Were we therefore rendered wholly dependent upon our enemies for this important article, we should, no doubt, be obliged to secure supplies, either

from neutral ports by our own ships, or, according to circumstances, even to admit importations, under this act, by neutral ships, direct from enemies ports.

Under existing circumstances, however, notwithstanding that cotton has become an article of the very first consequence to our manufactures, this act is altogether unnecessary for the encouragement of its importation.

Our own East and West Indian colonies, and the countries in amity with us, such as the Brazils, &c. are capable of amply satisfying all our demands; at any rate, with such cotton of the United States as could be obtained from the ports of neutrals, taken as prizes, &c. they would afford the most abundant supplies.*

* The unfortunate planters in the late Dutch and British colonies, deprived of that choice of market which the foreign planters enjoy, are compelled to send their cottons to this country; their supplies, whatever they may cost, must be drawn from hence: their poverty puts it out of their power to hold back their crops, however much at times it might be for their interest to do so, and though now loaded with additional freight and insurance consequent upon the American war, they pay the same duty here with the neutral foreigner, who is exempted from all these consequences; therefore, from them, thus depressed and broken down,

The present importation of cotton from the United States, and the present and late importations of timber from enemies countries, are, therefore, and have been, unnecessary; they are, indeed, measures of great hardship and injustice towards our own colonists and ship-owners, and impolitic and ungenerous towards our antient and faithful allies, the Portuguese.

Hemp is likewise an article of imperious necessity, for purposes of the first importance. For our supplies of this article we have been

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thrown on the mercy of their country, yet treated worse than strangers, no change of measures are to be apprehended.

I have, my Lord, next to contemplate the probable results that are to be expected, if the import of American cottons is restricted to British ships from neutral ports. The adoption of this measure would be returning to the system of our *navigation-laws*, and the performance of an act of justice to the British ship-owners. This system, I will venture to assert, ought never to be departed from, but under circumstances of the most urgent pressure and necessity, such as, in the present case, I humbly contend do not exist. Our naval greatness and commercial consequence are admitted to be closely connected, if not dependent upon our adherence to its principles, and that they cannot be departed from, without feeding the resources of the enemy, or the neutral, at our expense.—*Mr. Gladstone's Letter to the Board of Trade.*

hitherto principally dependent upon foreigners; and, considering that but few countries produce it for exportation, and that, from the peculiarities of the situation of those countries from whence it can only be obtained, when we are at war with them, our supplies are generally not to be procured from neutral ports; and, therefore, this act might, at certain times, be very properly put in operation for the admission of this important commodity, in neutral ships, direct from enemies ports.

The same mode of reasoning applies to every item of which our imports consist, viz. either as adduced with respect to timber, cotton, or hemp; the whole ought, therefore, to be classed accordingly.

In the first place, for example, all articles, (the produce of an enemy's country,) being articles of which we could obtain a sufficient supply from our own colonies and countries in amity with us, ought, undoubtedly, according to the above observations respecting timber, and agreeably to our old maritime laws, to be prohibited, except imported in our own ships, and warehoused, for exportation.

In the second place, all articles, (the produce of enemies countries,) being articles of which we could not obtain sufficient supplies from our own colonies and countries in amity with us, but of which a sufficiency could be procured by only admitting such articles of enemies produce from neutral ports, according to the above observations respecting cotton, ought to be admitted only in British ships :—And,

In the third place, all articles, (the produce of enemies countries,) being articles of which we could not obtain adequate supplies from our own colonies,—countries in amity with us, nor even from neutral ports, according to the above observations respecting hemp, ought, no doubt, during the existence of such circumstances, to be admitted from enemies ports in neutral ships.

Had every item of which our importations consisted been judiciously classed under one or other of these three cases, and our importations regulated accordingly, our colonies would have been now in a more thriving state,—our shipping in a more flourishing condition,—and our whole commercial and manufacturing concerns infinitely less liable to those glaring irregularities

which they have of late experienced,—irregularities which have, to an alarming extent, converted our merchants into adventurers, and our mariners into smugglers, under the patronage and direction of *a British Privy Council ! !**

For the sake of one or two articles, however, this sweeping act has been adopted, levelling all the privileges and advantages which our colonies, and the nations in amity with us, have an undoubted right to enjoy; placing them, in fact, upon a footing with our most inveterate enemies.

The injury which our North-American provinces—and the greatest of all the many injuries which our shipping interest have sustained from the importations made under this act has been in the importation of timber:—for our shipping has been injured by being deprived of the carriage of it, which would have

* The connivance of our legal authorities at our own and the ships of foreign nations, trading to our ports by licence under false colours, and the consequent perjury inseparable from such practices, proves this assertion to a demonstration.

been secured to them if brought from our own colonies; and our American colonies have been injured both by the irregularity and incalculable amount of the quantity introduced, as well as in the admission of it upon any terms; these provinces being capable (as I have clearly shewn in the next chapter) of supplying all our demands for that article.

It may not be improper here to remark, that the scarcity of specie has been attributed to our licensing system, merely for the purpose of shewing, that, although this scarcity had not existed the ruinous tendency of this pernicious mode of carrying on our commerce, might have been discovered; and, therefore, that, were an abundant supply of the precious metal again to supply the place of this scarcity, or, in other words, were Bank-of-England notes again readily convertible into specie, it would afford no proof that our license-trade was profitable to the country and according to the principles of sound policy.

The scarcity of specie, felt by government, proceeds principally from the immense expenditure they have been led into for the very salvation of

the country; having been left alone to defend our own independence, and the antient freedom of Europe, against the most powerful enemy that ever assailed this or any other country.

From this vast and necessary expenditure, therefore, they have experienced, that nations, like individuals, must necessarily find money scarce in proportion as their means of purchasing it are limited; — that, when they are not in possession of real funds, their extraordinary anticipations must produce inconvenience, and be made at considerable disadvantages, which must be the case with respect to large sums borrowed for the purpose of sending abroad.

Had the revenue of the country been even nearly sufficient to meet the public expenditure, the present scarcity of specie would not have been felt; for the profits upon our commerce would have more than enabled them to have made all the exports of bullion necessary for their foreign expenditure, without producing any inconvenience. But, considering the enormous sums that government have been imperiously called upon to borrow, for the very salvation

of the country; and, particularly, considering the great proportion which our foreign expenditure bears to the whole, the profits of our commerce were unequal to balance such an exhausting exportation of bullion, so necessarily made, without producing such inconveniences as we have felt.

These speculative projects of our Privy Council, (I mean the licensing system carried on under the 43d Geo. III. cap. 153,) abstractedly considered, are certainly not calculated to produce a scarcity of specie: for, had these adventurous speculations been, upon the whole, profitable to the country, instead of draining us of our specie, they would, on the contrary, have even contributed to our ability to send specie abroad. This new method of carrying on our trade with foreign parts, however, has been extremely ruinous, and, consequently, a drain of specie from this country has been one of the many ruinous effects which it has produced.

To go fully into a discussion concerning our licence-trade would of itself form a work of great length: it is not my intention, however, neither is it here necessary, to go into particu-

lars, further than the few general observations which I have made concerning its effects upon our American provinces, and the consequent injury which our shipping has sustained.

It may be further observed, however, that orders of council may very properly be had recourse to in cases of great and sudden emergency. For example, in the instance of those retaliatory measures wisely adopted to meet Buonaparte's Milan decrees, and to thwart the projects craftily contrived by him, and connived at by the United States, for our destruction: but, in the above instances, orders in council were introduced to suspend and controul those wise and salutary laws of our ancestors, calculated to regulate all our mercantile transactions with America, and to have provided amply for every contingency which could have arisen out of such transactions. And, if any new case should have occurred in the common course of business, it ought to have been the subject of legislative investigation, and not disposed of in a summary way by the executive branch of our government.

OF THE HIGH PRICE OF OUR SHIPS AND THE GREAT EXPENSE AT WHICH THEY ARE NAVIGATED, COMPARED WITH THE FOREIGN SHIPS WITH WHICH THEY HAVE TO COME IN COMPETITION.

With respect to the comparative difference of expense at which our ships and those of America were navigated, previous to the late interruptions which have taken place in our commercial intercourse with that country, No. 4, in the Appendix, is an estimate which shews a disadvantage against us, in this respect, of no less than 28*s.* per ton, upon a six months voyage.

Possibly in this estimate the exact value and expense may not be correctly ascertained. It is, however, notorious to every one who is acquainted with these affairs, that foreign ships are and have been, for some time past, navigated at considerably smaller expense than ours; and, at the same time, it is more probable that the difference is rather under than over-rated.

The high price of our ships, and the great expense at which they are navigated, are circumstances which, in respect to our coasting and colonial trade, are no injury to our shipowner,—in this respect they only keep pace with the price of labour, and the prices of things in general.

But this great expense, as far as it respects our trade with foreign countries, being combined with various other circumstances, is to our shipping-interest ruinous in the extreme:—the ports of our colonies opened to the Americans;—the partiality shewn to foreigners, in respect to the duties charged upon timber;—the enormous advantages allowed the Americans in countervailing duties, and our licensing system;—these, with the high price of our ships, are calculated to sweep our foreign shipping from the ocean.

Supposing the maintenance of our labouring class of society cost five times more than the maintenance of the like class amongst the Russians, yet, if the Englishmen's wages are commensurate with the high price of their living, the disparity of prices does not render them less comfortably situated, compared with

the Russians. But how would such Englishmen be circumstanced, were myriads of Russians to come into this country, and come in competition with them for wages; the Russians enjoying, at the same time, the unreasonable advantage of having their subsistence furnished to them at the same low rate they paid for it in their native country? There is no doubt wages would be reduced, and the Englishmen, in the midst of plenty, might perish for want of bread. Yet this case and that of our shipping-interest are so exactly parallel, that, as certainly as our labouring class would suffer under such circumstances, in precisely the same proportion is our shipping as unreasonably and unjustly suffering, and will continue to suffer as long as the cause which has been above-assigned remains unremoved, or at least until its baneful effects are rendered less injurious, by a careful attention to other circumstances.

The difference of the value in the ships, of the sailors wages, of the price of provisions, of the amount of insurance, &c. and, in fact, of every item composing the expense of navigating the ships of the respective countries ought to be taken into consideration, in

laying on the duties upon all importations from foreign countries; and, if the difference should then appear against us, as in No. 5, an additional duty, precisely equal to that difference, should be charged upon all importations made in foreign ships; and then, over and above that difference, a countervailing duty in favour of our own shipping.

Had this equitable principle been declared and acted upon in our late commercial intercourse with the United States, the additional duty upon the produce of that country, imported in American ships, over and above that charged upon what was imported in our own vessels, instead of being 1*s*. 7½*d* per ton upon timber, would have been, in the first place, 28*s*. (see No. 5.) and, in next place, a countervailing duty, equal to what the Americans charged, which, according to No. 4, in the Appendix, was £3 : 10, being, together, £4 : 18 per ton, instead of the pitiful sum of 1*s*. 7½*d*.!

This rule, for regulating the duties for the protection of our shipping-interest, equally applies to all foreign countries as well as to America; and our shipping must actually either still continue to suffer in every competition, or that

disadvantage must be attended to and, either directly or indirectly, counterpoised.

Possibly some difficulty might be experienced in charging a direct extra tax upon importations made in foreign vessels, to balance the high price of our ships, by the opposition of the governments of foreign countries, as it is very unlikely that they would have occasion to claim from us any such privilege, and may, therefore, be the less inclined to acknowledge the principle, however just in itself.

If such obstacles should prove insurmountable, which I admit they might, perhaps we ought, therefore, to be upon the alert to remove all other disabilities, particularly those above-mentioned; in the doing of which no foreign governments would have any right to interfere.

From the undue advantages allowed the Americans, as appears from this view taken of our transactions with that government, particularly *in the relaxation of our navigation-laws in favour of the United States, by opening the ports of our colonies to their ships;—in the admission of their produce into the united kingdom, at the same rate of duties as that of our*

own colonies;—in the advantages allowed their ships in the countervailing duties charged by the respective governments, it is evident we have been at once guilty of an improper partiality towards them as regards other foreign nations, and at the same time of injustice to our own colonists; and, also, of actually countenancing a system which might ultimately tend to the ruin of our own shipping.

THE TANJORE MAHARAJA SERFOJI'S SARASWATI MAHAL

CHAP. IV.

OF THE EXTENSIVE, VALUABLE, AND IMPROVABLE RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES POSSESSED BY OUR AMERICAN PROVINCES, AS RESPECTS OUR SHIPPING AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.

REGARDING the important resources of the British North-American provinces, it may not be improper to make a few observations concerning the qualities of the lumber exported from these colonies, the carriage of that article being, of all others, of the greatest importance to our shipping.

OAK TIMBER.—This article is only exported from the Canadas; there being none produced in the lower provinces fit for exportation.

Quebec Oak* consists of two kinds, which are WHITE and RED; the white is only exported, the red not being considered merchantable.

The merchantable size is 12 inches and upwards on the side; and 20 feet long, and upwards. There is not much brought to market under 12 inches; the general size is from 13 to 16 inches square, and from 30 to 40 feet long. In some few instances, however, a few pieces may be found to square even from 16 to 30 inches; and some sticks, perphaps, to run the length of 60 feet.

The quality of Quebec white oak is considered superior to any which we import from any other part of America, or even from Europe. This may be proved by inspecting the prices current at those ports, wherein all the variety of qualities we import are to be found.

Before oak can be exported from Canada, it must be inspected by a person, appointed by government, for that purpose, and stamped as

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* Canadian oak, from whatever part of the St. Lawrence it is shipped, is generally termed Quebec oak.

merchantable. That which is rejected as unmerchantable is not allowed to be exported.

The faults for which it is considered unmerchantable are, its being red oak, under 20 feet long,—under 12 inches upon the side,—having unsound knots,—being crooked or ill-squared,—and its being ringed, which last is the most general and the greatest of all faults.

Ringed timber is that which has begun to rot or decay in the heart. When this disease has but just commenced, it requires a good judge to discover the defect, which, in a circular manner, appears, by shewing a small shade of difference in the colour.

From this variety of the quality of oak in the Quebec market, a proportionate variety of prices are produced; the unsound, perhaps, selling at *6d.* per foot, and the best at *2s. 6d.* Hence is the difference of the quality and character of Quebec-built ships most satisfactorily accounted for; being built of timber which differ 400 per cent. in price; their quality must of necessity differ materially, and, therefore, no wonder that opinions the most opposite, concerning their durability, may be formed by those unacquainted with this circumstance.

The quality of Quebec oak, compared with English and American oak,* may be judged of by the price it bears in the London and Liverpool markets. In London its price is generally a medium between that of the best and that of the worst quality of English oak,—maintaining a price about 20 to 30 per cent. higher than the worst, and about the like proportion under the best; and, in Liverpool, it will be found to have commanded, for a number of years past, a price about 20 per cent. higher than that imported from America.

The quantity of oak timber exported from Quebec,

	LOADS.
In 1804, was	2626
In 1806 - - -	5452
In 1810 - - -	22,532

PINE-TIMBER.—There are two kinds of pine or fir timber exported from British North-America, viz. RED and YELLOW. There is

* The oak-timber imported from the United States is generally termed American oak, in contradistinction to that imported from Quebec.

none of what is properly termed white pine exported from these provinces.

At the port of Quebec, as well as in the other ports of the St. Lawrence, pine-timber, as well as oak, must be inspected, and found merchantable before it can be exported.

Neither red nor yellow pine is merchantable under 12 inches on the side, nor under 20 feet long.

Yellow pine runs from 14 to 22 inches on the side, and, in some instances, even to 30, and from 30 to 45 feet in length: it may be had, however, 50 to 60 feet long, and upwards. It is generally perfectly straight, and remarkably free from knots. Indeed, many sticks, and even whole lots, are to be found without even a single knot; this is to be accounted for by the extraordinary length of the timber of the Canadian forests in general. When the trees are felled, they must be greatly reduced in length, that they may be the more conveniently hauled to the rivers which are to float them to market; a large proportion of the top part, with all the knots, is consequently cut off.

Red pine was little known in Canada be-

fore the year 1808, when there was a small quantity exported. In 1809, the quantity shipped was very considerable; indeed, as soon as it was particularly inquired after, it was furnished in abundance. Quebec and other British American red pine, for strength and durability, is equal to any which we import from any other country whatever.

The quantity of pine-timber exported from Quebec,

	LOADS.
In 1804 was	1,012
In 1806 - - - -	2,761
In 1810 - - - -	69,271

MASTS.—Government have been for some years past principally supplied with masts from our American provinces. These colonies furnish mast of the largest dimensions, even to 35 inches. The proportionate dimensions of masts are three feet in length to every inch in diameter, at the partners, with the addition of nine feet. A thirty 35-inch mast is, therefore, 114 feet long, which is about the greatest length wanted in the Royal Navy. Yellow-pine-masts, of the largest dimensions, are to be had

in the greatest abundance; but of red pine there are few to be found above 20 or 21 inches.

The number of masts and bowsprits exported from Quebec,

	PIECES.
In 1804 was	115
In 1806 - - - -	354
In 1810 - - - -	7,655

Deals.—The deals (or pine-plank, as they are tecknically termed in Canada) which are exported from that country, run generally from 2 to 3½ inches thick, 7 to 11 broad, and 12 feet long. They are not reckoned by any particular standard, but are sold by the thousand superficial feet, of their respective thicknesses, reckoning 1200 to the thousand.

There is no branch of the Canadian timber-trade more capable of improvement than this; nor would any other improvement which could be introduced, be attended with more beneficial effects both to the British and Canadians. It has, indeed, within these last few years, been greatly improved. A few years back the deals and boards which were brought to market con-

sisted of the most irregular dimensions, both in length, breadth, and thickness. What are now produced, however, are principally reduced to some particular standard, generally to 12 feet long and either to 2, 2½, or 3 inches thick, and from 7 to 11 inches in breadth, but principally 7, 9, or 11. It is to Mr. Usborne, late of Quebec, that the public are principally indebted for this improvement in the manufacture of deals in Canada. There yet remains a great deal to be done, however, in the improvement of this branch of the Canadian timber-trade, both as regards the manufacture or preparation of the article, and as respects an increase in the quantity exported.—The British government have it in their powsr, and ought to secure, a demand for deals in Canada; and the Canadian government have it in their power, and ought to encourage their preparation throughout the country, generally.

It is of importance to observe, that, although throughout the most populous part of Lower Canada, particularly upon the banks of the St. Lawrence, below Montreal, that no trees fit for being converted into masts or square timber, now remain; yet, nevertheless, upon

those wood-lands which necessarily yet remain, such as those parts which are unfit for agricultural purposes, parts reserved for fuel, &c. there are to be found abundance of trees, fit for deals, of various lengths. Indeed, by adequate protection and encouragement, a sufficient quantity might be furnished, not only for the supply of Great Britain and her West-Indian settlements, but also for all Europe.

The chief support of the American shipping has been the exportation of deals, boards, and staves, which have been of late principally obtained from those parts of the United States, which have been for many years cleared of all the trees fit for masts or square timber. The consideration of this circumstance shews the importance of endeavouring to discover the cause why such a valuable source of wealth is so much neglected in the British North-American provinces.

The quantity of deals and boards exported from Quebec,

	PIECES.
In 1804 was	69,067
In 1806 - - - -	66,166
In 1810 - - - -	312,432

Staves.—The exports of staves are principally from Canada, from whence the most abundant supplies may be obtained. Quebec staves form a very important item of the exports of Canadian lumber. As they constitute broken stowage to ships, which take in cargoes of masts and timber in the ports of the St. Laurence, at the full rate of freight,—whereas, from most other ports, the broken stowage of ships, timber-load, affords comparatively but a mere trifle of freight,—renders them of vast importance to the ship-owner, and they consequently afford great encouragement to the exportation of lumber in general.

The encouragement of the exportation of staves from Canada is, indeed, in many respects, of great importance; they are not only a valuable article for the assortment of other cargoes, but constitute an immense tonnage for the exclusive employment of ships in the carriage of them alone.

Their quality is excellent, commanding in the London market, at the present moment, prices equal to those imported from Dantzic.

Staves is an article of indispensable necessity to the mother-country; to obtain supplies,

therefore, from her own colonies, must be a very desirable object; and, consequently, the abundant quantity, and excellent quality, of those to be obtained from Quebec, must be, to her, considerations of great importance.

The quantity of staves exported from Quebec,

		PIECES.
In 1804	was	1,061,195
In 1806	- - - -	1,803,234
In 1810	- - - -	3,887,306

THE most important articles of British North-American produce and manufactures being lumber and agricultural produce, I shall therefore endeavour to shew, *that these colonies are capable of supplying the most extensive demand which the mother country and all the other colonies, which she possesses, can afford for timber;—that, if their resources are encouraged to flow in their proper channel, they are adequate to supply our West-Indian settlements with flour, provisions, &c.;—and that it only requires a little well-directed attention to render them capable of supplying the mother-country with hemp and flax.*

N 2

THE BRITISH NORTH-AMERICAN COLONIES CAPABLE OF SUPPLYING THE MOTHER-COUNTRY AND HER OTHER COLONIES WITH TIMBER.

As to how far the British provinces are capable of supplying the mother-country and her West-Indian possessions with lumber, it may be observed, that no person in any degree acquainted with these parts would dispute the adequacy of the British-American forests to such supplies.

If, therefore, they do not supply these markets, it must be for one of the following reasons, viz. either that there is not a sufficient population to prepare and bring the produce to market, or that other markets, coming into competition with these colonies, obtain a preference.

With respect to the adequacy of the population to furnish so large a quantity, it may be fairly stated, that this very population has been hitherto completely adequate to supply the market to the utmost extent which has been

hitherto called for. There may, indeed, have been a scarcity of a few particular articles in some solitary instances; but, in every one of these, such partial scarcity has been uniformly produced by a sudden demand, occasioned by some unexpected contingency.

In the greatest demand for lumber which has ever occurred, where a reasonable time for cutting down, preparing, and transporting, the articles, has been allowed, the market has been uniformly supplied to a commensurate extent. For, since the additional duty has been imposed upon timber from the United States, and the supplies from the north of Europe became limited, on account of the war, the exportations from these provinces have experienced such an immense increase as is at least sufficient to convince us, that the supplies hitherto obtained from them afford no criterion whatever from which we could fairly judge of the extent to which they are capable of furnishing these articles: and, moreover, at this immensely-augmented demand has been most abundantly answered, at moderate prices, it is equally demonstrable that the quantity hitherto obtained

from these colonies will not, in the smallest degree, prove them inadequate to supply the mother-country, and her West-Indian islands also, with all the lumber they require.

By inspecting No. 2, in the Appendix, it will be found that the exports of lumber from the British provinces, in 1806, was 95,975 loads, and in 1810, 311,114, of which 160,932 loads were exported from Quebec, being about five times the quantity exported from that port in 1806; yet, notwithstanding this vast increase which took place, no scarcity was upon the whole experienced. For, although there might have been a short supply of some particular articles, there were more of other articles than could be taken off; and this superabundant quantity, perhaps, amounted to ten times that of the deficiency.

Notwithstanding the immense shipments which were made from Quebec in 1808, 1809, and 1810, as will be found in the list of exports from that port, as stated in No. 1, there still remained a considerable number of articles unshipped in the fall of the latter year. And in that fall, although the prospect of a greater

demand the ensuing season was very evident, timber was contracted for at even lower prices than those at which contracts were made in the preceding year.

Indeed, one of the most convincing and decisive proofs of the abundant resources of lumber which the Canadas possess is, that excepting the article of oak-timber, prices actually continued declining from 1807 to 1810, notwithstanding the enormous increase which had continued to take place in the quantity exported, (as has been already stated). The price at which staves and pine-timber (which articles constitute the principal bulk of the exports of lumber) sold, during the summer, and which were contracted for in the fall of 1810, was not much above half the price which prevailed during the summer of 1807.

Another most important circumstance that may be noticed, concerning the abundant resources of lumber which these colonies possess, is, that in three or four years the increase in the exports of that article, from the port of Quebec alone, was equal to the whole supply of our West-Indian possessions. For, by in-

specting Nos. 2 and 6, in the Appendix, it will be found that the increase in the exports of that article, from the port of Quebec, from the year 1806 to 1810, was 127,998 loads, whilst the annual supply of our West-Indian settlements was only about 117,740 loads. And it is of material importance to remark, that, notwithstanding this increase, so far from the extent of the supplies which may be obtained from the Canadas being ascertained, that the market was equally well supplied with every species of that article, and the capability of a still farther increase apparently greater than it was four or five years before, when there was but about one-fifth part of the quantity exported.

Indeed, it is evident, as the pernicious laws and regulations which affected the exportation of lumber from British America ceased to operate, the exports of that article experienced a proportionable increase.

These important and now-established facts shew the genuineness of the opinions of those, who, a considerable time back, advocated the capability of these provinces to furnish our West-Indian possessions with their supplies of

lumber. For, but a few years ago, those who asserted that the British provinces possessed this capability, were literally laughed at. Such opinions being held up to ridicule by merchants, whose profits were arising out of measures at variance with the interests of their country, were then ridiculed or disregarded, and, therefore, the arguments used to prove that the pernicious consequences of those impolitic commercial treaties, which we had entered into with other countries, and that most mistaken policy by which the commercial intercourse between our West-Indian islands and the United States was regulated, were the causes which prevented the British provinces from supplying our West-Indian possessions with lumber, were considered as futile and ridiculous.

The advocates for the American interest had only to urge in reply, what these colonies, thus crippled and discouraged, had hitherto done; and this bare assertion was considered, by the superficial politician of the day, a sufficient refutation of this now-indisputable and substantiated fact. For, in the short period of three or four years, the increase of the ex-

portation of lumber, from the Canadas alone, was equal to the whole demand of our West-Indian islands; and that the oak-timber, exported in 1810, from Quebec only, was more than equal to half the quantity annually used in the whole of our government dock-yards, are facts so broadly founded, that not all the sophistry of those, who, either from sinister motives or erroneous hypotheses, espouse the cause of the American government, nor all the eloquence of the advocates of the United States in the British parliament can, in the remotest degree, controvert.

For, although our own legislators, misled by the advice and information of interested individuals, continued ignorant of this valuable source of national wealth, and, in that ignorance, persisted in damming up its current with the very rubbish which they removed to clear a commercial channel for our bitterest enemies, yet the operation of time and circumstances have brought about events which have exhibited to full view the vast importance to this trade; and, in the short space of four years, raised the freights earned by our ships, in the exportation of the produce of these provinces, from less

than £1,000,000 to nearly £2,500,000.* Our enemies, by their insatiable avarice, encouraged by that tameness with which we submitted to their artifices,—by their inordinate ambition, engendered by British pusilanimity,—and by their unmerited envy and hatred, blasting their own malignant purposes, have thus revealed to us this most important fact.

The Americans, by their embargo, withheld all those supplies with which they were in the habit of furnishing us; and Buonaparte, by the rigors of what he termed his continental system, prevented our supplies from the north of Europe: and, what is a still more important consideration, the rigorous measures of this oppressive and too-successful tyrant, prevented, at least in a considerable degree, the operation of the baneful effects of our ruinous licensing system, and thereby produced a most uncommonly large demand upon Canada for lumber;—a demand, however, which, notwithstanding its having been so large and unexpected, was as abundantly answered as

* See No. 8, in the Appendix.

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that which was experienced three or four years preceding, when no more than one-fifth part of the quantity was required.

It was then made clearly manifest, that the quantity of lumber, which had hitherto been shipped from the British colonies, bore but a very small proportion to the quantity which these provinces were capable of furnishing. Neither is it yet known to what extent they could furnish this article for exportation, for all which has hitherto been required has been obtained.

Government have never found any difficulty in obtaining abundant supplies of all the timber they required; such as square oak, masts, spars, red and white square pine, deals, staves, &c.

For, up to the present moment, notwithstanding the immense increase in the demand for lumber of every description, which has lately been experienced, they have always found contractors ready to engage to furnish, at reasonable prices, the largest quantities which they have ever advertised for;—this is the best proof of the abundance which may be obtained.

Any partial scarcities, in the supply of merchants orders, which may have occasionally happened, are solely to be attributed to the demand having been occasional and unexpected; and because the orders were not sent in time to have the articles contracted for from the people who fell the timber in the woods and float it to the shipping-ports; whereas, the extent of the quantity wanted, by government, being known the year before it is required for shipping, has been uniformly furnished in the most ample abundance. The amount of the quantity which may be sufficient to supply the demand for merchants, however, is always, in some measure, uncertain; and, consequently, as the anticipated demand, is over or under-rated, the scarcity or abundance will be proportionably commensurate. Indeed, the greatest irregularity and uncertainty of demand, and, consequently, a proportionate fluctuation of prices has prevailed for a number of years past.

The alternation of peace or war in the north of Europe has had no inconsiderable influence in this respect; but the most incalculable irregularities and inconveniencies, experienced by these provinces, in the demand for lumber,

as well as other articles, have arisen from the importations received into Great Britain by licences: and these irregularities were the sole cause of the partial scarcities, which have, in some solitary instances, appeared in these colonies.

Now, however, as an interposition of providence has divulged the secret, and convinced us, (I had almost said against our inclination,) that we were in the possession of an abundant source of the most valuable species of national wealth, of which we continued ignorant, and has clearly shewn us, that it was only our own impolitic laws, and the improper arrangement of our commercial concerns by government, that prevented our receiving the most abundant supplies from these colonies, let us not again check the growing prosperity of these valuable colonies by regulations similarly pernicious.

Considering the very small proportion that the tonnage of the manufactures which we export, bears to our imports or tonnage employed in foreign trade; and that this proportion is rendered still smaller by the quantity exported in foreign bottoms, it will appear that

the support of our shipping must, and does, depend upon the carriage of our imports.

For it will be found that, although the amount of the manufactured goods which we export, is, in point of value, enormously great, yet, in point of bulk, they are comparatively small; and, consequently, the amount of their tonnage, when compared with the extent of the tonnage of our merchant-shipping, is comparatively trifling.

The advantages which the country in general derives from the exportation of our manufactures are great in proportion to the amount of their value; but the advantages resulting to our shipping-interest, in particular, is but of trifling importance in proportion to the comparative smallness of their tonnage.

It, therefore, necessarily follows, that, by far the greater proportion of our ships clearing out, upon foreign voyages, are obliged to sail in ballast; and, therefore, the competition for the outward freights is such, that goods are frequently carried out at such a low rate, that, in many instances, the ships that sail in ballast are more successful than those which take goods on freight; the principal dependence is consequently upon the homeward freight.

It follows, of course, that the most bulky articles, or such articles as require the greatest quantity of tonnage, must necessarily be of the greatest importance in this respect; and, considering the many bulky commodities which the British North-American provinces produce, hence the intimate connexion between the improvement of our shipping and the encouragement of these colonies. One of the most important of these articles of produce is timber, which, although it be but of comparatively small value, is, nevertheless, of infinitely more importance to us, in every commercial point of view, than all the riches in India:—the timber we have imported from these provinces has lately afforded five times as much employment to British ships as the gross amount of all our Asiatic imports.

The comparatively small value of timber to its bulk, however, does not lessen its consequence as an article of trade; but, on the contrary, renders it of more importance. For, let it be remembered, that a ton of pine or fir timber pays proportionably the same freight as a ton of any of the most valuable articles which we import. It matters not to the ship-

owner, whether his ship carries pine timber, worth only, at shipping, 20*s.* a ton, or indigo worth £700 a ton;—whether she carries cod-fish from Newfoundland, or gold-dust from the coast of Africa, since competition must of necessity bring the freight of the one, comparatively, as low as the freight of the other.

It is obvious, indeed, that the bulkier the article the more it becomes a national object to secure the freight of it: and, therefore, it is equally desirable to secure the carriage of the timber we import, as it is important to protect and encourage our merchant-shipping, —that shipping which supplies our navy with men, and forms the very basis of that commerce by which alone we have become great, by which we are enabled to support the great expense that secures our dignity and independence; nay, perhaps, our very existence as a nation. Consequently, the bent of all such of our commercial regulations as in any way concern the importation of timber into this country ought to be carefully directed, so as to effect this important purpose. And in no way would it be more easily accomplished than by a proper attention being paid to the inexhaustible sup-

plies of this article, which may be obtained from our American provinces: the value, therefore, of these colonies to the mother-country is great in proportion as her shipping is important to her.

When we reflect that, agreeably to the opinion which generally prevailed, a considerable number of intelligent persons have, even up to the period of the occurrences which have stated, respecting the late increase in the quantity of lumber exported from the British American provinces, insisted that these colonies were not capable of supplying our West-Indian islands with that article. We cannot help concluding that their opinions, regarding the other productions of these provinces, may be also founded upon principles equally erroneous, and, therefore, their conclusions as false as they have evidently been regarding lumber. For, that these provinces are capable of supplying our West-Indian settlements with that article is a fact now established beyond all doubt; and, if this capability is not put in requisition, it is the fault of the British government.

Of all our improvements in commerce, whether in opening new channels or improving the old, the improvement of the trade of our own

colonies is the most important, considering that in this we enjoy, without rivalship, the undivided benefit resulting from it. And, in no instance, does this maxim more aptly apply than in our trade and intercourse with our American provinces, especially in the exportation of timber from these colonies, which, as has before been observed, is not only most advantageous and encouraging to the improvement of our commerce in general, but of the most material consequence to our shipping-interest in particular.

We have, however, in every article of importance, but particularly in lumber, neglected, discouraged, and sacrificed, the interests of these colonies to the United States, almost up to the present period: the birth of American independence, which ought to have brought and secured to these provinces a multiplicity of privileges and advantages, was a death-blow to their prosperity.

Indeed, the Americans enjoyed benefits from this country, to the prejudice both of our colonies and of our shipping-interest, of such a nature, as, I believe, no nation ever enjoyed from another before, namely, exclusive of the

greatest advantages over other foreigners, the rights and privileges of British subjects.

For their produce being admitted into this country, at the same rates of duty as the produce of our own colonies, whilst they, as an independent nation, had the ports of all other countries, as well as those of Great Britain, open to them; whereas, the produce of our own colonies being confined to the mother-country for a market, they were thereby, at all times, but particularly at such periods as they experienced a want of demand from other countries, encouraged in glutting our markets with lumber and other articles, thereby creating the greatest irregularities in our supplies. Our colonists were, therefore, unable to make head against such a current of difficulties and disadvantages;—being confined to the British ports, where they were denied the rightful privileges, which belonged to them,* both they and our ship-owners were obliged, tamely, to submit to this monopoly of our supplies of American timber, by the United States, notwithstanding the forests of our own provinces produced that article, comparatively, of a far

* See Nos. 3 and 4, in the Appendix.

better quality, whilst our own ships, otherwise unemployed and rotting in port, could have transported it to the British market.

They had likewise, as has been already fully explained, the supplies of our West-Indian plantations so completely secured to them, that of 117,740 loads annually imported into these colonies, they had an opportunity afforded them, by the impolicy of our government, of furnishing 113,600; whilst the disadvantages, which our own provinces laboured under, were such as prevented their obtaining any larger share of this profitable trade than about 3439 loads. And, moreover, they had not only the furnishing of the supplies of these islands thus far secured to their market, but the carriage of the goods to their ships; so that out of £1,766,639, which appears to be about the amount of the freight of the principal articles of lumber, flour, grain, provisions, &c. annually imported into these settlements, their ships earned £1,477,301, whilst British ship-owners were suffering the greatest distress, for want of employment for their shipping.

The most convincing proof of the sacrifice of our interests, in respect to the neglected resources of lumber, which these pro-

vinces possess, (according to what I have already stated,) will be found in the comparative amount of their exports of this article, which, for six or seven years previous to the interruption of our commercial dealings with America, was nearly stationary; but, upon an interruption of this commercial intercourse taking place, when a fair opportunity was afforded them, immediately increased to an enormous extent;—the Canadas having, in the space of three or four years, increased their exports of lumber five-fold; and the other two provinces having, in the same short period, nearly doubled theirs:—the exports of timber from these provinces were thereby, in four years, raised from 95,975 loads to 311,114; adding no less than £1,721,040 to the freights earned by British shipping.

If these colonies, from the transient occurrences of these four years, produced the vast addition to the freights of our ships in the carriage of our timber, with still as much, or even more, apparent capability of increase as they appeared to possess a few years before, when they were shackled and discouraged,—what might not the operation of measures calculated to encourage the exportation of that article

have produced in the course of thirty years?—which is the lapse of time since American independence, and the period of our first peace with that country;—and I sincerely hope, that as the Americans have, even in opposition to their own interests, by wantonly and maliciously lending themselves the degraded tool of the scourge of the human race, put a period to this peace and amity, that our eyes will be so far open to our own interest as to make the commencement of this war the termination of the *sacrifice of the rights and privileges of British colonists and British ship-owners* to that degraded country.

CAPABILITY OF OUR NORTH-AMERICAN PROVINCES TO SUPPLY OUR WEST-INDIAN SETTLEMENTS WITH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE, SUCH AS FLOUR, BREAD, GRAIN, PROVISIONS, &c.

One of the most-important objects, which would be answered by the exportation of flour, &c. from these colonies, is the supply of our West-Indian possessions.

The adequacy of these provinces to such supplies is a subject which has often been discussed in the British parliament, and by the parties immediately interested. But, although these discussions have certainly brought forth much important information, I may safely say, they have never produced a single measure calculated to bring about this desirable end.

However, that *these provinces, or, even the Canadas alone, are capable of supplying our West-Indian settlements with flour, &c.* is a proposition which I have no doubt I shall be able to demonstrate in the clearest manner.

Of the supplies of flour, bread, and provisions, hitherto obtained from our North-American colonies, the principal part has been furnished by the Canadas: and, moreover, as these two provinces, from the superior excellence of their soil, the immensity of their territorial extent, and other local advantages, possess considerably the most extensive and improveable resources, not only with respect to furnishing these, but every other species of agricultural produce, it is to these provinces, therefore, that we must principally look for these important articles. I shall, consequently,

confine my observations respecting agricultural produce more particularly to the Canadas.

By looking into No. 6, in the Appendix, it appears that 1,300,000 bushels of wheat and other grain are equal to the annual supply of our West-Indian settlements with flour, meal, bread, and grain. The amount of these articles, hitherto exported from the Canadas, no doubt, falls short of this demand, being only, upon an average of eight years, equal to about *one-fourth* of the requisite quantity, as appears by No. 2, in the Appendix: this cicumstance, however, and my present proposition, namely, that *the British provinces, or, even the Canadas alone, are capable of yielding these supplies,* can be satisfactorily accounted for.

Indeed, the causes which have hitherto discouraged the exportation of flour and lumber, as well as every other kind of produce, from our American possessions, have been so many, and operated so powerfully, (as may be observed by what has been already stated,) as to constitute matter of surprise, that the exports from these settlements should have been so considerable.

The demand upon these provinces for flour

and lumber having been of late greatly increased, and this increased demand for lumber being abundantly answered, whilst the exports of wheat and flour experienced but little increase, does not by any means disprove my proposition; for, although the disadvantages which our colonies laboured under may, in many respects, have alike hindered the exportation of these articles, yet, in others, their effects were very different in their operation.

For example, the Canadian forests affording an inexhaustible supply of lumber, and there being a sufficient number of hands to be obtained to cut it down and float it to market, the largest quantity which has or would be wanted to complete the supplies, of which I have stated these provinces to be capable of furnishing, has, therefore, been, and will continue to be, furnished in abundance. For, exclusive of the lumber which the forests of the British provinces produce, that of all the immense tract of the United States territory lying upon Lake Champlain, the south banks of the St. Laurence and its tributary streams, must also either be shipped from the ports of the St. Laurence, or remain an incumbrance to the

ground :—the waters upon which it grows must float it to market,—to the ports of the St. Laurence, or it is not worth the cutting down.—If there is no demand for it in ports of the British provinces, it must remain growing in the forest, or be destroyed and consumed to make way for agricultural improvements.—And even although the British government should again, (as they have for the last thirty years,) by the strange and unaccountable encouragement and facilities which they have unjustly given to American commerce, neglect and discourage the interests of British subjects in this valuable commerce; yet it will at least be some consolation, (however small,) to reflect that that part of the timber of this extensive country, which might thus be prevented from being shipped in the St. Laurence, cannot be shipped from the ports of the United States, so as to come in competition with shipments from the British provinces.

But how very different the case is with respect to flour and provisions; their exportation is capable of being diverted into various channels, accordingly as it may be affected by po-

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litical circumstances. These articles being the surplus produce of the lands already cleared and cultivated, and constituting a considerable portion of the means of the inhabitants for supplying themselves with other necessaries; and from their small bulk, compared with lumber, they are, therefore, capable of conveyance by channels, through which lumber, from its greater bulk, is incapable of being transported, will, therefore, be raised in abundance throughout this fertile country, and will certainly find a market, whether the British government encourage (or I may say *allow)* the exportation of them through the St. Laurence or not.

It is, indeed, to be regretted, that the first fruits of the commerce of the vast tract of fertile country now settling along the Canadian frontiers have been expelled the Canadian market, by the impolitic measures of the British government.* For when any branch of trade or commerce is once established in any particular channel, the longer it is confined to that direction the

* See pp. 89 to 105.

more difficult it will be to divert it from its wonted course. And it may be observed, that the current of commerce, arising out of the agricultural produce of this extensive and fertile country, cannot, like that arising from the exportation of the wood of the forest, be checked in the fountain, but has and will continue to find another course, until our government shall open that which is most congenial to it.

The ports of the St. Laurence are certainly the most convenient for the commerce of all that vast tract of country, lying upon the banks of that noble river; and the chain of lakes which it unites, as well that upon the American side as that upon the Canadian. Indeed, nothing short of such confused and vaccillating measures as have hitherto marked the disposition of all our commercial concerns in that quarter of the world, will be sufficient to prevent the trade of this part of America from flowing in this its most natural channel.

A well-directed line of policy, respecting these colonies, would, no doubt, add to the Canadian exports the whole produce of this important portion of the United States; the

rapid settlement, fertility, and improvement of which, and its contiguity with the navigable waters and shipping ports of the St. Laurence, have lately so greatly excited the jealousy and roused the attention of the American government.

The exportation of wheat and flour from Canada, viewed in all its bearings, is a subject which exhibits a variety of circumstances that altogether form the most complete anomaly, which we could conceive it possible to be produced.

It is a notorious fact, that flour and provisions have been carried from the very banks of the St. Laurence to the ports of the United States, a distance of many hundred miles, by various tedious and expensive means of conveyance, by land-carriage, by canals, by rivers, &c. at an immense expense and loss of time; and, notwithstanding the goods were for the supply of our West-Indian islands, commanded a better price in the ports of the United States, even after all this loss of time and accumulated expense, than they would have brought in the port of Montreal, where, compared with the

American ports, the produce might have been carried in a much shorter time and at a much smaller expense.

The cause of this transportation was very obvious. Insuperable obstacles were thrown in the way of produce being shipped from the Canadas to our West-Indian settlements; and, consequently, the prices of wheat and flour were regulated, in these provinces, by the demand for wheat for the British market.

And, it is no less extraordinary than true, that, whilst these very occurrences were taking place, the question, whether or not, or how far, our American provinces were capable of supplying our West-Indian possessions with American produce, was, at various times, gravely discussed in the British parliament,—evidence examined, with all the usual formalities; and the opinions, which appear to have been the result of these inquiries, were, that, although these provinces might, at some future day, do much, yet they were not now capable of supplying the British settlements in the West Indies,—no, *not even with lumber*, nor with *ships to carry it* from the United States: and, therefore, as heretofore, we continued to

apply to *the Americans* for these supplies, and generously, to the exclusion of our own ships, employed theirs to carry the goods to market.

Exclusive of the information which might have been derived from this unaccountable transportation of flour from the neighbourhood of the St. Laurence, to the ports of the United States, a practice which had prevailed in Canadian commerce ever since the American independence, was also sufficient of itself to indicate the existence of some insurmountable obstacle to the shipment of Canadian flour to our West-Indian plantations, namely, the shipment of wheat from Canada to Great Britain, and flour from Great Britain to the West Indies, being tantamount to sending wheat from Canada to Great Britain to be manufactured for the West-Indian market, whilst it could have been manufactured to as great perfection in the Canadas as in Great Britain, and sent from Quebec to the West Indies at comparatively as low a freight and by a shorter passage.

It, therefore, appears, that, between merchants commissions, shipping charges, freight, insurance, out-lay of money, &c. not less than

4*s.* 6*d.* per bushel* upon the wheat, was actually sacrificed.

It may, therefore, be asked, why not manufacture the wheat in Canada, and ship the flour to the West Indies?—One would be ready to conclude, that, if this was not done, it must have been for want of mills to manufacture it, ships to carry it, or merchants to carry on the trade. With regard both to a want of ships for this trade, or of merchants to embark into it, no such inconvenience existed, nor, indeed, could possibly be supposed to exist: neither could there be said to be a want of mills.

Although, for some years after the independence of the United States, the mills to be found in the country might not have been sufficient to convert the whole wheat which was produced into flour; yet, as there were many

	£	*s.*	*d*
* Commission upon wheat, at 7*s.* 6*d.* per bushel	0	0	4½
Shipping charges, &c. . . . . . . ————	0	0	3
Freight	0	2	7½
Landing and warehousing in Great Britain, interest, commission, waste, &c. and merchants profit	0	1	3
	£0	4	6

mills subsequently erected, upon a large scale and according to the most-improved principles, there is no doubt but that had such encouragement and protection been given to the exportation of flour from Canada to the West Indies, as to have secured a steady demand, the mills would have been found adequate to manufacture all the wheat raised in the country.

Neither can it be supposed that either capital or enterprise was wanting. Indeed, whereever channels have been opened to British commerce, it has invariably happened, that every branch has been so eagerly grasped at as to prove, that, instead of either of these requisites being wanting, there generally appears a superabundance of both.

If, however, the shipment of Canadian produce to the West Indies can be said to have ever been a channel opened to British commerce, it may very properly be observed, that those who opened it left it in such an unfinished and slovenly state, that it only proved a trap to ensnare the British merchant, and deter him from coming in competition with the Americans, in the supplying of our West-Indian settlements.

It may not be improper to inquire who sustains this loss of *4s. 6d.* per bushel upon wheat, incurred in the transportation of that article from Canada to Great Britain, and flour from Great Britain to the West Indies, as already stated.

Respecting this inquiry, it may be observed, that these islands appear to have been supplied with flour from Great Britain, the British provinces, and the United States; and that a large portion of the surplus produce of Canadian wheat, and also a considerable proportion of the flour, exported from the United States, were regularly shipped to Great Britain; and that the prices of flour, both in the British provinces and the United States, must have, therefore, been regulated by the price in Great Britain, and, consequently, comparatively much lower.

It is obvious, therefore, that our West-Indian colonists could have been supplied with flour at a much lower rate from either of these markets than from the mother-country; and it consequently follows, that had either the British provinces or the United States been allowed to have afforded these supplies in a regular manner, the prices in the West Indies would have cor-

responded with the prices in these markets, added to the expense of transportation.

But of these three markets, Great Britain had only a fair, uninterrupted, and unrestricted, opportunity of importing this article into our West-Indian islands. For, the imports from the United States were precarious and uncertain, from their being only made in consequence of the occasional suspension of our navigation-laws, by which they were expressly prohibited:—and the importation of produce from the British provinces was a trade which the irregular imports from the States, coupled with the peculiarities of the climate, and the local situation of these provinces, rendered extremely speculative and uncertain.—Great Britain, from her extensive and regular intercourse with the West Indies in other commodities, had, therefore, compared with the American provinces, a better opportunity of securing a fair average of that market for her exports of flour and provisions.

Let us suppose the price of flour in Great Britain, either at any particular period, or, upon an average, before any of the late restrictions were laid upon our intercourse with America, to

have been £3 per barrel: the prices, both in Canada and the United States, being generally regulated by the prices in Great Britain, and, as the expense of transportation from either country to England would be about £1, the price of flour in those markets must have consequently been £2 per barrel. Here, therefore, appears the mystery—wheat continuing to be sent from Canada to Great Britain, and flour as regularly shipped from Great Britain to the West-Indian market, which was open to the Canadians upon the same terms as to the British—and the expense of transportation from each country, comparatively, about the same. Nothing can account for this, as I have already explained, but the great irregularities, which prevailed in the West-Indian market, from the manner in which the supplies from the United States were introduced, coupled with the peculiarities respecting the British provinces,—but, as already observed, peculiarities which, unattended by such absurdities, would have proved to be but little or no inconvenience.*

* See observations upon the opening of the ports of our colonies to the Americans, chap. iii.

It is evident that the importation of flour into the West Indies, from Great Britain, must have been found upon the whole to have answered the purpose of the importer, as may be concluded from the quantity imported, as stated in No. 6, in the Appendix; it must have one time with another paid the expense of transportation. This expense, which we may compute at 20*s*. per barrel, as already observed, added to the price in Great Britain, estimated at £3, the price in the West Indies must have, therefore, averaged £4 per barrel.

Now, in the second place, as this average price of flour in Great Britain would not have afforded more than £2 per barrel in Canada; the expense of transportation being 20*s*.; and the expense of transportation, from Canada to the West-Indies, being even comparatively less than from Great Britain, it is obvious that, unless some great impediment had interrupted this intercourse, that either the inhabitants of our West-Indian settlements would have had flour from Canada at £3 per barrel instead of £4; or, that the Canadians would have received £3 per barrel for their flour, in-

stead of £2: or, at any rate this 20*s.* per barrel must have been shared between them.

As it therefore appears, from the very considerable and regular importation of flour and bread into the West Indies from Great Britain, that the price of flour must have, one time with another, amidst the fluctuations to which it was rendered liable, been so high as to have afforded the importer the expense of transportation, it is evident, therefore, that this loss of 20*s.* per barrel upon flour, being equal to about 4*s.* 6*d* per bushel upon wheat, must have fallen upon the Canadian farmer.—

And who profitted by this enormous loss, occasioned by our legislative tolerations, interferences, or arrangements, concerning this intercourse between our West-Indian settlements and the United States? The Americans only. The ports of these islands, whenever any scarcity took place, were opened to American produce, which was admitted free of duty or any sort of restraint, and again shut when supplies were obtained;—their opening and shutting thus becoming each a consequence of the other.*

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* See Page 93 to 96.

Instead, therefore, of being as originally intended, to encourage and defend the interests of Great Btitain and her colonies, our navigation-laws were absolutely perverted to serve the Americans, and sacrifice the interests of the British colonist and the British merchant, for whose exclusive interest these laws were originally framed.

Had the supplying of our West-Indian islands been so regulated, that the West-Indian market would have afforded a regular and steady demand for flour in Canada, this *4s. 6d.* per bushel would have at once operated in stimulating the Canadian farmer to greater exertions in the growth of wheat, and also as a premium to encourage the transport of the produce of that part of the United States which borders upon Canada to the St. Laurence.

It may be further remarked respecting the surplus-produce of wheat, &c. raised in Canada, as stated in Nos. 1 and 6, in the Appendix, and the annual consumption of the manufactures from that article in the West Indies, that this surplus appears to bear but a small proportion to the annual consumption of these islands. Nothing, however, could be more absurd and

unreasonable than to draw the conclusion of inadequacy from this circumstance, the resources and capabilities of these provinces never having been put to the test.

Surely no person in any degree acquainted with the subject could argue that their resources were ever yet fairly put to the test, or were ever directed to, or in any manner encouraged to assume this channel, whilst such positive and manifest proofs as have been adduced exist, that Canadian flour, as well as other Canadian produce, is positively excluded the West-Indian market. Whilst wheat continues to be shipped from Canada to Great Britain, and flour from Great Britain to the West Indies, their inadequacy to such supply is inadmissible, as a reason why these provinces do not supply their sister colonies with flour.

Had the parliamentary inquiries, which have been made, concerning the adequacy of the Canadas to yield these supplies, been directed to the circumstance of this unaccountable transportation, the true causes might have been discovered and removed, and the Canadas rendered, not only adequate to these supplies at this day, but also capable of furnishing the

mother-country with a considerable quantity.—Our legislators would have discovered that the fluctuation of prices, and uncertainty of demand, to which the West-Indian market was rendered liable, and the risks and disappointments to which the Canadians were subjected in their attempts to supply these islands with flour, were the effects of their own impolitic measures, and the true causes which prevented these provinces from furnishing our West-Indian possessions with an abundant supply.

The effectual supply of our West-Indian islands with flour from the Canadas must necessarily be connected with several subordinate arrangements, the encouragement and protection of which are essential in producing that effect, and also, to the existence of such a trade after it may have assumed that channel.—Arrangements must have been entered into by a variety of classes of people in these provinces, for carrying into effect the transportation of wheat and flour from the United States to the ports of the St. Laurence;—for erecting mills for the manufacture of such imports of wheat;—for establishing ships in the trade for the regular transportation of produce to the West Indies.

But neither of these arrangements could have been made upon any reasonable grounds of success, whilst so much uncertainty existed with regard to the West-Indian market.

Having pointed out the causes which have prevented the Canadas from supplying our West-Indian colonists with flour, &c. and clearly shewn, that the smallness of the quantity of that article hitherto exported from these provinces is no proof of their being inadequate to furnish these islands with the most abundant supplies, I shall now endeavour to prove, that they may in a very short period be rendered capable of yielding more than sufficient to satisfy the greatest demand which our settlements in the West Indies require. This *capability* consists, in the first place, *in the supplies which might be drawn from the United-States side of the St. Laurence;* secondly, *in the further extension of agriculture upon the vast tracts of fertile land, still unsettled in these provinces;* and thirdly, *in the agricultural improvements of which the land now under cultivation is capable.*

With respect to the first position, viz. the supplies to be drawn from the United-States side of the St. Laurence, it may be observed,

that although this is not the most important source, yet it is the one from whence the most immediate increase in the exports of flour could be drawn. It appears plain, however, from what has already been stated, that the transportation of flour from the United-States side of the St. Laurence to the ports of that river, has been greatly discouraged, and more particularly by the irregularities which have hitherto existed in the mode of furnishing the West-Indian market.

The most effectual means which could be adopted, for the encouragement of this trade, would be absolutely to prohibit flour from being imported from the United States, into our West-Indian settlements; or otherwise, at all times to allow the importation of such flour, but in our own ships only, and liable to a duty equal to the comparative difference of freight and insurance, as might be found operating against the importer of produce, into our West-Indian islands from Canada, as relates to imports from the ports of the United States, (provided such a difference did exist,) with a small addition over and above that difference, as a protecting duty.

It may appear to some persons, unacquainted with many minute circumstances relating to this trade, that the imposition of such a duty might occasion exorbitant prices in our West-Indian settlements: but, compared with the prices which have hitherto been paid in these settlements, this would certainly not be the case. For, it will be observed, from the observations already stated, that the great irregularities which existed in the mode of supplying these colonies must have raised the prices double or treble to what this difference of freight and insurance could, at the highest, be possibly estimated.

In the event of the exportation of this article from the ports of the St. Laurence being unshackled, and such exportations being also unrestricted from the ports of the United States, otherwise than their carriage being confined to British ships, and liable to the protecting duties just mentioned, it is very unlikely that the difference could exceed 7*s.* 6*d.* per barrel; whereas, it appears, the inhabitants of our West-Indian possessions must have paid at the rate of 20*s.* per barrel higher for their flour, than the proportionate price at which the

Canadians sold their wheat for the British market.

Undoubtedly such measures would soon have the effect of furnishing the ports of the St. Laurence, with considerably larger supplies than the demand of our West-Indian colonies would require.

Whatever, therefore, the price of flour may have been previous to such an effect being produced, it is obvious, that it must from that period correspond with and be ruled by the prices in the British market. Thus, a short time would produce a most important advantage to the inhabitants of our West-Indian colonies, considering that the price of flour in these settlements and Great Britain must then as nearly correspond as does the expenses of transportation from Canada to these markets respectively; thereby bringing about a reduction of the price to these West-Indian colonists, equal to the amount of the expense of the transportation of flour from Great Britain to the West Indies.

SECONDLY, with respect to the further extension of agriculture, upon the vast tracts of fertile land still unsettled in these provinces, it may be remarked, that such an extension may

take place, either by an increase of the proportionate quantity which the cultivated land bears to the population,—by an increase of the population, or by both.

The increase of the proportionate quantity of cultivated land to the population may be promoted by the encouragement of the exportation of timber and ashes; and also, by a steady demand and encouraging prices for agricultural produce.

The vast tracts of fertile land to be possessed at a low rate, and situate in the most healthy and agreeable climate, proves highly encouraging to the increase of the population, both by multiplication and emigration: indeed, land is to be obtained upon such easy terms, that the poorest man, if he is but industrious, may soon acquire a freehold in these fertile provinces. Emigrations into Canada are principally from the mother-country and the United States. Nothing, however, can be said hitherto to have encouraged emigration to Canada, except the superiority of the soil. But, so powerfully has this circumstance operated, that the emigration which has prevailed for several years past from the United States has been very considerable

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indeed. Such are the causes, and such have been the effects, that, (except in that part of the United States bordering upon the Canadas,) throughout almost the whole extent of the eastern states, but particularly New England, one may ride for days together without seeing a spot of what could be properly termed good land,—in many parts, hundreds of miles without seeing a spot worth cultivating, —in many districts, the generality of the people poorly clothed and miserably lodged, and here and there the farms deserted, and the farm-houses tumbling down; and, upon inquiring concerning them, it will be found their desertion was occasioned by emigration either to Canada or to those parts of the United States which lie upon the banks of the St. Laurence.

But, upon the other hand, one may travel in the Canadas, especially above Quebec, for days together, without meeting with any considerable interruption of the most superior soil;—one may, for hundreds of miles, pass through uninterrupted tracts of land of the first rate quality, and all over the country find the inhabitants comfortably lodged, well clothed, and in every respect enjoying abundance. It there-

fore appears that several of the most important circumstances contribute materially to encourage the settlement of the waste-lands in these provinces.

THIRDLY, as to the agricultural improvements of which the land now under cultivation is capable, it may be observed, that it is certainly a most important object, and ought, above all other improvements, to be attended to. It would not only directly augment the exports from these colonies, but also afford considerable facility to various other most important advantages which they possess.

With respect to the smallness of the crops which are here produced, from the very superior quality of the soil, and the industry of the inhabitants, being circumstances which have already been noticed, it appears clear that considerable improvements in agriculture might be easily effected.*

* The author in making the necessary observations, and in collecting such information as he conceived necessary, in writing a statistical account of the Canadas, which he has nearly ready for publication, necessarily devoted the most particular attention to the quality of the soil and the state of agriculture. He has, therefore, from the superior quality and unimproved state

If an increase of four bushels an acre were produced, still the crops would be but very small; only about 16 or 17 bushels per acre.*

Such an increase, however, would yield 1,953,852 bushels; which, with the 330,483 now annually exported, upon an average, would make 2,284,335 bushels, being nearly equal to double the amount of the supplies of our West-Indian plantations.†

Estimating also the small proportion which the land under grain bears to the amount of cleared land, an increase of the quan-

of the land, and from his experience and knowledge of the practice of husbandry, in some of the best cultivated districts of the mother-country, deemed it his duty to write a treatise, shewing those agricultural improvements, which are most peculiarly adapted to these provinces, with the most appropriate systems of cropping, rules of farm-management, &c. This, with some observations upon the best means of overcoming the prejudices, which, amongst the Canadians, (as well as amongst the people of any other country wherein improvements, or any change of system, is unknown,) must be found to exist against any deviation from their old-established practice, are intended to be submitted to the Board of Agriculture, in order to an application being made to the board of trade and plantations, in behalf of our interest in the improvement of these extensive and valuable colonies.

* See page 58. † See No. 6, in the Appendix.

tity under grain (if accompanied with an improvement of agriculture in general) might certainly be made to great advantage. Such an increase to the extent of 100,000 acres, being only an addition of about one-fifth to the quantity computed to be now under grain, and about the fiftieth part of the cle[...] the Canadas,* and also supposing it to produce only sixteen bushels per acre, would yield 1,600,000 bushels; which, with the above 2,284,335, would make the annual exports 3,884,335 bushels.

An improvement to this extent might certainly be brought about without much difficulty, provided the proper means were used to effect so desirable an object.

The circumstances favourable to the improvement of agriculture in Canada are an excellent soil, a favourable climate, a steady demand for produce, and that activity, industry, and emulation, which exist amongst the inhabitants; whilst the only circumstances, which militate against such improvements are, the ignorance of the Canadian cultivators of the modern

* See page 56.

improvements in agriculture and their attachment to old-established practices. For nothing is more obvious than that industry and emulation may exist under the greatest ignorance and the most obstinate tenacity of the old beaten path, as well as under the most successful [illegible] which experiment can lead.

Under such circumstances, it is evident that improvements judiciously introduced must be attended with the most certain success.

The difficulty of eradicating the prejudices of the Canadian farmers, by introducing agricultural improvements, would not be greater than what would be experienced in the introduction of any improvement amongst the farmers, or any other class of people, in any other country.

A proof that the people are not altogether averse to new experiments, and that they are disposed to follow up such practices as they may find profitable, is to be found in the circumstance of the introduction of the growth of barley, and the cultivation of peas, already noticed.

The growth of barley was unknown in Canada until a few years back, when a gentleman, in the prosecution of some speculations

in that article, introduced it, and the example was almost instantaneously followed.

The principal difficulty experienced in such introductions is in finding individuals amongst the older residents disposed to try the experiment; but this is a difficulty very far from being insurmountable. When once any new discovery is made, and the improvement adopted by only one such individual, and is found profitable, there is no doubt but that it will be generally adopted. For, whatever the neighbours of the person who first adopted the improvement may have formerly thought of such projects, or whatever antipathy they may have entertained against them, the temptation of profit and the fear of being considered less ingenious than a neighbour, who excelled them in nothing else, and whom, to esteem, in any respect, superior to themselves would be to them the greatest mortification, would induce them not only to follow his example, but would also set their ingenuity to work and stimulate them to improve upon his principles.

From the view taken of the improveable capabilities of the Canadas, in respect to furnishing wheat, as well as other agricultural pro-

duce, for exportation, it is obvious that these hitherto-neglected colonies might, in a very short time, be so improved as to yield the most extensive supplies. There is, indeed, no doubt that, in a few years, under good management, they might not only furnish our West-Indian settlements with their supply of flour, but also the mother-country with all the wheat, hemp, and flax, which she requires from foreign parts; unless she should be still determined to be dependent upon foreign countries for her supplies of these important articles.

Canada capable of producing hemp and flax sufficient for the supply of the mother-country with these articles.

In reference to the question as to how far the Canadas are capable of producing a quantity of hemp and flax sufficient to supply the wants of the mother-country, it may be observed, that, as far as relates to the extent and quality of the land under cultivation, and also their population, they certainly do possess this capability.

To prove this point, it will be only necessary to notice the circumstances which have promoted or retarded the production of flax and hemp in these provinces.

This fundamental cause may be justly traced to the extreme ignorance of the Canadians, with respect to agriculture in general.

Upon this cause a variety of others are hinged, such as, the reduced state of the land in point of fertility; the defective knowledge of the natives, concerning these crops; and their tenacity of antient habits and established practices. Athough these circumstances have been already noticed, it is nevertheless necessary here to make some further observations, in order to shew how far these impediments are capable of being removed, and to what extent they stand in the way of the cultivation of hemp and flax in particular.

Although the exhausted state of the soil is a cause which, to a certain degree, operates against the cultivation of these crops generally, and in particular where combined with certain other causes, actually prevents their cultivation, yet, under other circumstances, it would not by any means prevent their being cultivated

to advantage, even to an extent sufficient to supply the British market.

There are certain parts of every farm fit for the profitable production of either hemp or flax, or both; and therefore upon the judicious choice, both in respect to extent and situation of the parts chosen for the production of these crops, will depend their profitable culture; hence follows the absolute necessity of a general knowledge of agriculture.

The generally reduced state of the land, the want of a thorough knowledge of the management of hemp and flax, and a defective knowledge of agriculture in general, are causes which, combined, must inevitably prevent the profitable cultivation of these crops. For, under such circumstances, either an injudicious choice may be made of the land destined for these crops, or too large a proportion may be appropriated to that purpose; and therefore, even supposing the farmer by accident to have made a proper choice of the land, as to its fitness to produce the crops in question, he may nevertheless so derange his system or mode of cropping as may occasion considerable loss and inconvenience, notwithstanding the hemp and flax produced may have been very abundant

Where the cultivation of these articles is undertaken by persons unacquainted with agriculture in general, notwithstanding they may tolerably well understand the management of hemp and flax, such persons are not only likely to fail in rendering good crops of them profitable, but, from an injudicious choice and improper management of the land selected for their growth, will certainly often meet with a double loss and disappointment, by their total failure.

With respect to popular prejudices against new introductions, and a blind adherence to established practices, I have already shewn, that, were proper means introduced, — such means indeed as might be reasonably expected to succeed under like circumstances in any other country, these prejudices might not only be easily overcome, but the improvements which they might have given way to would certainly be followed up with energy.

Considering that very good crops of flax are generally produced, but ruined in the management which succeeds the operation of pulling, it is therefore evident, that a little well-directed attention to this circumstance would meet with the most certain success in improving and encouraging the cultivation of this crop. And it

is also evident that, besides the direct advantages which would be derived from this end being accomplished, another important purpose would thereby be easily effected, namely, the cultivation of hemp; an improvement which, compared with the cultivation of flax, would prove much more profitable to the farmer, and of infinitely greater consequence to the mother-country.

Our annual importation of hemp is about 250,000 cwt. and of flax about 175,000 cwt. 50,000 acres of land under hemp, at 5 cwt. each, and 50,000 acres under flax, at 3½ cwt. each, would produce these respective quantities.

The cleared land in the Canadas is estimated at about 5,002,428 acres;* and, supposing that of the 360,000 inhabitants there are only employed in agriculture 300,000, there must, in that case, be 50,000 families of six persons each, employed in husbandry, and 50,000 farms, averaging about one hundred acres.

Thus it appears, that if each farmer were to sow one acre of hemp and one acre of flax, and the crops produced of only the middling quality which I have stated, our supplies of

* See page 56.

these important articles would be obtained from our own provinces, and consequently all our anxieties about obtaining a precarious supply from our enemies relieved; besides, our colonies would be thereby improved, and our manufacturers proportionably benefited.

Every farm is capable of producing either hemp or flax; and therefore in proportion as any particular farm might be found more adapted to the production of any one of these articles, respect should be paid to that circumstance, either with regard to the respective proportions of these crops, or an absolute preference given to the one considered the most profitable: there are, however, but very few instances where the land is not capable of profitably producing both.

But supposing that only two-thirds of the farmers were to sow hemp and flax, in that case were each to sow one acre and an half of hemp and the same quantity of flax, the whole of our supplies would thereby be produced. Or further, to suppose that only half the number of farmers as above were to cultivate these crops, still our supplies would be produced by each only cultivating two acres of hemp and two acres of flax.

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CONCLUSION.

From what has been advanced concerning the importance of the colonies which we possess in North America, and the danger in which they are placed by the present war, it is evident they are, in the highest degree, entitled to our protection:—Compared with any of our other colonial establishments,—with our colonies in the West Indies,—with our colonies in the East Indies,—or with our Mediterranean establishments, and estimated by the proportionate quantity of our shipping they employ, I have shewn that they rank the highest :*—if valued by the present proportionate amount, and the sure prospect of future increase of the demand and facility they afford us for vending our manufactures: it is clearly demonstrated that they have decidedly the precedence.†—Should

* Appendix, Nos. 8 and 17. † No. 2.

they be estimated according to the loyalty of their inhabitants ;—recent occurrences and the uniform conduct of these brave people prove that they are second to no colonies that Great Britain now has or ever did possess. Possessing then these important properties, in such a pre-eminent degree, are they not entitled to a proportionate degree of our care and attention, and a commensurate share of those means which we possess, for the protection of our colonies in general?

Perhaps some may be scarcely inclined to admit that these colonies are actually in danger. I would, however, most earnestly remind such persons, that the loss of our colonies, in the last American war, was occasioned solely by the extravagant contempt which we entertained of the strength of the Americans as an enemy,—by the inadequacy of the forces sent out, and, more especially, to the tardy and apparently reluctant manner in which they were furnished.

Instead of a respectable force being sent at once, such as might have been deemed sufficient to destroy and disperse this enemy, whose power we then held in so much contempt, our troops were sent out in handfuls,—a

few at a time; and, when these were destroyed, a few more; and so on, to the end of the war, which, as might have been expected, brought with it the loss of our valuable colonies, and our humiliation and disgrace before this otherwise contemptible enemy.

And what but the same spirit of infatuation could have so long delayed sending a military force to Canada, after the declaration of the present war against us by the United States? What but the same lethargy, and blind insensibility to danger, which occasioned the loss of our colonies at that time, could have so long withheld the trifling and inadequate supply of troops which have been hitherto sent to these provinces? Indeed, it is notorious that our government, in sending out these small supplies, have allowed our enemy full time to prepare for their reception, and in every respect appear determined to carry on this war *à la* NORTH and GAGE.

The danger of the Canadas consists chiefly in their small population being disposed along an immense extent of the frontier of a populous hostile country.—Their safety consists, in the first place, *in the combined circumstances of the river St. Laurence, and the strong garrison of*

Quebec being the key to the country, and of our fleets being able to command the navigation of the St. Laurence; in the second place, *in the loyalty of their inhabitants, and the firm attachment of the Indians to the British interest;* and, in the third place, *in the aid of a British army.*

With respect to the first of these defensive properties, viz. the strength of the garrison of Quebec, and the power which we possess of commanding the navigation of the river St. Laurence, it may be observed, that, although these are certainly valuable properties, yet, unattended by the other two, they would be found comparatively of little avail. For, were the Americans in possession of the country, and the Canadians indifferent to our interests, and we in possession of the river St. Laurence, notwithstanding that that river is, and necessarily must be, the channel of commerce to the extensive country upon its waters; yet we should, in that case, be only so far in possession of the Canadas, by merely holding the St. Laurence, as we should be in possession of the Russian empire, by having the command of the mouths of the Baltic and Black Sea.

The command which the possession of the

garrison of Quebec and the river St. Laurence has over the Canadas are valuable advantages, and certainly of vast importance: but they are only to the possession of the Canadas, as the capital is to the kingdom, or as the citadel to the city. In the defence of the country, they are strong and important positions; but to rest the safety of our possession of the country, in any considerable degree, upon them, would be little better than voluntarily resigning it to the enemy.

Our government, however, must have trusted the safety of these provinces principally to these circumstances, otherwise they would have been more prompt in furnishing the means of defending them at the commencement of hostilities, and, at this moment, would have had a much greater force in that country.

Regarding the loyalty of the Canadians, and their attachment to their parent-country, they are certainly of vast importance in the defence of these colonies. If proofs of this were wanting, let us look back to the late American war, and witness their zeal and enthusiasm in the British cause in the present struggle. The Canadas, consisting as yet but of a small popu-

lation, and extended along the American frontier, and, consequently, exposed to an enemy of immensely superior strength in point of numerical proportion, are, therefore, however unshaken their zeal and undaunted their courage, inadequate to the defence of these colonies. With a reasonable supply of troops from the mother-country, however,—even with half the number to which the importance of these possessions entitle them, which would be at least double the force which is there at present, they would be safe beyond all doubt or apprehension.

The firm attachment of the Indians to our interest is a circumstance which adds greatly to our means of defending and securing our Canadian possessions; and, indeed, constitutes the principal means of our holding these colonies. It may be, therefore, necessary to take notice of the circumstances to which we owe this important alliance. For we must not suppose that the Indians esteem us merely because we are British, nor hate and despise our enemies in that quarter merely because they are Americans; they, as well as civilized nations, must have more potent reasons, and more stimulating motives, for their friendship.

The friendly alliance of the Indians is derived from various causes:—in the first place, *from the American encroachments upon their rights and privileges;* in the second place, *from the good-will of the frontier nations, purchased by the presents annually made them by our government;* and, in the third place, *from an extensive intercourse which has been cultivated with them, almost over the whole northern continent of America, by our fur-traders.*

With regard to the first of these causes; the rapid progress which the settlements of the United States has made towards the interior upon all sides, and the little ceremony observed by the Americans in obtaining possession of their new territory, has produced several wars between the Americans and the Indians, and thereby created and kept up in the Indian breast a constant rancour and antipathy towards these intruders.

Our government, upon the other hand, has carefully avoided the smallest misunderstanding with them upon the score of territorial right; and, likewise, studiously courted and secured their friendship by an annual distribution of presents to the nations inhabiting the frontiers.

Our fur-trade with the Indians, however, has certainly done infinitely more towards securing their friendship than all the other causes jointly considered.

This trade is principally carried on by a company of merchants, consisting of several establishments, but generally styled the North-West Company.

The concerns of this house have been so organized, and their plans and schemes of operation conducted upon such an extensive scale as to have extended their trade over a very large proportion of the continent of North America; even from the coast of Labradore nearly to the Pacific Ocean; and from the vicinity of Lousiana, almost to the Frozen Sea, which bounds the continent upon the North.

The trade carried on by this company with the Indians has been so industriously prosecuted and judiciously and honourably conducted as to have rendered it not only extremely profitable, but highly honourable to the company, from their having thereby secured to the British nation the friendly disposition of all the Indian nations, to whom their commercial intercourse has extended. For, in all their intercourse

with these savages, they have not only avoided quarrels, but have universally commanded respect, and secured the friendship and esteem of that uncultivated and war-like race, both for themselves and the British in general.

It is evident, therefore, that it is to this mercantile establishment that we are indebted for the cordial co-operation of the Indians against the Americans.

Considering that it was in a great measure from our Indian alliance, during the last American war, that we secured the Canadas at its termination, it may therefore be fairly concluded that it is, in some degree, to the honourable principles upon which our fur-trade has been carried on, that we are indebted for the possession of the Canadas at the present day.

Indeed, our Indian alliance would, had it not been from the most culpable ignorance of our negotiators, have then secured to us what now constitutes the richest and best portion of all that part of the United States, which lies east of the Allegany mountains, viz.—that vast fertile country, situated upon the south side of the St. Laurence and the lakes, to the head-waters of the rivers which empty themselves into the St. Laurence and its chain of lakes.

But so miserably deficient, in point of information, were our *negotiating magi* upon this occasion, that they appeared blind to their countries' rights, in respect to the protection of this most valuable branch of British commerce, (the fur-trade,) and ignorant that our faithful Indian allies had any interests, entitled to our notice, in this treaty; otherwise they never would have ceded to the Americans that very country, of which these allies were then in possession,—in which the Americans had literally not a soldier in arms,—they would have never given up that fine country upon the south banks of the St. Laurence and its lakes, thereby wresting from these friendly Indians (who had already suffered so much in our cause,) their paternal inheritance;—driving them, by this disgraceful treaty, from their antient possessions, of which the hostile armies of America could not dispossess them.—

They must have been totally ignorant that there was any thing respecting the fur-trade worthy of attention, or even that there existed any such branch of industry in British commerce, otherwise they would not have ceded the forts or posts of Michilimakinac,

Detroit, Niagara, &c. and, allowed the boundary line to reach the middle of the St. Laurence and the lakes, thereby, in a great measure, shutting up the door of access to the fur-trade against us. Indeed, they appear to have entered into negotiation with our rebel-colonists, with a determination to insist upon nothing that was contended for by that party; for, being in possession of the whole country, upon the south side of the St. Laurence and the lakes, as well as upon the north side, and, as I have already mentioned, holding the forts of Niagara, Detroit, and Michilimakinac, who could have supposed that there were to be found British negotiators so very ignorant as to have given up all that extensive country.

The settlements of the State of Main had not then reached farther to the eastward (being towards New Brunswick) than the river Penobscot.

That river, therefore, ought to have been the boundary between the United States and New Brunswick; and, upon the Canadian side, the boundary line ought to have run from lake Kersisango to the head of lake Champ-

lain; from thence to a point about equal distances, between lake Erie and the river Ohio, at Pittsburg; and, from thence, to the westward, in that parallel of latitude.

Such a boundary line would have secured us the free and uninterrupted navigation of the St. Laurence and the lakes, and the possession of one of the finest and most fertile countries in the world. The cession of this country, then in our possession, without an equivalent, glaring and unaccountable as that sacrifice was, was rendered still more culpable by our being then, as already observed, in possession of New York and Rhode Island, both which, with this fine country, were given up by the ministers of that day.

My reason for taking so particular notice of these gross mistakes, which were committed in negotiating the last peace with America, is intended for the double purpose of stimulating to adequate exertions, for regaining that which we so foolishly, and with so much simplicity, gave away:—and to remind our ministers, that America actually *gained nearly as much territory by negotiation*, at the end of the late war, *as she did by a bloody contest of seven years,*

that they may, when they come to negotiate, endeavour to regain what has been so *wantonly and foolishly thrown away*.

Respecting the impolicy, of which the British government has been guilty, in suffering the Americans to take possession of Louisiana, but particularly the latter, it may be remarked that this acquisition of the United-States government was not merely a territorial extent,—not a forest, the settlement of which would be a work of ages, but an immense augmentation to their population,—a country, in every respect, superior to any they ever before possessed; and in this point of view it was considered by one of the most subtle politicians, who organized the immense power of Buonaparte,—Talleyrand, whose opinions of the importance of these colonies, and the fertility of the country, on the banks of what he terms the Nile of America, may be seen, from the following extracts, from a pamphlet, written by him at the period when Buonaparte was first consul.

"* Our nation had the vain honour of conferring a name on a portion of the globe, not exceeded by any other portion of it, in all the advantages of climate and soil. Before the war of 1757, it was an immense valley, watered by a deep and beneficent river. This river first acquires importance in the latitude of forty-five, north. It flows in a devious course about two thousand miles, and enters the bay of Mexico, by many mouths, in latitude 29. In these latitudes is comprised the temperate zone, which has been always deemed most favourable to the perfection of the animal and vegetable nature. This advantage is not marred by the chilling and *sterilifying* influence of lofty mountains, the pestilential fumes of intractable bogs, or the dreary uniformity of sandy plains. Through the whole extent, there is not, probably, a snow-capt hill, a moving sand, or a volcanic eminence.

"This valley is of different breadths. The ridge which bounds it on the east is in some places near a thousand miles from the great

* From the New Quarterly Review, No. 5.

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middle stream. From this ridge, secondary rivers, of great extent and magnificence, flow towards the centre, and the intermediate regions are an uncultivated Paradise. On the west, the valley is of similar dimensions, the streams are equally large and useful, and the condition of the surface equally delightful.

"We must first observe, that, in gaining possession of this territory, we shall not enter on a desert, where the forest must be first removed before a shelter can be built; whither we must carry the corn and the clothes necessary to present subsistence; and the seed, the tools, and the cattle, which are requisite to raise a future provision.

"There cannot, in the first place, be imagined a district more favourable to settlement. In addition to a genial climate and soil, there are the utmost facilities of communication and commerce. The whole district is the sloping side of a valley, through which run deep and navigable rivers, which begin their course in the remotest borders, and which all terminate in the central stream. This stream, one of the longest and widest in the world, is remarkably distinguished by its depth, and freedom from

natural impediments. It flows into a gulf which contains a great number of populous islands. Among these islands are numerous passages into the ocean, which washes the shores of Europe. Thus, not only every part of the district is easily accessible by means of rivers, but the same channels are ready to convey the products of every quarter to the markets most contiguous and most remote.

"The Nile flows in a torrid climate through a long and narrow valley. The fertility which its annual inundations produce extends only two or three leagues on either side of it. The benefits of this fertility are marred by the neighbourhood of scorching sands, over which the gales carry intolerable heat and incurable pestilence, and which harbour a race of savages, whose trade is war and pillage. Does this river bestow riches worthy of the greatest efforts of the nation to gain them, and shall the greater Nile of the western hemisphere be neglected? A Nile, whose inundations diffuse the fertility of Egypt twenty leagues from its shores, which occupies a valley wider than from the Duna to the Rhine, which flows among the most beautiful dales, and under the

benignest seasons, and which is skirted by a civilized and kindred nation on one side, and on the other by extensive regions, over which the tide of growing population may spread itself without hindrance or danger.

"But of what avail will be all these advantages, unless a market be provided for the produce of the soil? Now this market is already provided. For all that it can produce, France alone will supply *thirty millions* of consumers. The choicest luxuries of Europe are coffee, sugar, and tobacco. The most useful materials of clothing are cotton and silk. All these are either natives of the Mississippi valley, or remarkably congenial to it. The cultivation of these, and the carriage to market, are as obvious and easy as the most ardent politician can desire. The whole extent of the river will be our own, and in the lower and most fertile portion of its course, the banks on both sides will be our indisputable property.

"The friend of the health, longevity, and useful pleasure of the human species, and of the opulence of France, could not devise a better scheme than one which should enable every inhabitant of Europe to consume half a-

pound of sugar a day, and assign to Frenchmen the growth, the carriage, and the distribution of thus much.* Now this scheme is no other than the possession of the American Nile. But this end may be too magnificent to be deemed credible. Let us, then, confine ourselves to the consumption of France; for this alone will be adequate to the employment, and conducive to the wealth, of a vast number of cultivators.

"A much less beneficial luxury is coffee, but this our habits have equally endeared to us. We have hitherto drawn it from the same fountain which has supplied us with sugar: the trade in it must follow the same destiny, the same benefits will flow from increasing the supply, and from drawing the supply from the valley of the Mississippi.

"I shall pass over, without mentioning, many other articles, such as tobacco, indigo, and the like, for which France and the rest of Europe

* 225,000,000 cwt. the produce of an area, not exceeding that of Guienne, Normandy, and Britanny, are not a twentieth part of the valley of the Mississippi.—TRANSLATOR.

will supply an unlimited consumption, and hasten to articles which are of more importance, and these are cotton and provisions.

"The most beautiful production of nature is cotton. It was more than the caprice of fashion that went to the extremities of the East in search of this material, for there is none capable of a greater number of uses, of so many forms, and such various colours. Its texture may constitute the lightest and most beautiful of ornaments, or the best defence against the intemperature of the air.

"The nations of the East have used it immemorially, and from them has it gradually been brought to Europe. The use of it seems to have been limited by nothing but the power of procuring it. Like sugar, the use of it has increased since it has been naturalized to the soil of America. The consumption has, in like manner, been eager to outrun the supply.

"*The American States have, of late, become sensible of the value of the commerce in cotton,* and their success supplies us with a new example, and a powerful inducement to appropriate, in part, *the territory of the Mississippi to the same culture.*

"But now come the fearful and scrupulous head to dash these charming prospects. Obstacles to these great achievements multiply in his timorous fancy. He expatiates on the length of the way; the insalubrity of uncultivated lands; of a climate to which the constitution and habits of the colonists are uncongenial; of a soil, part of which, and that accessible and most valuable, lies under a torrid sun, and is annually inundated.

"Now all these difficulties are imaginary. They are real in relation to a *first* settlement. They ought to be taken into strict account, if our projects extended to New Holland or to California. In all real cases, these difficulties have been great by reason of the avarice, injustice, and folly, of the colonizing nation; and the wisest plans could not totally exclude, though they would greatly lessen and easily surmount them. But Louisiana is not a *new* settlement: It is one of the oldest in North America. All the labours of discovering and of setting the first foot on a desert shore, were suffered and accomplished long ago.

"The Spaniards must be thoroughly aware that their power in Mexico and Peru exists by

the weakness and division of their vassals, and by the remoteness and competition of their European enemies. Unwise and imbecile as that nation has generally appeared in latter times, the admission of the French to a post from whence their dominions may be so easily annoyed at present, and from which their future expulsion is inevitable, is a folly too egregious even for them to commit, and of which the most infatuated of their counsels has not hitherto given an example.

"If Spain should refuse the cession, *there is an end to our golden views.* Our empire in the new world is strangled in its cradle; or, at least, the prosecution of our scheme must wait for a more propitious season. But, should the fortune of our great leader continue her smiles; should our neighbour be trepanned or intimidated into this concession, there is removed, indeed, one obstacle, of itself insuperable; but only to give way to another, at least, equally hard to subdue; and that is, *the opposition of England.*

"That nation justly regards us as the most formidable enemy to her greatness. Of late, if her pride would confess the truth, she would

acknowledge that not her greatness only, but her very being was endangered, either by the influence of our arms, *or the contagion of our example.* She was assailed in her vitals, *as the confusions of Ireland will testify.* She was attacked in her extremities, as the expedition to Egypt, a mere prelude to the conquest of Hindostan, will prove. Her efforts to repel both these attacks, were suitable to their importance, and evince the magnitude of her fears. The possession of the vantage-ground enabled her to crush the Irish. HER NAVAL SUPERIORITY, and the caprice of the winds, enabled her to check our victorious career in the east.

" Will they suffer France to possess herself of the most effectual means of prosecuting future wars to a different issue? Their navy and their commerce are, at present, all their trust. France may add Italy and Germany to her dominions with less detriment to England than would follow from her acquisition of a navy, and the extension of her trade. Whatever gives colonies to France, supplies her with ships and sailors; manufac-

tures and husbandmen. Victories by land can only give her mutinous *subjects;* who, instead of augmenting the national force, by their riches or numbers, contribute only to disperse and enfeeble that force; but the growth of colonies supplies her with zealous *citizens*, and the increase of real wealth and effective numbers is the certain consequence.

"What could Germany, Italy, Spain, and France, combining their strength, perform against England? They might assemble in millions on the shores of the channel, but *there* would be the limit of their enmity. Without ships to carry them over; without experienced mariners to navigate these ships, England would only deride the pompous preparation. The moment we leave the shore her fleets are ready to pounce upon us; to disperse and destroy our ineffectual armaments. *There* lies *their* security: in their insular situation and their navy consist their impregnable defence. Their navy is, in every respect, the offspring of their trade. To rob them of that, therefore, is to beat down their last wall and fill up their last moat. To gain it to ourselves, is to enable

us to take advantage of their deserted and defenceless borders, and to complete the humiliation of our only remaining competitor.

"The trade which enriches England lies *chiefly in the products* of foreign climates. But her Indian territories produce nothing which the Mississippi could not as easily produce. The Ganges fertilizes a valley less extensive. Its *Deltas,* as well as those of the Nile, are in the same latitudes, and these rivers generate the same exuberant soil, only in smaller space and in less quantities than the great western Nile: but the Mississippi comprehends, in its bosom, the regions of the temperate zone as well as the tropical climates and products. The arctic circle in America will be equally accessible to us and to the English. *Our antient possessions in Canada will in due season return to us of their own accord;* and, meanwhile, a double portion of anxiety, and double provision of forts and garrisons, will fall to the lot of the usurping English. The progress of the French will expose their islands, first to be excluded from the markets of Europe, and next to be swallowed up by military power. At present, the protector and the enemy are at an equal

distance; but then there will only be a narrow frith between the Mississippi and the isles, between the invaders and the objects they covet, while the defenders would be, as now, afar off; neither apprised of our designs nor able to defeat them.

"This nation could not bury itself in a more inaccessible fortress than this valley. The mouths of this river, as to all attacks by sea, are better than the bastions of Malta. All around the entrance is impassable to men and horses, and the great channel is already barried by forts, easily extended and improved. A wise policy would teach the English to divert our attention from this quarter, by the sacrifice of Valetta or Gibraltar.

"Can we imagine the English so vigilant, so prudent in all affairs connected with their maritime empire; so quick in their suspicions; so prompt in their precautions; can be blind to the dangers with *which this cession will menace* them? No defeats or humiliations, short of their island, will make them acquiesce in such arrangements.

"It is contrary to all probability that either Spain or England will be tractable on this oc-

casion; but, if the danger, by being distant, is invisible to them; or if the present evils, arising to England from continuance of the war, or to Spain from the resentment of the French government, should outweigh, in their apprehensions, all future evils, and prevail on one to grant, and on the other to connive at the grant, by what arguments, by what promises, by what threats, by what hostile efforts, shall we extort the consent of the American States? How shall we prevail on them to alienate the most valuable portion of their territory; to *admit into their vitals a formidable and active people, whose interests are incompatible, in every point, with their own; whose enterprises will inevitably interfere and jar with theirs; whose neighbourhood will cramp all their movements; circumscribe their future progress to narrow and ignominious bounds; and make incessant inroads on their harmony and independence?*

"Long ago would the lesser princes of Italy and Germany have disappeared, if Sweden, France, Prussia, and Austria, had not stood ready to snatch the spoil from each other. Long ago would the Turkish robbers have been driven back to their native deserts, if any

single nation of Europe had been suffered by the rest to execute that easy task. But the Spaniards know that Spain and America must one day fall asunder. Why then should they decline a present benefit, in order to preclude one means of an event, which yet, by other means, if not by these, will inevitably happen?

"As to England, all the disadvantages with which this event is said to menace them are real. All the consequences just predicted to her colonies, to her trade, to her navy, to her ultimate existence, will indisputably follow. *The scheme is eligible to us chiefly on this account*, and these consequences, if they rouse the English to a sturdier opposition, ought likewise to stimulate the French to more strenuous perseverance.

"But, in truth, every Frenchman must laugh with scorn at the thought of British opposition. What would the Spaniards say, were they told by the English—You must not give away this colony. Though a great incumbrance to you, and a great benefit to those whom it is your interest and duty to oblige, you must, by no means, part with it. What patience, either

in France or Spain, would tolerate an interference thus haughty, from an enemy to both? But when is this opposition to be made? This is not a subject of debate between the agents of England and France. It falls not under their discussion It cannot, therefore, be the occasion of their interviews. There is no room for opposition to what comes not under our notice. The cession must be made without their knowledge. It is only to be published by its execution, and when the French are safely lodged in the Mississippi, the gainsayings of the English will be too late.

"But there is a nearer, and, it must be owned, a more formidable, nation to gain. If there be any truth in the picture heretofore drawn, of the value of this province to France, it must be, in a still greater proportion, of value to the American States. If the powers of this rising nation were intrusted to the hands of one wise man; if the *founder* of the nation was still its *supreme magistrate*, and *he* had no wills to consult but his *own*, the French, most probably, would never be allowed to set their foot on that shore; but the truth, the desirable truth, is, that opposition is the least to be

dreaded from those who have most reason to oppose us. They, whose interests are most manifest, may be most easily deceived: whose danger is most imminent, may most easily be lulled into security. They, whose vicinity to the scene of action puts it most in their power to enact their own safety; whose military force might be most easily assembled and directed to this end, we shall have the least trouble in dividing, intimidating, and disarming.

"I come now to the last difficulty, which the most scrupulous objector has discovered; and *this difficulty will be dissipated with more ease than the rest. On what foundation does it repose, but the visionary notion, that the conduct of nations is governed by enlightened views to their own interest?* The rulers of nations have views of their own, and they are gained by the gratification of these private views. The more individuals there are that govern, and the more various their conditions and their character, the more dissimilar are their interests, and the more repugnant these interests to those of each other, and the interests of the whole.

"Was there ever a people who exhibited so motley a character; who have vested a more

limited and precarious authority in their rulers; who have multiplied so much the numbers of those that govern; who have dispersed themselves over so wide a space; and have been led, by this local dispersion, to create so many clashing jurisdictions and jarring interests, as the States of America?

"They call themselves *free*, yet a fifth of their number are slaves. That proportion of the whole people are ground by a yoke more dreadful and debasing than the predial servitude of Poland and Russia. They call themselves *one*, yet all languages are native to their citizens. All countries have contributed their outcasts and refuse to make them a people. Even the race of Africa, a race not above, or only just above, the beasts, are scattered every where among them, and in some of the districts of their empire, are nearly a moiety of the whole.

"Such is the people whom we, it seems, are to fear, because their *true interest* would make them our enemies; with whom *we* are to contend in negotiation, or, if need be, in arms! We, who are as much a proverb for our skill in diplomatics as in war; who have all the

unity in counsels; the celerity in execution; the harmony of interests; the wisdom of experience; and the force of compactness, of which this patchwork republic is notoriously destitute. Their numbers! *That*, when the parts are discordant, is only fuel more easily kindled, and producing a more extensive and unquenchable flame. Five millions of jarring and factious citizens are far less formidable than a disciplined and veteran legion of as many thousands.

"But the great weakness of these States arises from their form of government, and the condition and the habits of the people. Their form of government, and the state of the country, is a hot-bed for faction and sedition. The utmost force of all the wisdom they possess is exerted in keeping the hostile parts together. These parts are unlike each other, and each one has the individualizing prejudices of a separate state; all the puerile jealousies of the greatness of others; all the petty animosities which make neighbours quarrel with each other without cause. How slight an additional infusion is requisite to set this heterogeneous mass into commotion? to make

the different parts incline different ways, on the great question of war?

"*The master* of the Mississippi will be placed so as to controul, in the most effectual manner, *these internal waves.* It is acknowledged that he holds in his hands the *bread* of all the settlements westward of the hills. He may dispense or withhold at his pleasure. See we not the mighty influence that this power will give us over the councils of the States?"

From the above extracts we learn the importance of which our enemy considered this territory; whether looked at as a valuable acquisition in point of produce or the means of future annoyance.—How then is it possible to account for that infatuated blindness which could tamely permit the fradulent transfer of so valuable a province.

The inhabitants of this extensive, populous, and fertile country, hated the Americans, and would have been glad to have been placed under our protection. Our government, however, tamely looked on, whilst the United States took possession of this fine country in trust

for Buonaparte; being the first step of a project concerted between the American government and this Corsican tyrant, for wresting the Canadas from us.

Passing over, however, all former transactions, now is the time to rectify at once all former mistakes, by taking immediate possession of this desirable country. Its own intrinsic value renders it infinitely more than equal to balance every expense of such an undertaking, even were the cost more than ten times the amount which probability may indicate.

Its value to us is greatly enhanced by its contiguity to our West-Indian possessions,—by the favourable disposition of the people towards us,—by its being the key to the rich and fertile plains upon the rivers Mississippi and Ohio,—by the door which it would open to the introduction of our manufactures into one of the most populous and richest of all the Spanish colonies, (Mexico,)—and, by the command it would give us over the United States.

The possession of this territory would be, to use Talleyrand's expression, "a rein by "which the fury of the States may be held at "pleasure." The Indians to the northward,

being already devoted to our interest, the possession of this country would place the Indian force of almost the whole continent of North America at our disposal. Thus should we be enabled, at all times, to keep the United States in check, almost without the aid of British troops.

In a commercial point of view, the acquisition of this territory would be of immense importance. It would, at all times, secure to us an opportunity of supplying the southern and western parts of the United States with our manufactures. And the Canadas, also, affording us the like privilege upon her northern frontiers, we should thereby have, at all times, secured to us a door of ready access to one of the most valuable fields of British commerce.

The possession of all these colonies would render the whole border of the United States a permanent channel, which the American government never could prevent from being the means of vending our manufactures throughout the interior of her country, even whatever her disposition might be in this respect.

The produce of Louisiana is lumber, wheat, rice, Indian corn, provisions, cotton, indigo, tobacco, &c.

These are articles of great importance, both to our West-Indian islands, and the mother-country. The carriage of the produce of that country would also be of great importance to our shipping-interest: the additional employment it would afford our ships would be immense.

In fact, such an acquisition would be advantageous to all parties; to the mother-country, by opening a new and extensive market for her manufacture,—by securing to her an immense augmentation to the employ of her shipping, besides insuring her, both in peace and in war, an abundant supply of several articles of the greatest importance.—The possession of this territory would not only secure to our West-Indian possessions an abundant and regular supply of every article of American produce; but, in time of war, would, in many respects, prove a protection and defence to them.

And, what is most important, the many advantages which the inhabitants of Louisiana would derive from our being in the possession of it, would undoubtedly secure their firm attachment to our interest. — The act of our taking possession would be the immediate remission of many heavy duties to which they are now liable, and the immediate opening of

a market for their produce; whilst the produce of the United States would continue blockaded in their ports. There is no doubt but that these advantages, coupled with the hatred which the inhabitants of that country bear to the Americans, would render its possession at once secure.

FROM the view which has been taken of our provinces in America, particularly the Canadas, it is evident, that amidst the various important concerns which at present interest the British nation, those matters respecting her colonies in that quarter form a subject of the first importance.

Although these possessions have for many years almost escaped her notice, yet the magnitude of their vast and neglected resources, incapable of longer concealment, have at length attracted attention, and now exhibit an inexhaustible mine of wealth.—They present a permanent source of maritime facilities and naval strength, which to any nation would be of the greatest importance. In the possession of the United States,*

* The Americans, being allowed to catch fish all round the coast of these colonies, and encouraged to sell them in our West-Indian islands, may be said to have been already actually

they would soon raise her to the highest rank of maritime power.—With the privileges of the British ship-owner sacrificed to America to the same extent they have been for the last thirty years,* they would be sufficient to give her the absolute dominion of the seas. To Great Britain, therefore, these colonies are invaluable.

At the conclusion of the late American war, the loss of the colonies, which now form part of the United States, was considered as immense, and almost irreparable.

The colonies which then remained in our possession, however, and which now constitute our present possessions in that quarter, estimated either by the consequences which would inevitably result to this country from their loss, or by their actual value whilst in our possession, are of infinitely more importance to us now than those were to us at that period. I shall therefore make a few observations concerning them in both these respects.

The loss of them, and their annexation to the United States, would be dangerous in the

put in possession of one of the principal maritime resources of these colonies by the British government.

* See No: 6, in the Appendix.

extreme. By some it may be considered but idle speculation to suppose the loss of these colonies as even possible. But, let it be remembered, that they who, during the late American war, apprehended the ultimate loss of our colonies, were also considered as timorously anticipating evils which would never happen; and apprehending losses which would never be sustained. Were we not then taught, by fatal experience, however, that our extravagant contempt of the power of our enemy might prove the means of our defeat, — of placing victory in the hands of the imbecile, and of humbling us even before weakness itself? as that instance and subsequent events have fully proved.—

For, the result of the late war with the Americans was, *that they, almost without an army, actually beat us out of the field. They have also, without a navy, ever since, awed us into tame submission to the most gross violation of the maritime laws of Europe.* And, whilst their government was almost without form or consistency, they threatened us into concessions, by which they have acquired an amount of merchant-shipping *equal* or even greater

than *our own*:* the greater proportion of which—lamentable to state!—has been reared and supported by a sacrifice of the rights and privileges of British ship-owners and British merchants.†

Respecting the means which the Americans possess, of constructing and raising a navy, let us but for a moment reflect upon the following circumstances, viz. what powerful fleets nations of but small and trifling population, compared with that of America, have, in some instances, by careful nursing and proper protection reared upon only the pickings of the carriage of the goods of other nations, such as Holland, Venice, &c. Ought we not then to view with a scrupulous eye the maritime advantages possessed by America—her geographical and political situation;—her vast extent of coast;—the rapid increase of her population, and the vast and unparalleled growth of her commerce;—her extensive resources for the support of her shipping;—the amount of her tonnage, and number of the sailors

* See No. 14 in the Appendix.

† See Chap. III.

who man her merchant-shipping;—the abundance of timber and other materials, with which her country abounds, fit for the construction of ships of the largest dimensions, and that her harbours are full of shipwrights sufficient to build a navy in a very short period;*—and the striking events, and alarming effects, as to the aggrandisement which our mistaken policy produced in her commercial affairs in general in the short period of thirty years. Let us seriously reflect upon these important facts, and deeply ponder on the consequence to which we should render ourselves liable, either in risking the safety of our American colonies, or in allowing the United States the undue advantages she formerly enjoyed over our own merchants.

The vast extent, even nineteen hundred miles, of navigable coast, full of populous towns, and convenient harbours, occupied by the Uni-

* One hundred and twenty shipwrights, &c. are necessary to build a seventy-four-gun-ship in six months. A similar number employed in each of thirty of the sea-port towns of the United States, are therefore capable of building no less than sixty line-of-battle ships in the course of twelve months.

ted States,—her immense shipping, and the mode by which it has been acquired, are circumstances which, as well as the late overgrown power of Buonaparte upon the continent of Europe, ought to excite our most serious attention, and to be met by measures of proper precaution.

These circumstances, minutely investigated and maturely weighed, will be found, perhaps, to forebode to us consequences nearly as alarming as those which we might apprehend from the reduction of the whole continent of Europe, under the grasp of Buonaparte or any other tyrant. For such a continental combination against us, alarming as it would necessarily be, could only be expected to continue but for a short period, as has of late been most fortunately demonstrated.

The great body of such an empire acquired and forced together by the unnatural grasp of tyranny and oppression, and composed of nations varying in manners, customs, languages, and laws; differing from each other upon points of the most essential importance, and, consequently, convulsed by internal discontent, would be but little calculated to mature any

maritime project which would be adequate to create and organise a fleet, in any degree capable of coping with the British navy. But, on the contrary, America not only possesses the most extensive maritime resources and facilities, but is a country united by the same language, manners, and customs, and, already bound together by one government; and, moreover, every individual under that government, having already benefited by an extensive shipping, are therefore intoxicated with national pride at their late successes, and, teeming with the idea of naval rank and power, to which our half measures have lately so much contributed. The measures therefore, which might be adopted by a country so circumstanced, would be framed with comparatively more consistency, and prosecuted with more energy, and consequently must produce effects proportionably of a more formidable and permanent nature, than those to be apprehended from the measures of any continental coalition which could possibly be brought together.

Who in this country, that values its independence, would not be alarmed, were we

to recognise France, Holland, Germany, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, and Russia, all organised under one government; or even the maritime districts of these countries? There is not, perhaps, a loyal subject in the country, possessed of common sense and sound understanding, and an ordinary degree of discernment, who would not apprehend consequences, which would give him the most serious alarm.

But how different our ideas and apprehensions appear to be in respect to the United States! Although that government occupies a coast, which, compared with the vast extent of the continent of Europe, is equally extensive, and, (having reference to that part of the population only, who are employed and engaged in maritime affairs,) is, perhaps, equally populous, and indeed infinitely superior in point of a variety of maritime facilities.—Notwithstanding she possesses an amount of shipping, and every other means which constitute the sources from whence a navy is derived and supported, almost equally extensive as those possessed by all these nations, yet these circumstances appear to give us no serious concern.—Otherwise, we should not have tamely looked on, whilst

the Americans made such an extensive augmentation to their maritime resources as the possession of Louisiana.—We should not, by opening the ports of our East-Indian colonies to their trade at large, whilst shut against the great body of British merchants, have added largely to their shipping by crushing our own.—We should have neither encouraged nor allowed them to have caught cod-fish upon the banks of our own coasts, and dry them upon our own shores, for the supply of our West-Indian settlements; whilst the fish caught and cured by our own colonists, were spoiling in our merchants warehouses *for want of a market.*—We should not have secured to them the supplying of our West-Indian settlements with lumber, whilst that article was to be had in abundance in our own colonies, and our own ships rotting in port for want of employment.—Neither should we have charged a lower duty upon their produce, imported into this country, than what we charged upon the produce of other foreign nations, whilst they never charged lower, but in many instances higher, duties upon our produce and manufactures than they charged upon those of other nations; nor have

meanly submitted to their charge of a countervailing duty of *£3 per ton in favour of their ships,* whilst we charged *only* 22*d. per ton in favour of ours.*

The inhabitants of the United States—those colonists who rebelled against the mother-country, as well in the treaty which acknowledged their independence, as in all subsequent treaties, have in all our commercial arrangements with them, had not only the greatest advantages allowed them, over the "most favoured nations," but even been put upon a more favourable footing than our own colonists, — a more favourable footing than the true and faithful inhabitants of these provinces, whose blood and treasure were, and are at this very moment, cheerfully sacrificed to the salvation of these colonies to the British nation.

It would have been comparatively well for our loyal colonists, had they been put upon an equally favourable footing as the Americans. For, it will be observed, from what has been already stated, that we allowed the latter to import their produce into Great Britain, in their own ships, at nearly the same rate of duties as was charged upon that from our own colonies, and also kept the ports of our West-

Indian islands almost constantly open to them as a market, where no duty was charged upon their produce, thereby allowing them, although foreigners, the rights of British colonists. These unprecedented advantages, coupled with the privileges which their independence as a nation gave them of trading, I may say, to all the ports of the world besides, secured to them an uniform demand for their produce, and employment to their ships, thereby at all times encouraging the growth and exportation of their produce.

It is therefore evident that from our government having neither allowed our colonists to trade to foreign ports, nor protected their interests according to the established laws of the land, by an adequate difference of duties in their trade with herself, the British market being over-stocked with importations from the United States must have proved tenfold more discouraging to the British colonists than to the Americans.

Had American produce been liable to the same duties as the produce of other foreign countries, in that case, the difference of those payable upon the produce of the United States, and those payable upon that of the British

provinces, would have given our colonists such advantages,—such fair, just, and equitable advantages, as would have balanced those which the Americans derived from their commercial intercourse with ports, from which the British colonists were excluded. Had this been the case, at this very period these provinces would have had a population double to that which they have at present, and would have been more than sufficient to supply the mother-country and her West-Indian colonies with lumber, grain, flour, fish, &c.: at this period, the American shipping, compared with what it is now, would have been small, and the amount of British shipping proportionably greater, with ample employment.

In fact, in every instance so completely have the Americans been our superiors at negotiation, that the result of all our treaties with them, and of all our commercial arrangements in which they were concerned, have amounted either to the robbery of the British provinces of their legitimate rights and privileges, or a sacrifice of our shipping-interest, and indeed, in most instances, to both.*

* See Chap. III.

Reciprocity of interest has been uniformly understood to be an axiom, in the negotiation of all treaties, and, consequently, might have been reasonably looked for in those we entered into with America; but there we look for it in vain:—instead of reciprocity, we find, from what has been advanced, nothing but the grossest partiality and the most unjust advantages granted the Americans.

The advantage which they had over us, in respect to the expense of navigating their ships, being unattended to by us, as already observed, operated as a powerful auxiliary in giving effect to the direct advantages we allowed them, and indeed almost entirely excluded ours from any participation of the carriage of their produce in general. But, in respect to lumber in particular, this disability brought with it consequences, which were, in the extreme, destructive of our interests; namely, by preventing the shipment of lumber from the British provinces, where our ships would, without being rivalled, have earned the whole freights. For the 28*s*. per ton against our ships, as stated in No. 5, with only about 1*s*. 10*d*. per ton, countervailing duty, as stated in No. 3, to

balance it, actually shews 26*s.* 2*d.* per ton in favour of the American ships: having identically the same effect as a countervailing duty charged by the British government, upon timber imported from the British provinces, in favour of the importation of that article from the United States.

I do not urge that this great value and accumulated expense of navigating our ships was, abstractedly considered, any disadvantage which we brought upon ourselves, or, that it is one that we could have directly removed: but, I say it ought to have been so attended to, as to have put us upon the alert to prevent other circumstances from coming to its aid, to the injury of our shipping.

Had not the inhabitants of the British provinces possessed a soil far superior to that of the United States, and, therefore, proportionably a superior quality of timber, from the comparatively high freights occasioned by the great expense of our ships, they could have made no exports of that article, whilst this commercial regulation or absurdity existed, which admitted United-States timber at a reduced duty. This providential circumstance,

however,—the accidental superiority of their lumber, procured them a small share of this trade, notwithstanding the powerful operation of this expense of navigating their ships, aided by the low duty we charged in favour of the United States.

In whatever light we view the numerous and enormous advantages allowed the Americans, they will be found to be downright concessions and sacrifices; for we could not be said to have had, in any single instance, even the shadow of an equivalent.

The principal advantage which we have been said to derive from our commercial dealings with America, has been the demand she afforded us for our manufactures. But, in this respect, did she give us a preference? No; her market was open to the manufactures of other countries as well as to ours, and the same duties charged upon ours as upon those from other countries.

Indeed, for several years past, it has been matter of deep concern to those Britons who derive the smallest pleasure from reflecting upon our former naval superiority,—who are inspired with the least spark of zeal for our fu-

ture greatness and independence, to have seen, previous to our present differences with America, our ships lying rotting in port,—our merchant dock-yards all dwindling to decay, and many of them even deserted, and our shipwrights and sailors sent, by our impolitic proceedings, to America to build and man the shipping of the United States, for which our government had so liberally provided employment,—sent there in furtherance of the scheme which may be truly said to have been founded by American wisdom, foresight, artifice, and low cunning, upon *British imbecility and pusillanimity, for turning over the British shipping to the United States.*

And to what do we owe the temporary check, which has been put to these proceedings; for it is still a question, whether or not it may be rendered permanent? Why; more to the pampered temper, hatred, and ill-humour, of this spoiled child than to our own wisdom or foresight.

The Americans having already gained every point they disputed with us, became impatient for immediate possession of the source from whence we derived our maritime superiority. Consi-

dering as too tardy the means by which we were in effect *yielding them up the trident,* and encouraged to attempt wresting, by force, what our government was systematically granting by mean concession, they have thereby saved it to the British nation for the present.--They have, indeed, in this instance, afforded a pause for surveying and reflecting upon past occurrences, that I sincerely hope will teach us the necessity of proceeding with caution in all our future negotiations and transactions with them, which is my sole motive, (and, indeed, a very important one,) for bringing these past transactions under review.

However, notwithstanding these bonuses, *generously* granted by our government to the United States, had so far exceeded the bounds of prudence, as not only to lose sight of that of reciprocity, but actually to place our merchant-shipping upon the verge of ruin, and, consequently, our navy and nation at large in jeopardy; yet, the British nation in general, not only countenanced ministers in these sacrifices, but appeared still inclined, and did, all along, urge them on to further concessions.

It therefore appears, that all ranks of society in this country had, with one consent,

agreed to comply with the unreasonable demands of America; and, indeed, all in their turn have lent their aid or shewn their goodwill in furtherance of the enormous encroachments of the government of the United States.

Indeed, upon every occasion the country in general appeared disposed to out-strip government in making sacrifices to America. For, when our ministers, having at last become sensible of the impolicy of further concessions, began to make a stand, appearing inclined to retract where it could be consistently done, they were, in these laudable exertions, opposed and assailed by clamorous parties of various descriptions, both in and out of parliament. This was particularly the case of late, when they endeavoured, and, indeed much to their credit, persevered in asserting the established maritime laws of Europe,—laws, which had so much contributed to the high rank which we hold amongst other nations,—laws, the rigio observance of which, is indispensably necessary to the support of this elevated situation, and, consequently, essential to the very existence of our independence.

It is proper here to remark, that, from the facts which have been stated, the principal

sacrifices were commenced immediately after the American war, and were made with the greatest liberality up to the commercial treaty into which that government frightened us in the year 1794.

At the commencement of the restrictions which the Americans imposed upon their commercial intercourse with this country, the sacrifice of the commercial, shipping, and colonial interests of Great Britain had actually become so notorious, as has been already stated, as was sufficient to induce a belief, that the British government, in their commercial arrangements with the Americans, had no concern for the interests of this country. These foreigners had the ports of our colonies kept open to them against the wise laws of our ancestors, and contrary to the example and sound policy of other nations;—they were encouraged to supply our settlements in the West Indies with fish* and lumber, when the fishe-

* The demand for fish in our West-Indian settlements, upon an average of three years, ending 1807, was 456,221 cwts. 97,486 of which was furnished by the mother-country, leaving 358,735 cwt. which should have been supplied from our own American fisheries. But, strange and unaccountable as it may appear, although our own fisheries produced

ries and timber-trade of our own colonies were in the most depressed state;—they were encouraged to trade to our settlements in the Mediterranean, and to our Asiatic establishments, and, in particular, to supply these with masts and spars, as well as every other kind of lumber, whilst British colonists were, and are to this very moment, excluded these privileges; at least with the trifling exception of some few ports in the Mediterranean, wherein they have lately been *allowed the great privilege* of coming in competition with these foreigners in a trade, which, according to the laws of the land, ought to have been altogether sacred to British subjects. And, moreover, they have been allowed *upwards of three thousand* per cent. advantage over our ship-owners in the countervailing duty charged by them and us, respectively, besides their produce being admitted into

817,351 cwt. and, from their discouraged state, were capable of the greatest improvement; yet the British government encouraged the Americans to supply 188,125 cwt. of this 358,735, whilst, from their impolitic measures, they so cramped this valuable branch of trade from our American colonies, that only 170,610 was supplied from our own fisheries in that quarter.—See No. 18, in the Appendix.

this country at a lower duty than that charged upon other foreign produce, to the great discouragement of our colonial and shipping interests; whereas, they allowed us no advantage over other foreigners, but, on the contrary, singled us out for many insults and disadvantages. These enormous, these unaccountable and disgraceful sacrifices were continued to the Americans, as long as their insufferable ambition and hostile disposition, engendered by our pusilanimity, would allow the enjoyment of them.

It is notorious that a reformation of the abuses which existed in the management of our maritime and commercial concerns with America, previous to the commencement of the present war with that country, was highly necessary. This circumstance should therefore be duly attended to, in any negotiation into which we enter with that country. Regarding the footing upon which we stood with the United States previous to the present war, however, it is but just to remark, that our present ministers deserve some degree of merit for the stand they made in our continued progress of concession to that country as well as

for some attempts at a reformation of former abuses.

In this, however, they were assailed by the strongest opposition,—by the clamour of an interested party, who were heard from various parts of the country,—and by what is called the opposition in parliament, who have upon every occasion strenuously advocated the cause of America, even to the fullest extent of her unreasonable demands.

As the reformation of the shameful abuses which have existed in the disposition of all our arrangements with America has fallen to the lot of our present ministers, it is most devoutly to be hoped they will perform it scrupulously agreeable to OUR MARITIME LAWS, as far as relates to our shipping;—congenial with the interests of the community at large, as respects our commerce and colonies in general;—and in every respect becoming the dignity of the British nation.

The uniform hostile disposition which America has evinced towards us renders it the imperious duty of ministers, in their conduct towards her, both to adopt the most prompt and decisive measures in defending our American

provinces during the present war, and to proceed with the greatest caution and circumspection in negotiating a peace. The most wary and guarded conduct in all our proceedings with a country of such immense and unprecedented growth, both as respects her population and commerce, is highly necessary. In the short space of 20 years, she has doubled her population, which is now nearly 8,000,000; encreased her exports from about 16,000,000 to 118,000,000 dollars; her shipping from 939,000 to 1,911,250 tons;—and, before she had either raised an army or fitted out a navy, has actually, by her threatenings and artful negotiation, nearly doubled her territorial extent,* and trebled her maritime resources.†

Is it not trifling, then, with the most serious

* This acquisition will be found in her possession of Louisiana.

† The permission granted her for fishing upon the coast of our American colonies—her possession of Louisiana,—and the general sacrifice of our maritime laws, which was commenced immediately after her independence, and made in the most unlimited manner, up to her actual hostilities against us, has certainly trebled her maritime resources.

and important concerns of the British nation, to overlook, as we have hitherto done, the unprecedented growth and aggrandizement of this immense country?—To risk almost unprotected our valuable Canadian possessions to the attack of this artful and successful enemy, and by our neglect of these provinces excite the disaffection of their inhabitants, and thereby turn their unparalleled loyalty and patriotism into cold indifference to our interests, must be considered a crime of the first magnitude committed against the British nation.

Whatever importance, however, these colonies derive from an apprehension of the consequences which might result from their loss and annexation to the United States, they derive infinitely more from the great advantages which may be drawn from their valuable inherent properties and extensive resources.

The loss which we sustained, by the dismemberment of those of our colonies, which now form part of the United States, by the last American war, was considered immense, and it certainly was a loss of great magnitude; but those provinces, which then remained to us, being our present possessions in that quar

ter, are, in every respect, as I have already observed, of infinitely more importance to us now than the colonies then lost were to us at that time.

At the commencement of the late American war, the colonies which we lost then only annually exported produce to the amount of about £1,752,142; those that remained in our possession, now annually export to the amount of about £3,000,000.—Then 193,890 tons of shipping were all that was annually employed in the exportation of the produce of the colonies we lost at that time; 309,994 tons are now annually employed in the exportation of the produce of the colonies now in our possession.—Then the amount of our manufactures, &c. annually imported into the colonies which we lost, was only about £2,732,036, whilst the possession of these provinces afforded no further facilities in this respect, than that which their own consumption produced; but the amount now annually imported into the colonies which remained and is now in our possession, is upwards of £5,000,000, including goods vended through these settlements into the United States, into which they con-

stitute a door of access, more than 1200 miles in width, for the introduction of our manufactures into that country. — A door, which, if the British are sufficiently awake to their own interests in keeping it open, will not only render embargo, non-intercourse, or, even war itself, ineffectual in preventing the most extensive importation of our manufactures into the United States; but, what is also of infinite importance, it will, both in peace and in war, render the duties charged upon our manufactures imported into the United States, operate as premiums or countervailing duties for encouraging their introduction from the British settlements, and thereby, not only render prohibitory measures ineffectual, but, what is also of immense importance, a preference to the manufactures of other nations impossible.

In fact, notwithstanding the advantages which the United States have derived from her neutrality, during the convulsed state of Europe for the last twenty years, her great acquisition of territory, and the enormous commercial sacrifices which she has enjoyed from Great Britain ever since her independence; yet, the ex-

ports, both in point of tonnage and value, from our remaining provinces, shackled and discouraged as they have been, have, compared with the American exports, experienced an equal ratio of increase.

Our East-Indian possessions, which have of late occupied so much of our attention, appear of great consequence, and are certainly possessions of great magnitude.—Boasting a population of 60,000,000, whilst the vast patronage necessarily attached to colonies of so great a population and extensive territory, certainly render their importance very conspicuous: but, in point of real worth to the nation, they fall infinitely short of our American colonies. For, it will be observed, and it is worthy of remark, that these Asiatic possessions only employ annually, in their exports to this country, about 40,000 tons of shipping; whilst our American colonies, in their exports, employ upwards of 300,000 tons.

In 1810, the imports, from our East-Indian colonies, amounted only to about £5,000,000, while the imports from our American colonies amounted to upwards of that amount, with the

most flattering prospect of encrease.* Of these respective imports, too, the freight upon those imported from the East-Indies amounted only to about £1,200,000, whilst, of those imported from our American provinces, upwards of £2,500,000 was composed of the earnings of British ships,—the most valuable species of British commercial revenue. Regarding, moreover, these imports, which in point of value appear nearly of an equal amount, it may be observed, that four or five ships, manned with a few enervated foreigners, who must, under a heavy penalty, be returned to their native country, are sufficient to import Asiatic produce and manufactures to the amount of a million sterling; whilst to import of the produce of our American colonies to that amount an immense fleet, manned with several thousand of the hardiest seamen (our own countrymen) must be employed.

* See Nos, 11 and 12.

APPENDIX.

No. 1.

CANADIAN EXPORTS.

A List of the principal Articles of the Produce and Manufacture of Upper and Lower Canada, shewing the great increase which has lately taken place in the Exports of these Provinces.

Exports, from Quebec, for the last ten years, viz. in the years **1803** *to* **1812.**

	ARTICLES.	1803	1804	1805	1806	1807	1808	1809	1810	1811	1812
	LUMBER.										
PRODUCE	Oak Timber - - - - - - - - - - Pieces	3,819	3,940	4,535	8,178	11,195	12,372	10,143	33,798	34,741	19,837
OF THE	Pine - - - - - - - - - - - - - —	3,153	845	896	2,210	3,333	14,510	23,699	69,271	58,575	28,870
FOREST,	Masts and Bowsprits - - - - - —	283	115	124	354	1,063	4,367	3,333	7,655	5,087	3,578
VIZ.	Spars - - - - - - - - - - - - - —	254	60	141	189	316	1,612	2,570	3,354	3,325	1,867
LUMBER,	Walnut, Maple, Elm, &c. - - —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	141	205
ASHES,	Staves - - - - - - - - - - - - —	764,407	1,061,195	1,043,994	1,803,234	1,783,890	1,824,861	3,052,518	3,887,306	2,330,842	1,890,395
FURS,	Stave-ends - - - - - - - - - - —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	65,285	15,343
&c.	Pine-boards and Deals - - - - —	124,197	69,067	42,820	66,166	106,363	194,467	262,280	312,432	396,674	208,211
	Ash Oars - - - - - - - - - - - —	1,222	1,672	376	414	176	2,723	8,424	30,301	21,565	29,702
	Handspikes - - - - - - - - - - —	18,354	12,113	11,174	1,694	2,064	4,144	6,848	13,623	6,053	4,491
	Lathwood - - - - - - - - - - - —				1,778	11,579	130,915	152,487	167,389	222,236	136,411
	Hoops - - - - - - - - - - - - —	92,875	102,800	119,625	140,000	88,250	215,500	134,850	130,516	192,170	205,200
	Treenails - - - - - - - - - - - —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	131,400
	Shingles - - - - - - - - - - - - —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	16,000
	Scantling - - - - - - - - - - Feet -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,000
	Pipe-packs - - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,191	963	4,909	1,023	—	2,006	2,522	5,497	6,535	2,802
	Puncheon-packs - - - - - - - - - -	624		260	747	1,355	1,069	120	55	151	—
	Hogshead-packs - - - - - - - - - -	50	298	603	669	2,050	400	594	1,301	1,188	489
	Quarter-cask-packs - - - - - - - -	—	467	—	454	—	—	506	771	1,405	525

ASHES.											
Pot and Pearl Ashes	Barrels	5,437	5,933	7,925	10,717	13,215	30,838	30,942	29,407	22,734	9,613
	Cwts.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	77,497	35,077
FURS.											
Beaver	Skins	93,778	111,448	92,903	119,708	114,763	126,926	105,032	98,523	80,123	95,099
Martin	—	31,441	23,796	14,275	55,685	46,801	9,530	382	554	98	595
Otter	—	17,465	20,237	15,246	12,297	8,390	7,230	5,566	2,645	2,153	7,800
Mink	—	12,062	11,567	11,431	14,872	9,214	9,100	2,010	169	—	65
Fisher	—	7,326	5,767	3,882	6,578	5,512	3,866	3,048	2,536	2,501	1,062
Fox	—	9,788	8,891	7,228	8,863	1,547	1,038	103	1	273	3,222
Bear and Cub	—	23,369	17,417	19,436	15,977	10,661	11,298	9,561	10,751	400	2,735
Deer	—	206,979	249,050	213,843	212,037	166,366	103,875	83,549	82,551	77,218	4,789
Racoon	—	152,333	178,478	124,319	125,622	79,174	123,307	51,798	39,521	28,247	884
Cat	—	13,213	14,607	8,843	5,286	6,147	5,718	5,591	2,428	21	7,480
Elk	—	637	1,100	1,324	783	1,045	662	860	534	292	22
Wolf	—	5,596	8,234	4,558	1,016	23	18	—	19	1	3
Wolvereen	—	1,400	1,318	1,032	205	93	39	455	517	—	1,507
Musk-rat	—	78,625	94,199	66,127	16,849	1,750	6,513	16,996	9,971	1,887	21,901
Seal	—	2,644	1,426	714	—	1,330	10	91	59	45	130
Badger	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Swan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4,176	2,512
Castorum	lb.	—	—	—	—	—	400	240	265	146	200

No. 1, continued.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE, VIZ. GRAIN, &c. PROVISIONS, &c. HEMP AND FLAX, &c.

ARTICLES.		1803	1804	1805	1806	1807	1808	1809	1810	1811	1812
GRAIN, &c.											
Wheat	Bushels	363,542	200,043	22,016	96,908	231,543	186,708	198,221	170,860	448	263,178
Flour	Barrels	14,432	14,069	18,590	10,991	20,442	42,462	19,476	12,519	19,340	37,652
Biscuit	Cwts	17,581	21,134	26,462	23,659	28,047	32,587	32,915	16,928	13,090	19,257
Pease	Bushels	1,605	286	4,155	6,191	7,181	52,934	54,347	18,928	4,487	22,384
Beans	——	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	130
Barley	——	457	4,253	6,911	5,158	5,010	5,994	3,478	16	—	—
Oats	——	1,462	2,981	5,016	2,734	2,369	2,669	7,540	866	1,016	1,098
Indian Corn	——	128	1,342	1,211	2,781	—	3,467	313	98	308	888
PROVISIONS, &c.											
Pork	Tierces	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
——	Barrels	1,930	1,855	770	1,732	1,151	1,911	2,783	4,632	—	2,483
Beef	Tierces	1,047	593	10	—	9	—	40	—	—	2
——	Barrels	1,908	870	1,516	808	830	1,509	1,726	2,977	—	1,693
Butter	Firkins	95	262	199	114	502	2,600	285	422	—	734
Lard	Barrels and Kegs	48	46	72	18	443	—	117	147	—	424
HEMP AND FLAX, &c.											
Hemp	Cwts.	—	—	—	—	—	—	47	—	—	—
Flax	——	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Hemp-seed	Bushels	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Flax-seed	——	—	—	—	—	—	—	83	—	—	—
		8,225	6,188	6,522	3,377	8,680	13,830	28,090	8,548	7,688	9,347

	FISH AND OIL, &c.										
PRODUCE	Salmon - - - - - - - - Tierces	941	767	780	816	671	855	558	269	317	466
OF THE	——— - - - - - - - - Barrels	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	385	678
FISHERIES.	Cod-fish - - - - - - - - Cwts.	460	2,467	3,118	1,904	976	2,949	4,006	302	155	927
	——— - - - - - - - - Casks	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	380	700
	Herrings - - - - - - - - Barrels, &c.	—	—	225	1,409	—	519	992	483	2,162	763
	Smoaked ditto - - - - - Boxes	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	86
	Shad - - - - - - - - - - Barrels	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	115	—
	Sundry Salt-fish - - - - ———	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	345	137
	Oil, Seal, Porpoise, &c. - Hhds. - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	500
	New Ships - - - - - Register Tons	77	1,026	1,100	1,418	2,300	3,750	3,022	5,836	11,000	5,898
	* Articles not enumerated - - - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

* Besides the Articles above enumerated, the following are also exported, viz. hides, hams, tongues, corned beef, tripe, sausages, cheese, eggs, &c.; and live stock, such as horses, cows, hogs, sheep, poultry, &c.; and, likewise hops, ale, apples, cider, essence of spruce, onions, potatoes, feathers, bees-wax, soap, candles, wool, pitch, tar, turpentine, &c.

No. 2.

VALUE AND RAPID INCREASE OF THE CANADIAN EXPORTS.

An Estimate of the Amount of Tonnage and a Computation of the Value of the Exports from Quebec, in the Years 1806 and 1810 respectively; shewing the increase in these four Years.

	ARTICLES EXPORTED IN 1806.		Tons of 40 Cubic Feet.	Quantity, Price, &c.	Value.	1810 Articles Exported.	Tons of 40 Cubic Feet.	Quantity, Price, &c.	Value.
	LUMBER			£ s d	£ s. d.			£ s. d.	£ s. d.
PRODUCE	Oak Timber - - - - - Pieces	8,178		272,600 ft. at 0 2 0	27,260 0 0	33,798		1,126,600 ft. at 0 2 0	112,660 0 0
OF THE	Pine - - - - - - - - - - —	2,210		138,080 - - 0 0 9	5,178 5 0	69,271		3,468,560 - 0 0 9	130,071 0 0
FOREST,	Masts and Bowsprits - - —	354		354 pieces - 12 0 0	4,248 0 0	7,655		7,655 pieces 12 0 0	91,860 0 0
VIZ.	Spars - - - - - - - - - - —	189		189 ditto - - 1 10 0	283 10 0	3,354		3,554 ditto - 1 10 0	5,331 0 0
LUMBER,	Walnut, Maple, Elm, &c. —	—		—	—	—		—	—
ASHES,	Staves - - - - - - - - - —	1,803,234		1290 std.ms. 50 0 0	64,500 0 0	3,887 306		2,489 std.ms. 50 0 0	124,450 0 0
FURS, &c.	Stave-ends - - - - - - - —	—		—	—	—		—	—
	Pine-boards and Deals - —	66,166		66,166 pr hrd. 7 10 0	4,962 9 0	312,432		312,432 pr hd. 7 10 0	23,432 18 0
	Ash Oars - - - - - - - —	414		207 pair, at 0 6 6	65 5 6	30,301		15,150 pair, at 0 6 6	4,923 15 0
	Handspikes - - - - - - —	1,694	40299*	141 doz. - - 0 12 0	84 12 0	13,623	200290*	1,135 doz. - 0 12 0	681 0 0
	Lathwood - - - - - - - —	1,778		17 cord. - - 2 5 0	38 5 0	167,389		800 cord - - 2 5 0	1,800 0 0
	Hoops - - - - - - - - - —	140,000		140 - - - - 7 0 0	980 0 0	130,516		130 ms. - - - 7 0 0	910 0 0
	Treenails - - - - - - - - —	—		—	—	—		—	—
	Shingles - - - - - - - - —	—		—	—	—		—	—
	Scantling - - - - - - - - feet	—		—	—	—		—	—
	Pipe-packs - - - - - - - - -	1,023		1,023 - - - - 1 10 0	1,534 10 0	5,497		5,491 - - at 1 10 0	8,236 10 0
	Puncheon-packs - - - - - - -	747		747 - - - - 1 5 0	933 15 0	55		55 - - - - - - 1 5 0	68 15 0
	Hogshead-packs - - - - - - -	669		669 - - - - 0 15 0	501 15 0	1,301		1,301 - - - - 0 15 0	975 15 0
	Quarter-cask-packs - - - - - -	454		454 - - - - 0 9 6	170 5 0	771		771 - - - - 0 7 6	289 2 6
				£	110,740 11 6			£	505,689 15 6

ASHES.									
Pot and Pearl Ashes -	Barrels	10,717	1,766	cwts.	——	29,407	4,901	cwts.	
	Cwts.	——	——	36,456 at 2 0 0	72,912 0 0	——	——	100,035 at 2 0 0	200,670 0 0
FURS.									
Beaver	Skins	119,708	800	per skin 0 17 6	104,744 0 0	98,523	600	per skin 0 17 6	86,207 12 6
Martin	——	55,685		do - 0 2 6	6,960 12 6	554		0 2 6	69 5 0
Otter	——	12,297		do - 0 17 6	10,759 12 6	2,645		0 17 6	2,314 7 6
Mink	——	14,872		do - 0 2 0	1,487 4 0	169		0 2 0	16 18 0
Fisher	——	6,578		do - 0 6 0	1,973 8 0	2,536		0 6 0	760 16 0
Fox	——	8,863		do - 0 5 0	2,215 15 0	1		0 5 0	0 5 0
Bear and Cub	——	15,977		do - 1 0 0	15,977 0 0	10,751		1 0 0	10,751 0 0
Deer	——	212,037		do - 0 6 0	63,609 14 0	82,151		0 6 0	24,645 6 0
Racoon	——	125,622		do - 0 2 0	12,562 4 0	39,521		0 2 0	3,952 2 0
Cat	——	5,286		do - 0 4 0	1,057 4 0	2,428		0 4 0	485 12 0
Elk	——	783		do - 0 15 0	587 5 0	534		0 15 0	400 10 0
Wolf	——	1,016		do - 0 5 0	254 0 0	19		0 5 0	4 15 0
Wolvereen	——	205		do - 0 7 0	71 15 0	517		0 7 0	180 19 0
Musk-Rat	——	16,849		do - 0 1 9	1,474 5 9	9,971		0 1 9	872 9 3
Seal	——	——		——	——	59		0 5 6	16 4 6
Badger	——	——		——	——	——		——	0 0 0
Swan	——	——		——	——	——		——	0 0 0
Castorum	lbs.	——		——	——	265		——	0 0 0
		Tons	43,865	£	407,386 11 3	Tons	205791	£	836,428 6 6

* Concerning the computation of the tonnage of the timber, see remarks upon this table.

No. 2 continued.

	ARTICLES EXPORTED IN 1806.			Tons of 40 Cubic Ft.	Quantity, Price, &c.	Value. £ s. d.	1810	Tons of 40 Cubic Ft.	Quantity, Price, &c.	Value. £ s. d.
	Brought forward		—	43,865	- - - - - - - - - -	407,386 11 3	- - - -	205791	- - - - - - - - - -	836,428 6 6
	GRAIN, &c.									
AGRICUL-	Wheat	Bushels	96,908	2,422	96,908 bhls. at 0 7 6	36,340 10 0	170,860	4,271	170,860 bhls. at 0 7 6	64,072 10 0
TURAL	Flour	Barrels	10,991	1,373	10,991 brls. 2 5 0	24,729 15 0	12,519	1,564	12,519 barrels 2 5 0	28,167 15 0
PRODUCE,	Biscuit	Cwts.	23,659	2,365	23,659 cwts. 1 7 0	31,939 13 0	16,928	1,693	16,928 cwts. 1 7 0	22,852 16 0
VIZ.	Peas	Bushels	6,191	154	6,191 bshs. 0 7 6	2,321 5 0	18,928	473	18,928 bshls. 0 7 6	7,098 0 0
GRAIN, &c.	Beans	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PROVI-	Barley	—	5,158	128	5,158 - do - 0 4 0	1,031 12 0	16	—	16 - - do - 0 4 0	3 4 0
SIONS, &c.	Oats	—	2,734	68	2,734 - do - 0 3 6	478 9 0	866	21	868 - do - 0 3 6	151 18 0
HEMP AND	Indian Corn	—	2,781	69	2,781 - do - 0 5 0	695 5 0	98	2	98 - - do - 0 5 0	24 10 0
FLAX, &c.	PROVISIONS, &c.									
	Pork	Tierces	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	Barrels	1,732	216	1,732 barrels 4 10 0	7,794 0 0	4,632	579	4,632 barr. at 4 10 0	20,844 0 0
	Beef	Tierces	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	Barrels	808	101	808 - do - 3 0 0	2,424 0 0	2,977	372	2,977 - do - 3 0 0	8,931 0 0
	Butter	Firkins	114	11	10,000 lbs. - 0 0 9	375 0 0	422	42	36,000 lbs - 0 0 9	1,350 0 0
	Lard	Barrels and Kegs	18	1	2,000 - do - 0 0 7½	62 10 0	147	14	12,000 do - 0 0 7½	375 0 0
	HEMP AND FLAX, &c.									
	Hemp	Cwts.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Flax	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Hemp-seed	Bushels	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Flax-seed	—	3,377	82	3,377 bushels 0 8 0	1,350 16 0	8,548	214	8,584 bushels 0 8 0	3,433 12 0

FISH AND OIL, &c.									
PRODUCE OF THE FISHERIES. Salmon - - - - - - - - - -	Tierces	816	163	816 barr. at 4 0 0	3,264 0 0	269	54	269 barr. at 4 0 0	1,076 0 0
——— - - - - - - - - - -	Barrels	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cod-fish - - - - - - - - -	Cwts.	1,904	190	1,904 cwts. 0 10 0	952 0 0	302	30	302 cwts. - - 0 10 0	151 0 0
——— - - - - - - - - - -	Casks	—	—						
Herrings - - - - - - -	Barrels, &c.	1,409	176	1,409 barr. 1 0 0	1,409 0 0	483	60	483 barr. - - 1 0 0	483 0 0
Smoaked ditto - - - - - -	Boxes	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Shad - - - - - - - - - - -	Barrels	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sundry salt-fish - - - - -	———	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Oil, Seal, Porpoise, &c. - -	Hhds.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
New Ships - - - - -	Register Tons	1,418	—	1,418 tons 12 0 0	17,016 0 0	5,836	—	5,836 tons, at 12 0 0	70,032 0 0
Articles not enumerated - - - - - -		—	600	—	12,000 0 0	—	700	—	14,000 0 0
Tons of 40 Cubic Feet - - - - - - - - - - - -*			50,994	Total value of exports in 1806 -	551,570 6 3			Total value of exports in 1810 -	1,079,474 11 6
To reduce to Tons Register, deduct one-third†			16,998						
Tons Register, being equal to the amount cleared out in 1806 - - - - - - - - - - -			33,996						
Tons of 40 Cubic Feet - - - - - - - - - - -*							215,839		
To reduce to Tons Register, deduct one-third†							71,946		
Tons Register, being equal to the amount cleared out in 1810 - - - - - - - - - - -							143,893		

* Of the goods which constitute this 50,994 tons exported in 1806, it will be observed that 40,294 was lumber, and 10,700 of other articles; and of the 215,839 tons exported in 1810, 200,290 was lumber, and 15,549 of other articles. It will also be observed, that the tonnage of the goods, other than lumber, can be very correctly ascertained, and therefore a very correct estimate of the tonnage of the lumber, as stated in the observations upon this table, can likewise be made.

† A ton register is equal to carry, upon an average, 1½ tons of 40 cubic feet; deducting one-third, therefore, shews how many tons register was equal to have carried the above articles, and also proves the correctness of the above computation of the tonnage of these exports.

OBSERVATIONS.

There appears to have been 10,695 tons of goods, besides lumber, exported from Quebec in 1806; and, considering that ships generally carry about a ton and a half measurement-goods, per ton register measurement, 7,134 tons register were therefore equal to have carried these articles; and, therefore, of the 33,996 register tons, cleared out from this port, there must have remained 26,862 for lumber, as stated in the table.

Reckoning a ton register capable of carrying 1⅕ load, (equal to 1½ ton of 40 cubic feet,) it appears that the quantity of lumber exported from Quebec, in 1806, must have been about 32,234 loads; being 40,293 tons of 40 cubic feet, as in the table.

It appears, also, that the quantity of all kinds of goods, besides lumber, exported from Quebec, in 1810, was about 15,549 tons; and, considering that 10,366 register tons is equal to have carried these goods, and that, in that year, there were 143,893 tons register-measurement cleared out from this port, 133,527 must have been used in the carriage of lumber, and consequently must have transported about 160,232 loads of that article; being equal to 200,290 tons of 40 cubic feet, as in the table.

The increase, therefore, in the exports of lumber from the Canadas, in the space of these four years, was 128,008 loads, or, 160,001 tons of 40 cubic feet.

In estimating the quantity of lumber exported from the lower ports of the British provinces, in 1806 and 1810, (as I am not in possession of the detailed particulars of the exports made from these ports, having only the amount of the register tonnage cleared out,) I shall, therefore, compute the quantity of lumber exported, by deducting an amount of tonnage computed to have been used in the exportation of articles other than lumber, equal to the quantity of tonnage employed in the carriage of such articles from the Canadas, deducting, over-and-above that amount, 30,000 register-tons for the carriage of fish from Newfoundland, viz.

		Register Ton.
Cleared out from the lower ports in 1806 - - - - -		90,251
Deduct for the carriage of all goods except lumber, and fish exported from Newfoundland - - - - - - -	7,134	
——— for fish from Newfoundland -	30,000*	37,134
		Tons 53,117

* See No. 18.

Thus it appears, that 53,117 tons register-measurement, had been used in the carriage of lumber, being equal to have carried 63,741 loads.

Cleared out from the lower ports in 1810 - - - -		166,101
Deduct for the carriage of all goods other than lumber and fish exported from Newfoundland - - - - - - - - - - -	10,366	
——— for the carriage of fish from Newfoundland - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	30,000	
		40,366
Tons employed in the carriage of timber		125,735

This 125,735 tons, register-measurement, at $1\frac{1}{5}$ load per ton is equal to have carried 150,882 loads.

The following recapitulatory statement of these remarks, respecting lumber, exhibit an interesting view of the exports of that article from the British American provinces, viz.

	Exports in 1806.	1810.
	Loads.	*Loads.*
From the Canadas - - - - - - - - - - -	32,234	160,232
From the lower provinces, &c. - - - -	63,741	150,882
Loads	95,975	311,114

	Loads.
Exports in 1810	311,114
Ditto in 1806 -	95,975
Increase in these four years	215,139 loads.

OAK TIMBER.

The quantity of oak timber exported from Quebec, in 1806, reckoning each piece $33\frac{1}{3}$ cubic feet, was 5,540 loads, and, in 1810, 22,520; the increase in these four years being 17,080 loads.

GRAIN.

The average quantity of wheat annually exported from Quebec, for eight years, ending 1810, (flour and biscuit reckoned into wheat and included), was 304,000 bushels: and, of other grain 26,483, making the gross exports of grain 330,483 bushels. It may be remarked, however, that the exports in 1801 were upwards of 1,000,000 bushels.

Value of the Exports from the whole of British North America, for five Years, ending in 1810.

The value of exports from the Lower Provinces cannot be so precisely ascertained as the value of those made from the Canadas. The exports from the Upper Provinces, being all, (except the small quantities exported from Gaspé and St. Johns,) cleared out at the Custom-House of Quebec, renders their value easily ascertained.

In the absence, however, of official documents respecting particular details of the exports from the lower ports, as we have an official statement of the tonnage of the shipping cleared out from these, we may from that circumstance form a tolerably correct estimate of the value of the goods exported. As this amount of tonnage, after making a deduction for the carriage of cod-fish from Newfoundland, considerably exceeds the tonnage cleared out from Quebec, it cannot be doubted that the value of the exports from these ports must have also exceeded the value of the exports made from Quebec, particularly as I have included the 226,603 cwt. of fish, exported from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Cape Breton :—In forming the following estimate of the value, however, I shall only state them at an equal amount.

Value exported from Quebec in 1806 - - - -	£551,570
Ditto from the Lower Ports, in the same year, estimated at - - - - - - - - - - - - -	551,570
Value of the Cod-fish exported from Newfoundland - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	354,448*
Total value of exports from British North America in 1806 - - - - - - - - - - -	£1,457,588†

Value exported from Quebec in 1807 - - - -	681,740
Ditto from the Lower Ports, in the same year, estimated at - - - - - - - - - - - - -	681,740
Value of cod-fish exported from the Lower Ports, estimated at - - - - - - - - - - - - -	354,448*
Total value of exports from British North America in 1807 - - - - - - - - - - -	£1,717,928†

* The exports of cod-fish from Newfoundland, upon an average of the four years, ending 1808, was 590,748 cwt. which, at 12*s*. per cwt. amounts to £354,448.

† These are exclusive of the exports to the United States by way of St. John's, and also of those made from Gaspé.

Value exported from Quebec in 1808 - - -	£1,000,000
Ditto from the Lower Ports, in the same year, estimated at - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,000,000
Value of cod-fish exported from the Lower Ports, estimated at - - - - - - - - -	354,448*
Total value of exports from British North America in 1808 - - - - - - - - - - -	£2,354,448†

Value exported from Quebec in 1809 - - -	1,112,668
Ditto from the Lower Ports, in the same year, estimated at - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,112,668
Value of cod-fish exported from the Lower Ports, estimated at - - - - - - - - -	354,448*
Total value of exports from British North America in 1809 - - - - - - - - - - -	£2,579,784†

Value exported from Quebec in 1810 - - -	1,078,048
Ditto from the Lower Ports, in the same year, estimated at - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,078,048
Value of cod-fish exported from the Lower Ports, estimated at - - - - - - - - -	354,448*
Total value exported from British North America in 1810 - - - - - - - - - - -	£2,510,544†

Imports of British and Colonial Produce and Manufactures into our North-American Colonies, for the Domestic Consumption of these Settlements, for five Years, ending in 1810.

Respecting the Imports of British and colonial produce and manufactures made into our American Provinces, it may be observed that, although I have not been able to ob-

* Ibid. † Ibid.

tain official documents, by which their precise value could be ascertained, yet, nevertheless, a very correct computation of their amount may be made, by taking the value of the exports from these settlements, as a criterion.

In reference to this computation, it may be also observed, that it is more than probable, the value of the exports of these colonies exceeds that of their imports. Otherwise the trade of these settlements must have produced effects very different from what their thriving state indicates; it would have had the same tendency, as the conduct of an individual whose expenditure exceeds his income. The large supplies furnished the British government's establishments in that country, and the exports from Gaspé, however, neither of which is included in the estimate of the value of exports stated in No. 2, will constitute an ample allowance for this economical difference.

The imports, therefore, of British produce and manufactures, &c. furnished by our own merchants and manufacturers, as well as carried by our own ships, may be fairly estimated at an amount equal with the exports, as stated above, and would therefore stand as follows:—

Value of the British and colonial produce and manufactures imported into our colonies in North America for the consumption of these settlements only - - - - - - - -	in 1806 -	£1,457,588
	in 1807 -	1,717,928
	in 1808 -	2,354,448
	in 1809 -	2,579,748
	in 1810 -	2,510,544

Respecting these imports, it is also of importance to observe, that since the restrictions imposed, by the American government, upon our commerce with that country, there has been upwards of £3,000,000 of our manufactures annually imported into the British American colonies, for the United-States market. The gross amount of the imports of British manufactures, &c. into these provinces since that period would therefore stand thus:—

In 1808, for the consumption of these provinces - - - - - - - - - - - -	£2,354,448
Ditto, for the United-States market, about -	3,000,000
Total amount of imports of British manufactures, &c. made into our American provinces in 1808 - - - - - - - - - -	£5,354,448

In 1809, for the consumption of these provinces - - - - - - - - - - -	2,579,748
Ditto, for the United-States market, about -	3,000,000
Total amount of imports of British manufactures, &c. made into our American provinces in 1809 - - - - - - - - -	£5,579,748

In 1810, for the consumption of these provinces - - - - - - - - - - -	2,510,544
Ditto, for the United-States market, about - -	3,000,000
Total amount of imports of British manufactures, &c. made into our American provinces in 1810 - - - - - - - - -	£5,510,544

Value of the Imports made into Great Britain from British North America, for five Years, ending in 1810.

A very correct statement of the value of the imports from our American colonies may be made by adding the amount of the frieghts and other charges to the invoice value of the goods, as follows:—

To invoice value, or amount of the exports from British North America in 1806 - -		£1,457,588
To freight, 124,247 register tons, at £8 each - - - - - - - - - -	992,976	
To sundry other charges,* at £1 per ton - - - - - - - - - - - -	124,247	
		1,117,223
Total value of our imports from British America in 1806 - - - - - - - - - - -		£2,574,811

* Premium of insurance, commissions, warehouse and other rents and charges.

To invoice value, or amount of the exports from British North America in 1807 - -		1,717,928
To freight, 129,846 register tons, at £8 each - - - - - - - - -	1,038,768	
To sundry other charges, at £1 per ton - - - - - - - - - - -	129,846	
		1,168,614
Total value of our imports from British North America in 1807 - - - - - - - - - -		£2,886,542

To invoice value, or amount of the exports from British North America in 1808 - -		2,354,448
To freight, 189,573 register tons, at £8 each - - - - - - - - -	1,516,584	
To sundry other charges, at £1 per ton - - - - - - - - - - -	189,573	
		1,706,157
Total value of our imports from British North America in 1808 - - - - - - - - - -		£4,060,605

To invoice value, or amount of the exports from British North America in 1809 - -		2,579,748
To freight, 236,564 register tons, at £8 each - - - - - - - - -	1,892,512	
To sundry other charges, at £1 per ton - - - - - - - - - - -	236,564	
		2,129,076
Total value of our imports from British North America in 1809 - - - - - - - - - -		£4,708,824

To invoice value, or amount of the exports from British North America in 1810 - - -		2,510,544
To freights, 309,994 register tons, at £8 each - - - - - - - -	2,479,952	
To sundry other charges, at £1 per ton - - - - - - - - - - -	309,994	
		2,789,946
Total value of our imports from British North America in 1810 - - - - - - - - - -		£5,300,490

A considerable proportion of the cod-fish, and a small part of the other articles exported from these colonies, being shipped to our West-Indian settlements and foreign countries, no doubt, make some small diminution of the value of our imports from these possessions, as stated above. The amount, however, of this diminution is not very considerable; and, indeed, upon taking a minute view of the subject, these will hardly appear to be such in reality. For these indirect shipments, being carried by British ships, and the business transacted by British merchants, they are therefore generally drawn for on Great Britain, and consequently the gross proceeds of the sales remitted also to this country; and such of those remittances as are from foreign countries are generally made in foreign produce, which otherwise most probably would not have been imported. The freight, profit, &c. of these are therefore as net a gain to the British merchant; and, of course, the transaction as advantageous to the nation in general as if the fish, flour, &c. had been brought to Great Britain and re-exported. Yea, under certain circumstances, it is infinitely more advantageous to both; for, had the goods been brought to Great Britain, perhaps, from the accumulated expense, no profit might have resulted to the merchant, and consequently the public could have derived no permanent advantage from such a trade as, under these circumstances, it would of necessity have been relinquished.—See note to No. 17.

No. 3.

British Duties and Countervailing Duties,—the enormous Advantages allowed America in both.

A List of the Duties charged upon the most bulky Articles which we import from America; being those Goods, the Carriage of which are of the most material Importance; shewing, also, what the countervailing Duty charged for the Protection and Encouragement of our Shipping Amounts to per Ton.

	DUTY. Imported in British ships. £ s. d.	DUTY. Imported in Foreign ships. £ s. d.	COUNTERVAILING DUTY. Per load, of 50 cubic feet. £ s. d.	COUNTERVAILING DUTY. Per ton, of 40 cubic feet.* £ s. d.
Fir or pine timber, from British colonies, 12 inches square or upwards, per load, of 50 cubic feet	0 1 6	—	—	—
——— from United States - - - do.	0 1 6	0 3 6	0 2 0	0 1 7½
*——— from Europe - - - do.	1 0 0	1 0 9	0 0 9	0 0 7½
Oak timber from British colonies - - - do.	0 3 4	—	—	—
——— from the United States - - - do.	0 3 4	0 5 4	0 2 0	0 1 7½
——— from Europe - - - do.	0 19 0	1 0 0	0 1 0	0 0 10
Staves, pipe, 5½ feet in length, 5 inches in breadth, and 1½ inch in thickness, from British provinces, per 120	0 1 6	—	—	—
——— from the United States - - - do.	0 1 6	0 4 3	0 1 9	0 1 5
——— from Europe - - - do.	1 9 4	1 10 0	0 0 8	0 0 6½
Masts, 12 inches diameter and upwards, from British provinces - - - per load, of 50 cubic feet	0 18 9	—	—	—
——— from the United States - - - do.	0 18 9	1 0 7	0 1 10	0 1 5½
——— from Europe - - - do.	1 0 0	1 0 9	0 0 9	0 0 7½

Cotton-wool, from British plantations, in America - - - - - - - - - - - - - per 100 lbs.	0 8 4	——	——	——
———— from the United States - do.	0 8 4	0 9 2	——	0 6 8
Tobacco, from British plantations in America - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - per lb.	0 0 6	——	——	——
——— from the United States - do.	0 0 6	0 0 $6\frac{18}{100}$	——	0 15 0
Tar from the British plantations per last, of 12 barrels, of 31½ gallons each - - - - -	0 12 0	——	——	——
—from the United States - per do.	0 12 0	0 13 2	——	0 0 10
Ashes, pearl, and pot, from British provinces - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - per cwt.	0 1 0	——	——	——
———————— from the United States - do.	0 1 0	0 1 4	——	0 6 8
———————— from other countries - do.	0 3 6	0 3 6	——	——

From the above statement it appears, that, previous to the expiration of our late commercial treaty with the United States, the average of the countervailing duties upon the lumber which we imported from that country was, ... per ton of 40 cubic feet 18*d.*

Upon that which we imported from European countries .... per ditto 7½

Upon the lumber which we imported, both from the United States and European countries...... per ditto 13

The average of the countervailing duties upon the principal articles which we imported from the United States, as enumerated above, reckoning the tonnage of the other articles equal to one-twentieth part of the amount of the tonnage of the lumber, was .... per ditto 22

Of the freights from America, which may be estimated at about £5 : 10*s.* per ton of 40 cubic feet, 22*d.* is the *sixtieth* part.

By the 49 Geo. III. c. 39, the produce of the United States was rendered liable to the same rate of duties as the produce of other foreign nations. But, instead of following the example of the United States, in raising our countervailing duty as well as the other duties, we actually reduced it,* according to the above, from 1*s.* 7½*d.* to 7½*d.* per ton upon pine or fir timber;—from 1*s.* 7½*d.* to 10*d.* per ton upon oak timber;—from 1*s.* 5*d.* to 6½*d.* per ton upon staves;—and from 1*s.* 5½*d.* to 7½*d.* per ton upon masts.

* Freight upon all goods, except iron and such other articles as 40 cubic feet of which would amount to a ton weight, is charged by bulk—whether upon flour or provisions by the barrel bulk,—whether upon liquids by the gallon,—whether upon grain by the bushel,—whether upon timber by the load,—or whether upon cotton by the lb. all is charged in proportion to the bulk. I have, therefore, taken the ton of 40 cubic feet, as the most common or general standard by which freights are paid or computed, except heavy goods, such as iron, &c.

No. 4.

American Duties and Countervailing Duties.—Her Countervailing Duties exceed ours no less than the enormous Amount of 3,300 per Cent.

A List of the Duties payable, after the 1st of April, 1797, upon the principal Articles imported into the United States from Great Britain; shewing also what the Countervailing Duty charged for the Protection and Encouragement of the American Shipping amounts to per Ton.

	Duties charged in Cents. per Cent. ad valorum.		The duties estimated upon the ton of 40 Cubic Feet, and calculated in sterling Money.									Countervailing Duty per ton, of 40 Cubic Feet.		
			Estimated value of a Ton of each Kind of Goods.			Duty in sterling Money.								
	Imported in United States Ships.	Imported in British Ships.				Imported in United States Ships.			Imported in British Ships.					
			£	s.	d.	£	s.	d	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Chintzes and coloured calicoes or muslins, and all printed, stained, or coloured goods, or manufactures of cotton or linen, or of both, or of which either cotton or linen is the chief value	12½	13¾	500	0	0	62	10	0	68	15	0	6	5	0
Cloths, and clothes ready made	10	11	300	0	0	30	0	0	33	0	0	3	0	0
Iron, steel, or brass, locks, hinges, hoes, anvils, and vices	10	11	300	0	0	30	0	0	33	0	0	3	0	0
Manufactures of iron, steel, brass, copper, tin, and pewter	15	16½	400	0	0	60	0	0	66	0	0	6	0	0
Nails, per lb.	2	2¼	—			11	4	0	13	8	9	2	4	0
Cordage, per cwt.	180	198	—			9	0	0	9	18	0	0	18	0
Glass, window-glass	15	16½	100	0	0	15	0	0	16	10	0	1	10	0

Glass, all sorts of glass and manufactures thereof - - - - -	20	22	150 0 0	30 0 0	33 0 0	3 0 0
China and earthen-ware - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	17½	19¼	50 0 0	8 15 0	9 12 6	0 17 6
Hats, bonnets, gloves, and all sorts of millinery - - - - - -	15	16½	400 0 0	56 5 0	61 6 6	5 6 6
Painters colours -	15	16½	150 0 0	22 10 0	24 15 0	2 5 0
Salt - per bushel	20	22	——	2 0 0	2 4 0	0 4 0
Drugs, (except for dying,) oils, balsams, ointments, essences, scents. and all sorts of perfumes - - - - - - - - -	15	16½	1000 0 0	150 0 0	165 0 0	15 0 0
Gold, silver, and plated ware - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	15	16½	2000 0 0	300 0 0	330 0 0	30 0 0

Average of the American countervailing duties per ton, of 40 cubic feet, as above, **£5 13*s*. 6*d*.**; the average value being upwards of £380 per ton.

———

But supposing these goods to amount only upon an average to £200 per ton, which must be very considerably under the value, and stating the countervailing duty at 1½ per cent. which it will be observed is considerably under-rating it, it would amount to £3 per ton in favour of American ships.

To these countervailing duties, charged from the 1st of April, 1797, was added, by the United-States government in 1804, about ¼ per cent. ad valorem. This ¼ per cent. valuing the goods at £200 per ton, as above, was an increase of 10*s*. per ton, making the average countervailing duty £3 : 10*s*. per ton; being a preference to ships of the United States equal to the whole freight.

Here it may be remarked, respecting the countervailing duty charged by the British and American governments respectively, that the British government imposed about 10 per cent. upon her other duties, and that the American government also charged about 10 per cent. upon their other duties.—In point of per centage upon these other duties, therefore*,—so far they were equal: but how differently they operated upon those interests which were the object of their imposition! Our legislators, indeed, might have viewed them as equal; but our ship-owners *felt*, an *immense* and *destructive difference*,—£3 upon the one side and 22*d*. upon the other,—a difference against them of about £3,300 per cent!

* Freights from this country to America may be estimated only from £2 : 10s. to £3 : 10s. per ton; although from America to this country they may be computed at from £5 to £6 per ton: the reason is this, that the amount of the tonnage of the goods shipped from America to this country far exceeds the tonnage of our shipments to that country; many ships, therefore, having to go out in ballast, create such a competition for freight as reduces it to a low rate.

No. 5.

THE HIGH PRICE OF BRITISH SHIPS, &c.

The vast Disadvantage which British Ships are under, in cases wherein Foreign Ships come in competition with them for Freight, shewn by a comparative Statement of the Charges to which British and American Ships were respectively liable, upon a six months' voyage, previous to the present War with the United States: the Ships supposed to be of equal Quality and Tonnage.

English Ship, 360 Tons, valued at £10,080, being £28 per Ton.

Dr.	£
To provisions and all other expenses in fitting out for the voyage, up to the period of the ship sailing,—expenses at her loading-port in America,—and all charges and expenses upon her return, up to the period of delivering her cargo, (except premium of insurance and sailors' wages) - - - - - - -	850
To premium of insurance upon £12,000, at 6 per cent. -	720
To wages, viz. master £12; mate £6; twelve men at £5 each; three men at £4 each; one boy at £2; and one at £1 each per month, for six months - - - - - - -	558
To extra expenses incurred by sailors running away - - -	50
To interest of capital, profit, a compensation for management, wear-and-tear, &c. say 20 per cent. per ann. upon the ship valued at £10,080 - - - - - - - - -	1008
	3186
Cr.	
By amount of freight, at £7: 7 per ton register, or £4 : 18 per ton measurement, (40 cubic feet) - -	2430
Loss —	£756

American Ship, 360 Tons, valued at £7,200, being £20 per Ton.

Dr.	£
To provisions and expenses in fitting out for the voyage, taking in the cargo, and all charges up to the period of the ship's sailing,—expenses at the port of delivery in Great Britain,—and also all charges and expenses which she may incur, up to the period of her being safely moored in the American port where she took in her cargo, (except premium of insurance and sailors' wages	850
To premium of insurance upon £9000, at 4 per cent. - -	360
To sailors' wages, viz. master £12; mate £7; fifteen men at £4 each; and two men at £2 : 13 : 4 each per month, for six months - - -	500
To interest of capital, profit, a compensation for management, wear-and-tear, &c. 20 per cent. per ann. upon the ship valued at £7200 - - - - - - - - - -	720
	2430
Cr.	
By amount of freight, at £7 : 7 per ton register, or £4 : 18 per ton measurement, (40 cubic feet)	£2430

N. B. Considering that merchant-ships, particularly of the dimensions above-mentioned, or upwards, generally carry not less than a ton and an half of goods by measure per register ton, this loss of £756, which the British ship incurs is therefore equal to £2 : 2 per ton, register measurement;—£1 : 15 per load, of 50 cubic feet;—or £1 : 8 per ton of measurement goods.*

* The disproportion between British built ships and ships built in the *Baltic* is much more in favour of the latter.

No. 6.

INTERCOURSE between our WEST-INDIAN Settlements and the UNITED STATES.

A List stated to give an Idea of the Amount of the principal Articles of Provisions and Lumber annually imported into our West-Indian Settlements; being an Average of the Quantity imported in the Years 1804, 1805, and 1806, with a Computation of the Amount of their Tonnage, distinguishing the Countries from whence imported

	FROM THE UNITED STATES			FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, viz. The British Provinces.			Great Britain and Ireland			Other Countries.			Total Amount of Tons of each Article.
		Tons of 40 Cubic Feet.	Total. Tons.		Tons of 40 Cubic Feet.	Total. Tons.		Tons of 40 Cubic Feet.	Total. Tons.		Tons of 40 Cubic Feet.	Total. Tons.	
Flour, Meal, and Bread, Cwts.	463,505	33,107		2,789	199		34,495	2,463		7,667	549		
Corn, viz. Indian Corn, Oats, Peas, Beans, &c. - - - Bushels	406,189	10,154		3,276	81		183,168	4,579		4,432	110		
Rice - - - - - - - - Barrels	11,740	1,467		6	1		50	6		139	17		
Pork and Beef - - - ——	54,114	6,764		1,642	205		54,571	6,821		385	48		
			51,492			486			13,869			724	66,571
Fish, dry Cod, &c. - ——	569	71		220	28		395	49		——	——		
—— —— Cwts.	138,484	9,888		101,692	7,263		3,302	236		3,298	236		
——salt and pickled. ——	38,171	4,771		27,800	3,475		57,698	6,462		991	124		
			14,730			10,766			6,747			360	32,603
Butter - - - - - - - Firkins	8,050	402		204	10		49,818	2,490		80	4		
Cows and Oxen - - - - - -	4,145	2,072		3	2		8	4		1,123	561		
Sheep and Hogs - - - - - -	3,484	348		44	4		- - - -	- - - -		314	31		
			2,822			16			2,494			596	5,928
Oak and Pine Boards, and Timber - - - - Feet	39,022,997	121,947		942,122	2,944		- - - -	- - - -		101,330	316		
Staves - - - - - - - - Pieces	17,605,687	14,671		525,026	1,312		- - - -	- - - -		264,500	661		
Shingles- - - - - - -	43,051,704	5,381		332,925	42		- - - -	- - - -		13,000	1		
			141,999			4,298						978	147275
		Tons	211,043		Tons.	15,566		Tons	23,110		Tons	2,658	
											Total or Tons —		252,377

N. B The Freight of these 252,377 Tons, annually imported into our West-India Settlements, at the Rate of £7 per Ton, amounts to £1,766,639.

No. 6, continued.

A Statement of the respective Shares which BRITISH and AMERICAN Ships have earned of this Sum, viz.

		Tons.	Rate of Freight.	Earned by United-States Ships.	Earned by British Ships.
	Tons.		£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
Flour, Fish, Provisions, &c. from the UNITED STATES	69,044				
Lumber, from ditto	141,991				
		211,043	at 7 0 0	1,477,301 0 0	——
Flour, Fish, Provisions, &c. from the BRITISH PROVINCES	11,268				
Lumber, from ditto	4,298				
		15,566	Ditto.	——	108,962 0 0
Flour, Fish, Provisions, &c. from GREAT BRITAIN and IRELAND		23,110	Ditto.	——	161,770 0 0
Flour, Provisions, &c. from OTHER COUNTRIES	1,680				
Lumber, from ditto	978				
		2,668	Ditto.	——	18,606 0 0
	Tons	252,377			
Earned by UNITED STATES Ships, no less than		- - - -	- - - - £	1,477,301 0 0	
Earned by BRITISH Ships, only the trifling amount of		- - - -	- - - - -		£289,338 0 0
					Total — £1,766,639

Reckoning the Flour, Meal, and Bread, as stated above, into Wheat, 1,271,140 Bushels of that Article appears to be equal to the annual Supplies of our West-Indian Colonies of these Articles; but, for sake of even Numbers, we may say 1,300,000 Bushels.

By this Document it also appears, that the average Importation of Lumber into these Colonies, for these three Years, is 147,080 Tons, being equal to 117,740 Loads, which we may consider to be about the Quantity annually imported.—Of this Quantity it appears that the United States furnished 113,600 Loads; the British Provinces 3,439; and other Countries 783 Loads.

No. 7.

The Number of Merchant Ships, with the Amount of their Tonnage, annually built in Great Britain, for the last Twenty-five Years, with an Estimate of the Quantity of Oak Timber used in the United Kingdom, for Maritime Purposes.

Year.	Ships.	Tonnage	Year.	Ships.	Tonnage	Year.	Ships.	Tonnage
1789	627	58,027	1798	702	79,872	1806	606	58,772
1790	577	57,137	1799	689	83,658	1807	629	58,161
1791	624	58,760	1800	845	115,349	1808	455	46,859
1792	655	66,951	1801	918	110,206	1809	448	51,248
1793	652	65,583	1802	1,021	115,573	1810	501	68,281
1794	555	55,600	1803	1,194	118,238	1811	597	88,121
1795	540	63,235	1804	778	81,595	1812	870	115,630
1796	628	84,928	1805	718	71,603	1813	760	94,198
1797	630	78,250						
Average Amount of tons annually built for the 9 years ending 1797.		63,385	Average Amount of tons annually built for the 8 years ending 1805.		97,011	Average Amount of tons annually built for the 8 years ending 1813.		72,658

Average of the 25 years, ending 5th Jan. 1813, viz. Ships 868.—Tons 76,633.

An Estimate of the Quantity of Oak Timber annually used for all Maritime Purposes in Great Britain, viz.

	Loads.
For the building of new merchant ships, the tonnage of which, instead of 76,633 tons, which appears, from the above statement, to be the average amount built yearly for the last 25 years, I shall, for the sake of round numbers, state at 80,000, which, at one load per ton, is * - - - - - - - - - - -	80,000
For repairing merchant ships † - - - - - - - - -	10,000
For the supply of his Majesty's dock-yards - - - -	40,000
Loads -	130,000

* Considering that this estimate is made in reference to Quebec oak, which is, in general, die-square, and not under twelve inches upon the side, a load per ton is more than equal to the quantity requisite.

† With the timber obtained from broken-up ships, 10,000 loads, will constitute a sufficient quantity for repairs.

No. 8.

A Statement of the rapid Increase of the Employment which British Ships have lately received from our American Provinces, viz.

Amount of the tonnage annually cleared out from Quebec since the year 1797.			Amount of the register tonnage cleared out from the lower ports of the British provinces in the years 1807 to 1810.			Gross amount of the register tons cleared out from our North-American provinces.
Year.	Number of Ships.	Register Tonnage.	Year.	Number of Ships.	Register Tons.	
1797	87	13,349				
1798	78	11,882				
1799	125	17,941				
1800	140	16,837				
1801	175	25,736				
1802	197	32,999				
1803	208	26,493				
1804	173	26,883				
1805	170	26,506				
1806	193	33,996	1806	690	90,251	124,247
1807	239	42,293	1807	671	87,543	129,846
1808	334	70,275	1808	883	119,298	189,573
1809	434	87,825	1809	1,132	148,739	236,564
1810	661	143,893	1810	1,091	166,101	309,994

Estimate of the Amount of the Freights of the Exports from our American Provinces in the Years 1806 and 1810 respectively, shewing the Increase in the course of these four Years.

	Freights in 1806.			Freights in 1810.		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Amount of the register tonnage of ships cleared out from Quebec in 1806, - - 33,996 a £8 per ton,	271,968					
Ditto, ditto, in 1810, 143,893 a ditto - -	- -	-	-	1,151,144		
Amount of the register tonnage cleared out from the ports of the Lower Provinces in 1806, - - - - 90,251 a ditto - -	722,008					
Ditto, ditto, in 1810, 166,101 a ditto - -	- -	-	-	1,328,808		
Total amount of the freights of the exports from the British American Provinces in 1806 -	993,976					
Total amount of the freights of the exports from our British American Provinces in 1810 -	- -	-	£	2,479,952		

N. B. According to the above statement, the increase of freights from Quebec in the four years ending in 1810, was - - - - - - - - £879,176
Ditto, ditto, from the Lower Provinces in 1810, was - - - 606,800

Total increase in the four years ending in 1810* £1,485,976

* This *increase in the course of these four years exceeds* the whole earnings of British ships in all our trade to the East Indies and China.

No. 9.

The extensive and improveable Resources of British America, exhibited by a Comparative Statement of the Amount of Tonnage cleared out from the Ports of these Colonies, and the United States, respectively, viz.

Cleared out upon an average of three years, ending 1772, *viz.*

From the Colonies which revolted and now form the United States.				From the loyal Colonies which now constitute the British provinces.			
	Ships.	Tons.	Total amount of Tonnage.		Ships.	Tons.	Total amount of Tonnage.
For Great Britain - - - -	628	81,951		For Great Britain - - - -	250	9,582	
For the West-Indies - - -	2,297	111,939		For the West Indies - -	15	735	
		Total	193,890			Total	10,317

	Ships.	Tons.
Amount of tonnage cleared out from the British provinces for Great Britain, the West Indies, &c. in 1810, (being no less than about 30 times the amount cleared out in 1772) -	1,752	309,994
Deduct the amount cleared out from the colonies which we lost, and that now form the United States - - - - - -	——	193,890
	Tons	116,104

Thus it appears, that the tonnage of the exports, from the provinces which we now possess in America, *exceeds* that of the exports which were made from the colonies which we lost, at the commencement of the late American war, *no less than* 116,104 *tons,*—a most convincing proof of how much more consequence our present possessions, in that country, are to us now than what those which we lost were to us at the time they revolted.

No. 10.

The Importance of British America, exhibited by a comparative Statement of the Imports which Great Britain has received from these Provinces, and the United States respectively, viz.

Imported upon an average of six years, ending 1774.	
From the colonies which revolted and now constitute the United States.	From the loyal colonies which now constitute the British American provinces.
£1,752,142	£123,372
In 1807.	
From the United States, being the year preceding the restrictions imposed by the American government, and therefore amongst the greatest of our imports from that country.	From the British provinces.
£6,531,410	£2,886,542
In 1808.	
From the United States.*	From the British provinces.
	£4,060,605 †
In 1809.	
From the United States.*	From the British provinces.
	£4,708,824 †
In 1810.	
From the United States.*	From the British provinces.
	£5,300,490.†

* The restrictive and hostile measures of the American government have interrupted any importations being received direct from that country since 1807, except by licence; the amount of these, however, have been but trifling since that period.

† See remarks upon No. 2.

[No. 10, continued.]

Thus it appears that the value of our imports from these colonies, in 1810, amounts to upwards of an eighth part of the average value of the gross amount of our imports from all parts,* and nearly equal in point of value to the East-Indian and Chinese produce and manufactures which we import. This statement, therefore, exhibits a very interesting view of the trade of our American provinces. The vast importance of this valuable branch of our commerce will be seen in the clearest point of view, however, by observing that more than half the value of these imports is derived from the earnings of British ships.

Although, in point of value, our imports from the East Indies and China, and from our British North American provinces, may be about equal; yet they differ greatly in favour of the latter, in point of the national advantages, which we derive from our trade with these respective colonial establishments. Three or four ships may import, of the riches of *India*, to the amount of a million sterling:—but to import, to the amount of a million of *lumber*, from the Canadas, an immense fleet of ships, manned with hardy sailors,—our own countrymen, must be employed!!

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* The average value of our imports, for the last ten years, amounts to about £38,000,000, exclusive of those from Ireland.

No. 11.

The great and rapidly increasing Demand from British America forBritish Manufactures, exhibited by a comparative Statement of the Value of our Exports to the United States, and to our American Colonies respectively, viz.

Exported upon an average of three years, ending in **1774.**			
UNITED STATES. To the colonies which revolted, and now constitute the United States - - -	£ 2,732,036	BRITISH PROVINCES. To the loyal colonies which now constitute the British American provinces - -	£ 379,411
Exported in 1807.			
To the United States.	11,864,513	To the British provinces	1,717,928
Exported in 1808.			
To the United States about	5,241,739	To the British provinces*	5,354,448
Exported in 1809.			
To the United States †		To the British provinces*	5,579,748
Exported in 1810.			
To the United States.†		To the British provinces*	5,510,544

* About £3,000,000 of these have been for the United States. See No. 2.

† From the operation of the American embargo and non-intercourse measures few exports were or could be made to the States in these two years.

[No. 11, continued.]

This statement of the amount of produce and manufactures exported to our North American colonies, in the absence of official documents, is estimated upon the truest principles which could be adopted, namely, the amount of the exports from these colonies, as stated in the observations upon No. 2. From a comparison of the relative value of their exports and imports, made, at the periods as above stated, with those of other countries similarly situated, or, even with the trade of these provinces at former periods, it will be found, from the propositions stated, and inferences drawn in making this statement that our exports to these parts must be considered rather under than over-rated.

The imports of British produce and manufactures, &c. into these settlements, in 1806, was £1,457,588, and, in 1810, £5,510,544, an increase of upwards of one-third of the greatest of any one year's demand from the United States, and about three times the amount annually exported to our vast possessions in the East Indies.*

This increase has no doubt been partly for the supply of the United States. This circumstance, however, does not lessen the importance of these colonies; but, on the contrary, increases their consequence, by shewing that the American government have it not in their power to prohibit our manufactures. This commercial facility, afforded us by the local situation of these provinces, proves the vast importance of which the possession of Louisiana and the Floridas, from their commanding situation, would be to the British nation in this respect.

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* The average amount of British produce and manufactures, annually exported from this country, to the East Indies and China, from 1800 to 1810, was £1,218,535; and we are informed, from the best authority, that no increase in this demand need be expected.

No. 12.

BRITISH IMPORTS.

Value of the IMPORTS made into Great Britain, in the Years ending the 5th January 1804, 1805, 1806, 1807, 1808, 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812, and 1813, viz.

Years ending the 5th January.	FOREIGN & COLONIAL produce. Official value.	IRISH Produce. Official value.	EAST INDIAN and CHINESE produce.	Total amount of the official value.	Computed real value.
	£	£	£	£	£
1804	21,643,577 }	Including	6,348,887	27,992,464	——
1805	23,986,896 }	Irish produce.	5,214,621	29,201,517	44,492,697
1806	21,292,870	2,970,598	6,072,160	30,344,628	42,595,154
1807	21,841,005	3,248,131	3,746,771	28,835,907	44,615,715
1808	21,958,382	3,491,767	3,401,509	28,854,658	37,488,456
1809	19,869,723	3,910,981	5,848,649	29,629,353	51,133,063
1810	26,933,625	3,475,759	3,363,025	33,772,409	
1811	33,146,975	3,280,747	4,708,413	41,136,135	
1812	21,201,450	3,318,979	4,106,251	28,626,580	
1813	19,443,574	Not yet made up.	Ditto.	Ditto	
Average of the official value.	23,131,807		4,756,698	30,932,627	42,336,943 Average of 1804 to 1809.

From the above official statement the value of our imports, exclusive of those received from Ireland, the real value of which amounts to about £4,500,000, may be computed to be about £38,000,000.

According to No. 17 there appears to be 1,433,956 tons of shipping employed in the carriage of these imports; and reckoning the freights or gross earnings of these ships at £9 per ton register, it appears that of this £38,000,000 £12,905,554 has been made up of freight, viz.

Earned by British ships, £801,408 *a* £9 per ton,	£7,212,672
Earned by foreign ships, £632,548 *a* ditto,	£5,692,932
	£12,905,504

Of this £7,212,672, earned by British ships, nearly £2,500,000 has been in the trade with our North-American colonies.—See remarks on No. 2.

No. 13.

BRITISH EXPORTS.

Value of the EXPORTS made from Great Britain, in the Years ending the 5th January, 1804, 1805, 1806, 1807, 1808, 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812, and 1813, viz.

Years ending the 5th January.	British produce and manufactures.	Foreign and colonial merchandize.	Irish produce and manufacture.	Total amount of the official value.	Real value.
	£	£	£	£	£
1804	22,252,027	9,326,468	Including	31,578,495	51,109,131
1805	23,935,793	10,575,574	Irish produce.	34,451,367	53,028,881
1806	25,004,337	9,552,423	398,085	34,954,845	50,482,661
1807	27,402,685	8,789,368	335,131	36,527,184	49,969,746
1808	25,171,422	9,105,827	289,322	34,566,571	66,017,712
1809	26,691,692	7,397,901	464,404	34,554,267	
1810	35,104,132	14,680,514	502,244	50,286,900	
1811	34,923,575	10,471,941	474,343	45,869,859	
1812	24,131,734	7,975,396	302,541	32,409,671	
1813	31,243,362	11,508,673	489,506	43,241,541	
Average.	27,586,075	9,938,408	406,944	37,844,070	54,122,626 Average of 1804 to 1809.

No. 14.

AMERICAN SHIPPING.

A Statement of the Amount of the Tonnage of American Ships, exclusive of Ships of War, shewing the immense Increase which it has experienced from the Sacrifice which the British Government made of the Rights and Privileges of our Ship-Owners to the United States.†

In the Year	Value of Exports	Tons of Shipping owned by the United States.	Number of Seamen.
	Dollars.		
1790	16,000,000	450,000	27,000
1800	62,000,000	939,000	56,340
From Oct. 1805	95,000,000	* 1,433,000	* 86,848
to April, 1808 being two years & a half.	*118,750,000	* 1,911,250	* 116,760

	Tons.
Amount of the tonnage of the American shipping in 1808, exclusive of ships of war - - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,911,250
Amount of the tonnage of British shipping in 1808, exclusive of ships of war, and those employed in the transport-service,	1,815,360
Amount which the AMERICAN TONNAGE employed in trade exceeded that of the WHOLE BRITISH SHIPPING owned in 1808, exclusive of that employed by government	95,890

Those of the above numbers which are distinguished with an * are not from official documents, but calculated in that ratio of increase which the preceeding years indicate. Indeed, considering the very thriving state of the American shipping in 1805, 1806, and the beginning of 1807, I have no doubt it is rather under than over-rated.

In the above estimation, there is only 120,000 tons of shipping and 7,200 seamen added for the addition of Louisiana to the United States. But, from the shipping actually owned by this newly-acquired territory, and the ships which were built in the States in anticipation of this new source of commerce, the American shipping must have, no doubt, received a much greater addition from this French transaction than the amount which I have stated.

† See the observations concerning their intercourse with our West-Indian Settlements,—on the opening of our colonies to their ships in general,—and on the different effects produced by the operation of their and our countervailing duties.

No. 15.

Gross Amount of the Tonnage of British Merchant Shipping.

The Number of Vessels with the Amount of their Tonnage and the Number of Men and Boys annually employed in Navigating the same, which belonged to the several Ports of the British Empire,—to the Colonies as well as to the British Islands, on the 30th Sept. 1803, 1804, 1805, 1806, 1807, 1808, 1809, 1810, 1811, and 1812, viz.

Years ending 30 Sept.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.
1803	19,828	2,108,990	148,600
1804	20,713	2,210,508	148,598
1805	20,984	2,226,636	152,642
1806	21,106	2,208,169	150,940
1807	21,192	2,224,720	152,658
1808	21,542	2,265,360	151,781
1809	21,951	2,307,489	155,038
1810	22,577	2,367,394	158,779
1811	22,973	2,415,619	157,063
1812	22,996	2,421,695	159,710
Average for the last ten years	21,586	2,227,658	153,580

	Tons.
Amount of our shipping in 1808, as stated above, that period being the commencement of the interruption of our usual commercial intercourse with the United States - - - -	2,265,360
Deduct 450,000 tons, which may be about the amount employed by government in the transport-service, &c. - - -	450,000
Gross amount owned and employed for commercial and all other purposes, (except in the service of government,) both at home and abroad,—in coasting, fishing, foreign trade, &c. &c. throughout the empire - - - - - - Tons	1,815,360

No. 16.

SHIPPING ANNUALLY ENTERED INWARDS.

The Number of Vessels, with the Amount of their Tonnage, and the Number of Men and Boys employed in navigating the same, (including their respective Voyages,) which entered INWARDS at the Ports of GREAT BRITAIN from ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD, including IRELAND, the Islands of JERSEY, GUERNSEY, and MAN, and the WHALE FISHERIES, &c. in the Years 1790, 1791, 1792, 1799, 1800, 1801, 1804, 1805, 1806, 1807, 1808, 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812, and 1813: viz.

Year ending 5th January.	BRITISH.			FOREIGN.			Total amount of tonnage, both of Foreign & British Ships.
	Ships	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.	
1790	12,141	1,423,376		2,321	277,599		1,700,975
1791	12,494	1,452,498		2,686	321,684		1,774,182
1792	12,030	1,587,645		2,477	304,074		1,891,719
1799	10,517	1,575,169		3,012	476,596		2,051,765
1800	10,496	1,379,807		5,512	763,236		2,143,043
1801	10,347	1,378,620		5,497	780,155		2,158,775
1804	11,996	1,614,365	93,004	4,252	638,034	33,660	2,252,399
1805	10,508	1,395,387	82,979	4,271	607,299	30,744	2,002,686
1806	11,409	1,494,075	87,148	4,515	691,703	34,719	2,185,778
1807	12,110	1,482,412	88,963	3,792	612,800	31,346	2,095,212
1808	11,213	1,436,667	84,997	4,087	680,144	32,448	2,116,811
1809	11,316	1,314,241	82,754	1,925	282,892	15,512	1,597,133
1810	12,656	1,539,573	95,796	4,922	759,287	38,285	2,298,860
1811	13,557	1,609,588	102,900	6,876	1,176,243	60,094	2,785,831
1812	12,908	1,522,692	94,740	3,216	687,180	34,157	2,209,872
1813	13,869	1,579,715	96,371	2,536	518,443	25,519	2,098,158
Average of 1804.	12,154	1,498,872	90,965	4,039	665,403	25,648	2,164,274

RECAPITULATION.

	Tons.
Total amount of BRITISH SHIPS annually entered inwards in our trade with foreign parts, upwards of one-third of which has of late been in the trade with our North-American colonies -	798,872
FOREIGN SHIPS annually entered inwards in our trade with foreign parts - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	665,402
Tons	1,463,274
Amount annually, entered inwards from Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, and Man, and the Whale Fisheries, about - - - - - - -	700,000
Gross amount, annually entered inwards, upon an average of the last ten years, as above - - - - - - - - - - - - - Tons	2,164,274

No. 17.

SHIPPING ANNUALLY CLEARED OUTWARDS.

The Number of Vessels, with the Amount of their Tonnage and the Number of Men employed in navigating the same, (including their repeated Voyages,) which cleared OUTWARDS at the Ports of GREAT BRITAIN to ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD, including IRELAND, the Islands of JERSEY, GUERNSEY, and MAN, and the WHALE-FISHERIES, &c. in the Years 1790, 1791, 1792, 1799, 1800, 1801, 1804, 1805, 1806, 1807, 1808, 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812, and 1813: viz.

Years ending 5th January.	BRITISH.			FOREIGN.			Total amount of tonnage, both of Foreign & British Ships.
	Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.	
1790	12,560	1,399,233		1,130	148,974		1,548,207
1791	13,514	1,511,294		1,306	184,729		1,696,023
1792	13,391	1,563,744		1,138	175,556		1,739,300
1799	11,085	1,302,551		2,292	414,774		1,717,325
1800	11,866	1,445,271		4,893	685,051		2,130,322
1801	10,282	1,345,621		5,626	804,880		2,150,501
1804	11,072	1,444,840	92,943	3,662	574,542	30,414	2,019,382
1805	11,131	1,463,286	93,748	4,093	587,849	30,507	2,051,135
1806	11,603	1,494,968	94,388	3.930	605,641	30,910	2,100,609
1807	12,239	1,485,725	94,573	3,457	567,988	29,616	2,053,713
1808	11,428	1,424,103	89,715	3.846	631,910	31,411	2,056,013
1809	11,923	1,372,810	89,632	1,892	282,145	15,671	1,654,955
1810	12,490	1,531,152	192,523	4,530	699,750	37,256	2,230,902
1811	13,092	1,624,274	107,724	6,641	1,138,527	60,870	2,762,844
1812	12,774	1,507,353	96,739	3,350	696,234	37,262	2,203,587
1813	14,328	1,665,578	105,004	2,647	540,902	27,841	2,206,420
Average since 1804.	12,208	1,501,408	105,898	3,804	632,548	33,175	2,133,956

RECAPITULATION.

	Tons.
Total amount of BRITISH SHIPS annually cleared outwards in our trade with foreign parts, upwards of one-third of which has of late been in the trade with our North-American colonies - -	801,408
Foreign ships annually cleared outwards in our trade with foreign parts - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	632,548
Carried forward	Tons 1,433,956

Brought forward	Tons	1,433,956
Amount annually cleared outward for Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, and Man, and the Whale Fisheries, about - - - - - -		700,000
Gross amount annually cleared outwards, upon an average of the last ten years, as above - - - - - - - - - - - -	Tons	2,133,956

Thus it appears, that, of the gross amount of the tonnage of British ships cleared outwards and entered inwards, in our trade with all parts of the world, (except Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, and the whale fisheries,) being 801,408 tons, 250,000 to 300,000 tons (no less than the enormous proportion of one-third) has been of late in the trade with our North-American provinces.

It is, nevertheless, necessary here to observe, that, as there are considerable exports made from our North-American colonies to our West-Indian settlements and foreign countries, the amount, therefore, of tonnage cleared outward and entered inwards in our trade direct to these provinces, do not altogether shew so large a proportion as I have here stated. By minutely investigating the subject, however, it will be found that our Custom-house entries and clearances do not indicate the full extent to which our shipping is supported in the trade with our settlements in North America.

Regarding the tonnage which is cleared out from the ports of our North-American provinces to our West-Indian settlements and foreign countries, these provinces must, with reference to the proportionate amount of our tonnage employed in foreign trade, which they support, in justice be put to their credit. For it is to be observed that British ships are only employed, and therefore were these exports not made it is evident we must employ proportionably a smaller amount of tonnage.

For instance, it sometimes happens that ships are cleared out from this country to the West Indies to take pro-

duce from our settlements there to Quebec (or other parts of our provinces in North America,) and Canadian produce from thence back to the West Indies, and then West-India produce to Great Britain.

Now, although, in the list of ships cleared outwards and entered inwards in the trade of this country, none of such vessels appear cleared out for the British North-American provinces, yet such ships as evidently receive employment from the exports made from and the imports made into these provinces, as if they had been cleared outwards and entered inwards upon voyages direct between them and Great Britain.

Supposing that a voyage direct to the West Indies and back should be six months, and that its being extended to Quebec, as above, should lengthen it to twelve,* and that the freight for each of these parts of the voyage should be £9 per ton; in that case the ship would have only earned £9 per ton in a trip to the West Indies and back; but, in protracting the voyage to Quebec, her earnings would be £18 per ton. In such cases, although no ships are cleared out for or entered inwards from Canada, yet it is evident that that colony is entitled to credit for having afforded employment to half the amount of tonnage so employed.

In estimating, therefore, the extent to which our North-American colonies contribute to the support of that part of our shipping which is employed in foreign trade we must be more guided by the amount of tonnage which is cleared out with their exports than by the amount of tonnage cleared outward and entered inward in our trade direct with these provinces.

* To extend the voyage, by going to Quebec as here supposed, instead of six, it would not add to it more than four months, although, for the sake of perspicuity in elucidating the point under consideration, I have supposed the two parts of the voyage equal.

No. 18.

Amount of Fish exported from the British Colonies in North America, in the Years 1805, 1806, 1807, *and* 1808.

	1805.	1806.	1807.	1808.
	Cwts.	Cwts.	Cwts.	Cwts.
From Newfoundland - -	536,860	707,967	536,128	582,036
From the other Colonies -	190,840	238,799	228,229	248,544
Cwts.	727,700	946,766	764,357	830,579

Average exported in these four Years.

	Cwts.
From Newfoundland - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	590,748
From the other Colonies - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	226,603
Gross average of the exports of fish from the British Colonies in North America, in 1805, 1806, 1807, and 1808 - - -	817,351
Deduct the annual demand from our West-Indian Settlements -	456,221
Surplus, for which our Merchants and American Colonists would have had to find a market, even had they supplied the whole demand of our West-Indian Possessions - - - - - Cwt.	361,130

A Statement of the average Quantity of Fish imported into our West-Indian Settlements, in the Years 1805, 1806, *and* 1807, *being up to the Commencement of the Restrictions which the Americans imposed upon their Commercial Intercourse with this Country and her Colonies, distinguishing the Countries from whence imported.*

	Cwts.
From the United Kingdom - - - - - - - - - - - - -	97,486
From the British American Colonies - - - - - - - - - -	170,610
From the United States - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	188,125
Average amount of the demand for these three years - Cwt.	456,221

Of this demand from our West-Indian Settlements, amounting to 456,221 cwt. it appears that 97,486 has been furnished by the Mother-Country, leaving 358,735, which should have been supplied from our own American fisheries. But, strange and unaccountable as it may appear, although our fisheries produced 817,351 cwt. and, from their discouraged state, were capable of the greatest improvement, yet the British government encouraged the Americans to supply 188,125 cwt. of this 358,735, whilst, from their impolitic measures, they so cramped this valuable branch of trade from our American Colonies, that only 170,610 was supplied from our fisheries in that quarter.

N. B.—The above statements are made out from the following authentic document:

(A.)

Estimate of Quintals of FISH EXPORTED *from the British Colonies in North America and Newfoundland, in the Years* 1805, 1806, 1807, *and* 1808.

			Quintals, or Cwt.	qrs.	lb.
1805.	*Dry Fish*	Cod	623,908	0	0
		Salmon, 17,491, of 5 lb. each =	780	3	11
		Herrings, 8,178 boxes, 6 lb. each =	438	0	12
	Pickled Fish	57,441 casks, 200 lb. each =	102,573	0	24
		Quintals, or Cwt.	727,700	0	19
1806.	*Dry Fish*	Cod	804,819	0	0
		Salmon, 17,638, of 5 lb. each =	787	1	18
		Herrings, 10,388 boxes, 6 lb. each =	556	2	0
	Pickled Fish	78,738 casks, 200 lb. each =	140,603	2	8
		Quintals, or Cwt.	946,766	1	26
1807.	*Dry Fish*	Cod	631,537	0	0
		Salmon, 12,653, of 5 lb. each =	564	3	13
		Herrings, 12,666 boxes, 6 lb. each =	678	2	4
	Pickled Fish	73,683 casks, 200 lb. each =	131,576	3	4
		Quintals, or Cwt.	764,357	0	21
1808.	*Dry Fish*	Cod	695,794	0	0
		Salmon, 2,441, of 5 lb. each =	118	3	25
		Herrings, 15,716 boxes, 6 lb. each =	841	3	20
	Pickled Fish	74,942 casks, 200 lb. each =	133,825	0	0
		Quintals, or Cwt.	830,579	3	17

(B.)

Estimate of Quintals of FISH IMPORTED *into the British West-Indian Islands, in the Years* 1805, 1806, 1807, *and* 1808.

			Quintals, or Cwt.	qrs.	lb.
1805.	*Dry Fish*		220,357	0	0
		In 986 barrels of 100 lb. each =	880	1	12
	Pickled Fish	97,263 barrels of 200 lb. each =	164,755	1	12
		Quintals, or Cwt.	385,992	2	24
1806.	*Dry Fish*		268,130	0	0
		In 729 barrels of 100 lb. each =	650	3	16
	Pickled Fish	142,264 barrels of 200 lb. each =	254,042	3	12
		Quintals, or Cwt.	522,823	3	0
1807.	*Dry Fish*		239,068	0	0
		In 1,281 barrels of 100 lb. each =	1,143	3	0
	Pickled Fish	116,040 barrels of 200 lb. each =	207,214	1	4
		Quintals, or Cwt.	447,426	0	4
1808.	*Dry Fish*		190,577	0	0
		In 3,912 barrels of 100 lb. each =	3,492	3	12
	Pickled Fish	112,247 barrels of 200 lb. each =	200,441	0	8
		Quintals, or Cwt.	394,510	3	20

(C.)

Comparative Statement of FISH *(dry and pickled)* EXPORTED *from the British North-American Colonies and Newfoundland to all Parts; and of* FISH *(dry and pickled)* IMPORTED *into the British West-Indian Islands from the said Colonies, Newfoundland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, during the Years* 1805, 1806, 1807, *and* 1808.

	1805.	1806.	1807.	1808.
	Quintals, or Cwt. qrs.lb.	Quintals, or Cwt. qrs.lb.	Quintals, or Cwt. qrs.lb.	Quintals, or Cwt. qrs.lb.
FISH *exported* to all parts from the British North-American Colonies & Newfoundland	727,700 0 19	946,766 1 26	764,357 0 21	830,579 3 17
FISH *imported* from all parts into the British West Indies	385,992 2 24	522,823 3 0	447,426 0 4	394,510 3 20
Excess Cwt.	341,708 1 23	423,942 2 26	316,931 0 17	436,268 3 25

The three preceding statements are made up from the Accounts (D.) and (E.) which were obtained from the Custom-House, in October, 1809, and when the returns of the exports from the King's North-American Colonies for the last year are produced, they will shew the competency, as well as the exertions of the British American Colonists, in a more conspicuous manner than in any former year.

London, April 12, 1810.

Printed by order of the Committee of Merchants interested in the trade and fisheries of his Majesty's North-American Colonies - - - -

NATHANIEL ATCHESON, Secretary.

(D.)

An Account of dry and pickled FISH IMPORTED *into the British West Indies, in the Years* 1805, 1806, 1807, *and* 1808.

FISH, DRY, From	1805. Bar.	1805. Quintals.	1806. Bar	1806. Quintals.	1807. Bar.	1807. Quintals.	1808. Bar.	1808. Quintals
The United Kingdom - - - - -	237	2,774	365	4,637	636	6,910	49	31,803
The British Continental Colonies	501	99,532	12	113,937	181	128,154	3,194	147,100
The United States - - - - - - -	148	118,051	352	149,556	464	105,004	669	11,674
Total imports of Dry Fish - - -	986	220,357	729	268,130	1,281	239,068	3,912	190,577

FISH, PICKLED, From	1805. Barrels.	1806. Barrels.	1807. Barrels.	1808. Barrels.
The United Kingdom - - - - -	48,829	55,306	50,386	54,023
The British Continental Colonies	23,580	36,741	34,305	53,833
The United States - - - - - - -	24,854	50,217	31,349	4,391
Total imports of Pickled Fish -	97,263	142,264	116,040	112,247

CUSTOM-HOUSE, *London*, Oct. 20, 1809.

(E.)

An Account of the Quantity of Dry *and* Pickled Cod, *and of all other Kinds of* Fish exported *from Canada, Nova-Scotia, New Brunswick, Cape-Breton, Prince Edward's Island, and Newfoundland, in the Years* 1805, 1806, 1807, *and* 1808, *distinguishing each Year.*

		Cod.		Salmon.		Herrings.		Mackerel.
		Dry.	Pckled					
		Quintal.	Casks.	No. Sm'ked	Casks.	Boxes Sm'ked	Casks.	Casks.
1805.	Canada	1,770	—	—	731	—	53	—
	Nova-Scotia	70,350	29,504	596	1	8,178	1,446	—
	New Brunswick	8,870	437	16,895	1,174	—	18,149	59
	Cape-Breton	16,538	11	—	—	—	—	—
	Prince Edward's Island	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Newfoundland	526,380	1,205	—	3,882	—	789	—
	Total	623,908	31,157	17,491	5,788	8,178	20,437	59
1806.	Canada	1,316	1,527	100	359	—	100	—
	Nova-Scotia	85,410	44,949	972	280	10,388	1,532	709
	New Brunswick	11,023	240	16,566	4,660	—	19,173	39
	Cape-Breton	7,872	7	—	—	—	52	—
	Prince Edward's Island	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Newfoundland	699,198	1,304	—	2,662	—	1,136	9
	Total	804,819	48,027	17,638	7,961	10,388	21,993	757
1807.	Canada	150	275	—	28	—	—	—
	Nova-Scotia	87,824	51,359	388	11	12,666	111	—
	New Brunswick	13,654	202	12,265	1,538	—	13,975	3
	Cape-Breton	4,721	7	—	—	—	—	—
	Prince Edward's Island	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Newfoundland	525,188	1,333	—	2,669	—	2,080	92
	Total	631,537	53,176	12,653	4,246	12,566	16,166	95
1808.	Canada	800	154	—	346	—	484	—
	Nova-Scotia	97,962	42,567	604	1	15,687	248	—
	New Brunswick	22,244	153	1,812	2,815	—	20,215	349
	Cape-Breton	5,034	587	—	100	—	17	44
	Prince Edward's Island	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Newfoundland	569,754	1,792	25	2,253	29	2,660	157
	Total	695,794	45,253	2,441	5,515	15,716	23,62	550

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